Contesting Collective Representations of the Past:
The Politics of Memory in South Korea by Vink, Thomas
Contesting Collective
Representations of the Past:
The Politics of Memory in South
Korea
By
Thomas Vink
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Masters of Development Studies
School of Geography, Environment and Earth
Sciences
Victoria University of Wellington
Aotearoa New Zealand
March 2010
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to all those that I met during my time in Korea. Your hospitality
always amazed me. A big thank you to Sung-soo and Young-nan, for getting me started
in Korea, and for helping me whenever I was in need along the way. To my two host
families, I am particularly grateful. Thank you for accepting me so easily in to your lives
and sharing your homes, food and culture with me. A special thanks to all those who
had the patience to listen to my (often badly worded) questions and,  especially,  for
giving me so much in reply. You are this thesis and I hope that I have done your words
justice. Above all, I would like to thank Suyeong, Hyeong-Bok, Jin-Hwan and Beomhwi,
not only for being great friends, but also for your translation skills. I don’t know what I
would have done without you.
To  Stephen,  you  are  all  I  could  have  asked  for  in  a  supervisor  and  more.  I
thoroughly enjoyed working with and learning from you. Thanks for your always-swift
replies, your scrupulous editing and, most of all, for always being there. Throughout the
whole process you were like a massive trampoline underneath me as I blindly stumbled
along the thesis tightrope. You gave me the confidence to keep going and even take a
few leaps every now and then. To your wife, Mi-Young, my amazing Korean teacher,
thank you for welcoming me into your home and putting up with me all those weeks!
I  am grateful  to  all  the  office  staff,  lecturers  and  fellow students  within  the
school. You made university a very supportive environment to work in. I’d particularly
like to thank Sara Kindon. The courses I  took with you inspired this research and my
plans for the future. At times you have even been a second supervisor to me, a privilege
that I know most students do not receive.
For financial  support,  I  am very thankful  to Victoria University and Education
New Zealand.
ii
Finally, I would like to thank all my friends and family. You know who you are (if
you have the patience to read this, you are most likely one of them!). My brothers, flat-
mates, office buddies, friends around the globe; all  those who’ve written me emails,
given me phone  calls,  shared your  stories  –  your  lives  –  with  me;  those  who have
laughed with me, encouraged me, criticised me; every one of you is in here somewhere,
it may not resemble you very much, but you’re there nonetheless! A special thanks to
Mum and Dad. You may be on the other side of the world, but you’ve never felt far
away to me. Thanks for always being there to talk things over, for reading through all
the  bits  and  pieces  I  sent  to  you  over  the  months,  and most  importantly  for  your
unconditional  support, not only during my masters, but throughout my whole life at
university.
iii
Abstract
Because monuments, memorials and other ‘sites of memory’ privilege particular
collective interpretations of the past over others, they represent inherently contentious
and political spaces. Contention over representing the past is particularly resonant in
Korea, where sites of memory are imbued with strong, often polarised meanings. By
focusing on two such sites in Korea, this thesis seeks to discuss the wider implications of
the ongoing conflict over what representations of the past should be privileged.
In Gwangju, the area surrounding the former provincial hall (docheong) is being
redeveloped, part of the city’s attempts to become ‘reborn’ as a capital city of human
rights and democracy in Asia. However, to many citizens in Gwangju, this new image
ignores  the  meaning  that  the  city’s  dissident  past  holds  for  local  communal
understandings of identity. Conflict arose as citizens protested to keep the symbolism of
the docheong intact,  thus,  helping to maintain local narratives of the past.  In Seoul,
Myeongdong Cathedral, a key symbol of protest and democracy in the 1970s and 1980s,
is  now having its  meaning re-interpreted, as the Catholic Church de-couples religion
from socio-political concerns. The conflicting meanings of Myeongdong Cathedral are
representative of a wider divergence in Korean society, as apathy towards Korea’s past
grows  among society  at large while other segments appropriate the past  to protest
contemporary socio-political concerns.
Ultimately,  these  Korean  case  studies  emphasise  that  the  meanings  sites  of
memory convey are not fixed, and that groups are often able to appropriate sites to
affirm their own narratives of the past and to emphasise their own collective voice.
Therefore, sites that represent particular understandings of the past, while contentious,
also provide a space for debate and, thus, help to understand ongoing concerns within
wider society.
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Chapter One – Introduction: Contextual, Theoretical
and Personal Background
Overview
South  Korea’s1 rapid  rise  from  poverty  to  prominence  as  an  economic  and
technological powerhouse in a matter of decades is remarkable. Thus, to many around
the  world  today,  South  Korea  is  a  role  model  of  development  and  modernisation.
However, Korea’s economic success also masks a turbulent history of vast human rights
abuses. The growing strength of  democracy in Korea throughout the 1990s and the
state‘s move from  autocracy to a more populist  agenda  opened  the  way  for
investigations into Korea’s unsettled past. Recent decades in South Korea, then, have
seen a proliferation of memorials, monuments and commemorative activities related to
events and atrocities that occurred during the Korean War and Korea’s democratisation
movement (minjuhwa undong).
In Korea, the privileging of particular memories has very quickly been put to the
service of not merely nation-building, but the building of collective identities, with social
and political  groups appropriating sites with  historical  resonance to meet their  own
needs. As a result, the sites in which the past is memorialised have often become hugely
contested spaces. The overarching aspiration of this thesis is to investigate why so many
historical sites in Korea – so many sites of memory – become contested spaces, sites of
contention.
The forging of a collective identity requires the portrayal of a given reading of
the  past; the  past  is  re-interpreted  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  present.  However,
immediately questions arise: whose needs are being met? Whose narrative of the past
is privileged to build this collective identity? What voices are excluded? Therefore, the
contestation at sites of memory is not so much over what happened in the past, but
1 Henceforth referred to as Korea, except when contrasted with North Korea.
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rather who is entitled to speak for the past in the present. The chapters that follow
reveal that the conflict at sites of memory helps in understanding ongoing social and
political concerns within Korean society.
I spent March to June 2009 in Korea, carrying out research on two case study
sites that have great symbolic importance for Korea’s minjuhwa undong. However, as
interpretations and representations of the past are always changing and conflicting they
have also become sites of great contention.
One  case  study  is  the  former  Provincial  Hall  (docheong)  of  South  Jeolla,  in
Gwangju, a city in the south-west of Korea (see Figure 1 on page 3). The docheong was a
major rallying point for citizens during the ‘Gwangju Uprising’ in May 1980, and remains
an  important  symbol  in  remembering this  event.  The Jeolla  region  has  a  history  of
association with resistance and was largely excluded from government investment as
other  parts  of  the  country  rapidly  industrialised.  Gwangju,  too,  has  long  been  a
marginalised place and many citizens there now have an increasing desire to remold the
city’s image. Currently there are conflicts surrounding the construction of a new Asian
Cultural Center (ACC) as part of Gwangju’s attempts to become reborn as a capital of
culture,  human  rights  and  democracy  in  Asia.  A  number  of  associations  that  were
formed to uphold the memory of the Gwangju Uprising are concerned because the ACC
plans require the destruction of the docheong annex building (byeolgwan), and worry
that the ACC will not represent the Gwangju Uprising appropriately.
My other case study is Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul. The cathedral developed
a reputation as a safehaven for protesters during the 1970s and 1980s and became a
key symbol of democracy. More recently, however, Myeongdong Cathedral has been
trying  to  promote  a  new  image,  distancing  itself  from  its  past  reputation  and
emphasising  both its  religious  and  cultural  heritage.  The  situation  at  Myeongdong
Cathedral is also representative of a desire on the part of Catholic Church officials to
decouple religion and socio-political concerns.
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Figure 1: Map of South Korea (Seoul Maps and Orientation - World Guide to Seoul
2000-2010).
This  introductory  chapter  sets  out  the  contextual,  theoretical  and  personal
background of my thesis. First, I give a brief overview of contemporary Korean history,
focusing  on  events  that  led  to  the  present  situation, in  which contests  over  the
privileging of collective memories have become so prominent. The historical overview
will  illustrate  that  contestation  over  the representation  of  the  past has  become so
prominent because only in recent years have Koreans had the chance to examine closely
and critically the rapid changes of the last several decades. A review of the literature
related to  history  and memory studies,  as  it pertains to Korea, follows. After these
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contextual and theoretical discussions I address the personal aspects of the thesis by
giving my own reflections on the research process. Finally, I offer a summary of the
chapters to come.
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Historical Overview
“‘To understand history,’ Chacko said, ‘we have to go inside and listen to
what they are saying. And look at the books and the pictures on the wall.
And smell the smells’…
‘But we can’t go in,’ Chacko explained, ‘because we’ve been locked out. And
when we look in through the windows, all we see are shadows. And when we
try and listen, all we hear is a whispering. And we cannot understand the
whispering, because our minds have been invaded by a war. A war that we
have won and lost. The very worst sort of war. A war that captures dreams
and re-dreams them.’”
Arundhati Roy The God of Small Things (1997: 52-53).
The  20th century  in  Korea  was  characterised  by  contrast  and  change  as  the
peninsula experienced foreign occupation,  division,  war,  protest,  poverty  and  rapid
economic and industrial growth. From 1910 to 1945, the Korean peninsula was occupied
by  the  Japanese,  who  initiated  reforms  of  assimilation  designed  to  erase  Korean
nationality and conscripted Korean citizens as soldiers and comfort women. Following
liberation, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the Korean peninsula and
established governments in each half  that conformed to their own antagonistic Cold
War ideologies.  In 1950, war broke out between the two, resulting in the deaths of
millions of people before an armistice was signed in 1953.
South  Korea,  in  the 1950s,  was  characterised by  stark  poverty  and  post-war
development was almost entirely reliant on aid from the United States. In 1961, General
Park Chung-Hee took over the presidency in a military coup and went on to lead the
country for almost two decades. Under his leadership Korea went through a period of
rapid,  export-led  economic growth and industrialisation.  However,  Korea’s  economic
growth came on the back of harsh authoritarianism and ideological suppression; leftist
sentiment was seen as pro-North Korean and thus harshly condemned. Park also revised
the  constitution  in  order  to maintain  his  hold  on  power,  all  the  while suppressing
organised political opposition, controlling the media, and banning civil organisations not
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sponsored by the state (Yea, 2002). Labour conditions in Korea at the time were among
the worst in the world, and from the 1970s on widespread demonstrations occurred.
Korea’s  movement  for  democracy  began  its  first  tentative  steps  forward  as  some
members of the Catholic Church and liberal politicians like Kim Dae-Jung began to stand
up for social and political concerns. Following Park Chung-Hee’s assassination in 1979
came a brief period of quiet, but only two months later, General Chun Doo-Hwan seized
power in another military coup.
A crackdown by the government in May 1980 following demonstrations in Seoul
against the instigation of  martial  law resulted in  the closure  of  universities  and the
banning  of  political  activities  nationwide.  In  Gwangju,  students  clashed  with
paratroopers  in  front  of  the  gates  of  Jeonnam  University  on  the  18th of  May  to
demonstrate against its closing. The protests moved downtown and as more soldiers
arrived  in  the  city  the  clash  turned  into  a  violent  suppression.  By  the  21st of  May
gunfights had broken out and many citizens killed. The uprising ended on the 27 th of
May when an estimated 20,000 new troops were sent to the city. Due to a number of
factors, such as the historical marginalisation of Gwangju, regional tensions, and the fact
that Kim Dae-Jung,2 a key dissident at the time, was from Jeolla, the military crackdown
in Gwangju was much harsher than anywhere else in the country. The Gwangju Uprising
was brushed off by the government at the time, with their official  stance at a polar
opposite to local perceptions of the event. However, as international media coverage of
the uprising spread, and word gradually reached other parts of the country throughout
the 1980s, the government was widely condemned, never able to attain legitimacy due
to turning so brutally on its own people. The uprising also represented a turn towards
nationalist sentiments in Korea; the apparent complicity of the United States in Chun’s
rise to power, and in the uprising itself, resulted in a surge of anti-Americanism. The
Gwangju  Uprising  is  now  officially  recognised  by  the  government  as  the  “May  18
Democratic  Movement,” a key event in  Korea’s minjuhwa undong,  and had a major
2 Kim was convicted of instigating the “rebellion” and sentenced to death, though this sentence was later
reduced due to international outcries.
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influence on the demonstrations for democracy that followed. The event is also known
(sometimes revered) locally as 5.18 (o-il-pal), the date the uprising began. I generally
refer to the event as 5.18 throughout the thesis.
The period that followed 5.18 was one “of political inquietude when millions of
people marched in the streets protesting the military rule…[but] economic prosperity
enabled millions to found their middle class identities” (Kim Kyung-Hun, 2004:18). In
June 1987 alone, there were almost 3500 demonstrations held throughout the country
(Chung, 1997: 91-92) and, throughout the year, over 670,000 canisters of tear gas were
discharged by riot police in an attempt to contain the demonstrations (Chung, 1997:
84). On the 10th of June 1987 (otherwise known as 6.10) approximately one million
people gathered in Seoul to demonstrate against the Chun Doo-Hwan government.
Hundreds of protesters sought protection from riot police at Myeongdong Cathedral;
Catholic priests, led by Cardinal Kim Sou-Hwan, were also an integral element of the
1987  demonstrations.  The  sheer  size  and  scale  of  citizen  unrest  and  discontent
compelled Chun to stand down. Later that year Korea held its first direct democratic
elections.
In  Nov  1997, former  dissident Kim  Dae-Jung  was  elected, the  first  Korean
president  from  Jeolla Province,  ending  an  almost  40-year  run  of  presidents  from
Gyeongsang Province in the south-east of Korea.3 Regionalism has long had a major
influence on Korean political processes and been seen as a barrier to the establishment
of democracy (Yea, 2003: 117). Therefore, the election of Kim signalled the potential
decline of the regional influence on politics and, for the citizens of Jeolla, an end to
decades  of  neglect from  the  central  government.  Kim  Dae-Jung’s  presidency  also
represented  a  turn  away  from  conservatism  towards  more  liberal  policies,  and  he
3 Park Chung-Hee (president from 1961 to 1979), Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-1987), Roh Tae-Woo (1987-1992)
and Kim Young-Sam (1993-1998) were all born in Gyeongsang Province.
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remains well-known for initiating the “Sunshine Policy”4 towards North Korea, and his
historic meeting in 2000 in Pyeongyang with Kim Jong-Il.
The FIFA  World  Cup in  2002,  co-hosted  by  Korea  and  Japan, signalled  an
emphasis in Korea away from gathering as a form of dissent, as millions of Koreans came
together to  celebrate  their  collective  identity  as  Koreans rather  than  for  political
reasons.5 Under President Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2008) the progressive policies initiated
by Kim Dae-Jung continued. In 2005, under a new act set up to foster national unity by
investigating the truth of past events, the Korea Truth and Reconciliation Commission
was formed and scholarship related to revealing various non-hegemonic interpretations
of the past grew in scale.
 The election of Lee Myung-Bak of the conservative Grand National Party in 2008
saw the end of a ten-year period of progressive governance. Many citizens in Korea are
concerned that Lee has brought back aspects of the military-dominated past through a
greater use of riot police and by issuing laws that lessen the voice of civil society. These
concerns were highlighted most clearly during candlelight demonstrations in 2008 that
saw more  than one  million  people  gather  in  central  Seoul  to  protest  against  the
government.
The  sprawling  urban  metropolis  of  Seoul  that  represents  most  visitors’  first
impressions of Korea highlights the country’s transformation over a matter of decades
from poverty to a modern,  technologically  advanced global  economy.  However, as I
have highlighted in this historical overview, just below the surface lies a turbulent past
that many in Korea are still coming to terms with. As in the imagery of Arundhati Roy
above, until recent decades Korea’s history was a ‘locked door,’ the ‘windows’ hazed
4 The sunshine policy emphasised peaceful cooperation between the two nations as a prelude to eventual
reunification.
5 As Cho Han Hae-Joang states (2004: 21), “Koreans, for the first time in their history of nation-building,
experienced the euphoria of being together, a collectivity for itself, not for defense or antagonism.”
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over by the constraints that came from decades of occupation and authoritarianism. As
aspects of Korea’s history became more acknowledged in the 1990s – as the ‘lights’
turned on and the ‘shadows’ regressed – the contestation over whose readings of the
past were given importance also increased. Accordingly, research related to the conflict
over the privileging of particular understandings of the past also grew substantially. A
thorough reading of debates in the literature over the meaning of Korea’s past, and how
these  debates  are  informed  by  wider  studies  of  memory  and  history,  helps  to
understand the underlying meaning behind these contestations in Korea.
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Literature Review
Introduction
Within academia, the emergence of ‘sites of memory’ as a key area of study has
opened  the way  for  a  geographical  exploration  of  memory  and  history  scholarship.
Many academics are now interested in the link between contention over the use of
space and place, and the representation of specific narratives of the past. Memory as
described in this thesis is cultural memory and, thus, a collective remembering as well as
an  individual  remembering.  Collective  memory  is  based  on  a  perceived  shared
experience and understanding of the past. Sites of memory embody particular collective
memories  of  the past  and are,  thus,  inherently  contentious  and political  places.  To
understand this contestation over the use of place to represent particular memories
requires an analysis of the social constructions and ideologies that affirm some readings
of  the  past  over  others.  By  investigating whose  understandings  of  the  past  are
emphasised at two sites in Korea, I reveal underlying reasons behind the resonance of
contested memory in Korea, and the relationship of such contested memories to wider
concerns in Korean society.
Throughout this review I relate the literature on Korea with wider scholarship to
give a sense of why debates over space, place and identity take on such importance in
Korea. I begin by acknowledging how the research on contested memory in Korea fits
with  more  general  studies  of  history  and  memory.  I  then  examine  how specific
narratives of the past are privileged to create a sense of collective identity, not only in
Korea,  but  throughout  the  world.  Collective  identities  have  long  been  constructed
through memorials, monuments and museums that set given understandings of history
in ‘stone,’ although this process can have negative effects, which are also discussed.
Finally, I  describe how the contest over the privileging of particular narratives of the
past in Korea is an example of a wider global concern with attempts to reconcile the
past with the present.
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History and Memory
Sites  of  memory are  particularly  contentious  spaces  in  Korea because of  the
country's tumultuous history and the speed with which it changed over the second half
of the 20th Century. Michael Robinson (2007) points out that only since the 1990s, and
Korea’s democratisation, have Koreans begun to question the ‘obligation to forget’6 and
to  ask  what  was  really  lost  in  the  drive  to  modernise. The  study  of  contested
understandings of nation and identity in Korea fits  within a worldwide turn towards
memory studies, and mounting debates over the meanings of ‘history’ and ‘memory.’
Many  studies  of  memory  share  a  belief  that  the  distinction  between  history  and
memory is changing because, in recent decades, history has essentially been “speeding
up.”7 This “acceleration of history” refers to the link between globalisation and memory
and is  an idea used prominently  by Pierre Nora in his research (1989, 2002)  on the
“upsurge of memory.”8 Nora argues (2002) that “the most continuous or permanent
feature  of  the  modern  world  is  no  longer  continuity  or  permanence  but  change.”
Moreover, because we are forced to consume information more rapidly we must also
forget at a rapid pace (Todorov, 2001). For instance, in Korea, new political pressure on
remembering war and protest movements has also opened up spaces for the past not
only  to be remembered but  to be forgotten as  well.  As Sheila Jager & Rana Mitter
explain (2007: 14), “as long ‘forgotten’ war crimes are being brought out into the open
for public inspection, other crimes are being reburied in the name of re-establishing the
bonds of community torn apart by the cold war.” Thus, some scholars, such as Jager and
6 The ‘obligation to forget’ in Korea is representative of the way in which authoritarianism and human
rights abuses were justified by the ‘greater’ push to develop and industrialise, and to deal with the threat
of North Korea.
7 Huyssen, 2000; Klein, 2000; Kundera, 1979, 1984; Nora, 1989, 2002; Todorov, 2001.
8 Nora’s research focused on France as the first country to embark on an age of “memorialism.” In the
1970s,  with  the  end  of  revolutionary  ideas  in  France,  came  a  growing  awareness  of  the  historical
traditions that had been pushed aside since the ‘French Revolution’ of the late 18th Century (Nora, 2002).
Nora (1989)  argues that there was a turn towards lieux de memoire – sites of memory – in order to
protect these traditions and once more promote the idea of a national memory and thus a collective
identity. Following France there came a worldwide turn towards “memorialism” and an emergence of
initiatives related to “settling scores” with the past (Nora, 2002).
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Ji-Yul Kim, argue (2007: 251) that the new focus on commemorating the past is really a
different form of forgetting, “a new national strategy of memory-through-forgetting.”
Because interest over how collective understandings of the past are represented
has increased worldwide, Nora argues (2002) that the rhetoric of ‘memory’ has become
so broad and encompassing that it is now often used simply as a substitute for history.
The traditional view that history is objective and scientific and memory is subjective and
personal is now outdated; the distinction between memory and history is much more
complicated. The South Korean Presidential Truth Commission conducted research to
reveal the truth behind “suspicious deaths” that occurred during the Korean War and
the following years of authoritarianism in Korea and argue (2004: 527) that “history is
not simply something that happened in the past.” To ignore history9 increases the risk
that  future  groups  will  face  the  same  issues  (South  Korean  Presidential  Truth
Commission, 2004). Bringing the past into the present, therefore, is about more than
just memory, because all interpretations of history are acts of remembering. Instead,
interpretations  of  the  past  need  reflection  and  an  active  attempt  to  create
understanding.  As  Alessandro  Portelli  states  (1991:  52),  “memory  is  not  a  passive
depository of facts, but an active process of creation of meanings.” Because memory
can create meaning, emphasising particular memories over others has become a major
way of building on a collective sense of identity; by creating meaning from the past,
individuals  are  able  to  form  connections  between  each  other,  ties  that  bind  them
together.
Memory holds crucial importance to the individual. Nora argues (2002) that only
vestiges of the past remain, however, these snippets of the past “hold the key to our
“identity,” to who we are.” Because information is consumed so rapidly in today’s global
society  only  some  of  this  information  can  hold  individual  meaning.  Thus,  collective
memories of historical events – or rather representations of collective memories – are
9 In  the  case  of  South  Korea,  an  ideological  suppression  of  human  rights,  and  mass  murder  and
imprisonment.
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accentuated as a way to build on, or create, a given social group’s sense of identity; a
way of keeping a sense of place, nation or community in an increasingly globalised and
changing world. However, privileging given collective readings of the past immediately
raises the question of which events are given importance: what is considered important
to remember, what is ‘forgotten,’ and who has the power to decide? Different sets of
people remember different things, so whose memories determine collective memory?
The clash  over  what  memories  are emphasised –  what  is  ‘remembered’  and
what is ‘forgotten’ – in a social group’s history is widely discussed in the literature. 10 For
example,  Darien  Rozentals  studies  (2008)  how  urban  monuments  act  as  spaces  for
forgetting by exploring case studies in Lithuania, Japan and England. Rozentals speaks
(2008: 2) of “the binary of memory and amnesia,” arguing that there cannot be one
without the other, and seeks to find new forms of representation that can ‘reclaim’
memory back from where it  has been ‘forgotten.’  Remembering or privileging some
events necessarily requires that other events be given less importance or that they even
be forgotten. For Huyssen (2000: 38) the remembering/forgetting binary is necessary
because human memory is short, social, “always transitory, notoriously unreliable, and
haunted by forgetting.” Put simply, “memory without forgetting is impossible” (Zehfuss,
2006: 226).
As with any binary, conflict exists over which half is more significant. In the case
of memory, the debate is between the merits of remembering or forgetting: is it more
important  to  ‘remember’  or  ‘forget’  when  building  collective  identity? Friedrich
Nietzsche argues (1969: 57-58) that forgetfulness is like a doorkeeper that keeps out the
pain and grief of the past. Overcoming pain requires forgetting because “only that which
never ceases to hurt stays in the memory” (Nietzsche, 1969: 61). Paul Ricoeur is less
cynical  about memory,  claiming that  there is  a  tendency in history to celebrate the
victors,  but  often  more  can  be  learnt  from  those  who have  suffered:  “the  duty  to
remember is a duty to teach” (Ricoeur, 1999: 10-11). Acclaimed movie director, Luis
Bunuel, asserts (1983: 5) that there is in fact no life without memory: “our memory is
10 Hodgkin and Radstone, 2003; Huyssen, 1995, 1996, 2000; Klein, 2000; Passerini, 2003; Ricoeur, 1999;
Rozentals, 2008; Todorov, 2001; Zehfuss, 2006.
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our coherence, our reason, our feeling, even our action. Without it, we are nothing.”
Anna Funder, who explores memory issues in Germany following the fall of the Berlin
Wall, asks an important set of questions (2003: 52), what is healthier, “to remember or
forget…to demolish it or fence it off? To dig it up, or leave it lie in the ground?” This
question above  all –  of  memory  or  forgetting  –  is  widely  explored  in  memory
scholarship. However, the debate over what to ‘remember’ or ‘forget’ when building
collective identities is unresolved. Remembering and forgetting both have merits and
consequences  so  perhaps  more  scholarship  should  look  at  the  different  ways  of
remembering and forgetting rather than dichotomising the two notions.
Whatever  the  arguments  for  and  against forgetting,  commentators  generally
agree that forgetting (or the erasure of certain memories) plays an important role in the
creation of identity generally, and more specifically in relation to a collective identity.11
In his seminal work, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson argues (1991: 201) that
national identity is built through “reminders” of “already forgotten tragedies.” Following
the  same  link  –  between  nation  and  memory  –  Katherine  Hodgkin  and  Susannah
Radstone (2003a) claim that memory dispersed in a public sphere is inseparable from
discourses of national identity and Pierre Nora states (1989: 15) that every social group
must redefine identity through the “revitalisation” of its own history.
In Korea, the late 1990s saw a surge of work on 5.18 and the minjuhwa undong,
and associated issues of  memory.  Much of  this  work is  related to so-called minjung
nationalism and attempts by Korean citizens to create new narratives of the past.12 The
minjung are  variously  defined  as  the  masses,  the  people,  or  the  grassroots,  and
comprise those “who are made peripheral to, or alienated from, the political process”
(Shin, 1998: 161). Thus, minjung culture revolved around attempts to re-articulate the
voices of ‘the people’ to depict past protesters as victims, or ‘sufferers’ (Ward, 1995).
11 Anderson,  1991;  Bhaba,  1990;  Huyssen,  1995;  Klein,  2000;  Morris-Suzuki,  2005;  Nora,  1989,  2002;
Ricoeur, 1999; White, 1997.
12 Byun, 2000; Chung & Rhyu et al, 2003; Choi, 1999; Jager, 2003; Jung Keun-Sik, 2000, 2003; South Korea
Presidential Truth Commission, 2004; Shin, 1998, 2006; Shin & Kyung 2003; Wells, 1995; Yea, 1999, 2000,
2002, 2003.
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Around this victim construct a collective sense of history and identity could be built,
separated  from  past  state-dominated perceptions of  identity. In  other  words,  the
minjung movement was a way to “revitalise” (cf. Nora, 1989: 15) Korean history to give
previously marginalised identities more prominence.
To construct national identity by redefining or appropriating history implies that
identity is constructed via the sanctioning of some memories over others. Homi Bhabha
(1990) argues that all ideas of nationhood are shaped by ‘narratives.’ His research builds
on the idea of amnesia with a discussion of how identity, principally national identity, is
intersected by the “obligation to forget,” or “forgetting to remember” (Bhabha, 1990:
310). Bruce Cumings applies Bhabha’s notion of amnesia to an appraisal of how Korean
War memory is privileged or ‘forgotten,’ claiming (2007a: 270) that “you remember one
verdict  and  forget  the  other.  Each  verdict  implies  a  corresponding  amnesia.” Thus,
identity is built on narratives that are created by eliminating some events and accepting
others. Through  the  creation  of  these  narratives  the  past  is  related  to,  and  made
meaningful in, the present. By communally remembering a given aspect of the past,
individuals create a sense of collective belonging (Morris-Suzuki, 2005: 23). Discussions
regarding the intersection of  memory,  the Korea War and nationalism, for  example,
analyse how memory is appropriated for the creation of separate national identities in
North  and  South  Korea.13 Gi-Wook  Shin,  whose  research  (1998,  2006)  explores  the
creation of Korean identity,  argues that both North and South Korea have relied on
nationalist politics to legitimise their own regimes and de-legitimise the other’s. Sheila
Jager is similarly interested in the factors that have led to the creation of a Korean
‘national’ identity, and argues (2003: 118) that the meanings of the past in South Korea
have always been constituted and appropriated in the context of the promotion of state
legitimacy. In her reading, the struggle over how to deal with the North Korean nuclear
crisis and efforts to end the Korean War, for example, are caught up in the politics of
memory and the need for the South to accommodate the North in its national past and
future (Jager and Kim 2007: 265).
13 Cumings, 1997, 2003, 2007a; Jager, 2003; Jager and Kim, 2007; Jager and Mitter, 2007; Shin, 1998, 2006.
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If memory and collective/national identity are so intimately connected in Korea,
then it is worthwhile, even necessary, to interrogate the narratives of the past that are
currently  privileged, to  question  the narratives  of  the  past  around  which  Korean
collective and national identity is formed. In Korea and throughout the world, then, a
growing literature studies sites of memory in order to question whose readings of the
past are given importance in the present.
Landscapes of Memory
“He thought each memory recalled must do some violence to its origins. As
in a party game. Say the word and pass it on. So be sparing. What you alter
in the remembering has yet a reality, known or not.”
Cormac McCarthy The Road (2006: 131).
As the ‘acceleration’  of history has coincided with a rise in ‘forgetting,’ then,
throughout  the  world  collective  memories  of  given  social  groups  have  become
increasingly displayed through memorials and monuments that set the past in ‘stone’
and prevent it from being forgotten. In Korea, too, since the late 1990s more effort has
been made to commemorate events like 5.18 and the Korean War through memorials
and other sites of memory. However, the sites of these physical representations of the
past, or what Hodgkin and Radstone (2003) term public statements about what the past
has  been,  have  become  hugely  contested  space,  in  Korea  and  worldwide.  This
contestation is not so much over what happened in the past, but rather who or what is
entitled to speak for the past in the present (Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003). The crux of the
arguments made in the literature is that sites of memory have an inherent capacity for
transformation and “come to act not only as spaces for representation and reinscription
of political  events…but also as sites of contention in and of  themselves” (Yea, 2002:
1571).  By  appropriating the meaning that  sites  of  memory hold, social  and political
groups are able to re-conceive and ‘invent’ various sites as places and spaces to meet
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their  own  needs:  “though  statues  might  be,  their meaning is  not  written  in  stone”
(Agnew, 1997: 322).
Memory scholarship shows that sites of memory rarely hold the same meaning
to individuals as to the state and this discrepancy inevitably leads to conflict.14 In the
context  of  her  research  into the  impact  that  the  commemoration  of  5.18  has  on
understandings of the event, Sallie Yea discusses (2002: 1570) the “ongoing connection
between  history,  memory  and  resistance/dissent.” Yea  describes  how  the  national
cemetery built in Gwangju to memorialise 5.18, has altered images of the event and the
city  by  inscribing  national  importance  to  the  event.  However,  the  “official
memorialisation of the uprising unleashed a profound paradox in which the very act of
official recognition failed to accommodate these populist claims which were at the very
core of  the uprising itself”  (Yea, 2002:  1561-1562).  The case study explored by Yea
exemplifies how sites of memory are increasingly politicised as state forces realise the
potential  of  appropriating  these  sites  to  align  themselves  with  a  populist  historical
agenda. Besides Yea’s work,  there is little in  English about other sites of memory in
Gwangju.  Linda  Lewis  (2000,  2002,  and  with Byun  Ju-Na,  2003)  has  written  of  the
changing image of  Gwangju,  as  a  city,  looking specifically at  how  the  competing
interpretations held by individuals and the state have created an “identity crisis” within
the  5.18  movement.  Yea  (2002)  named  the  former sangmudae (a  prison  that  held
captive citizens during 5.18) and the area around the docheong, as the two other key
sites  in  what  many  Gwangju  residents  have  termed  Gwangju’s  “memorial  industry”
(ginyeom sa-eop) (cf. Yea, 2002: 1559), 15 but very little has been written about whose
collective understandings of the past are represented (and whose are marginalised) by
these sites.
14 See also Brenda Yeoh’s and Tan Bon Hui’s (1995)  discussion regarding the nature of Chinese burial
grounds in Singapore. They posit that space is a social and public product that holds interest to multiple
individuals and groups. Thus, burial grounds and other sites of memory are construed with a plurality of
diverse,  often antithetical,  meanings.  In  his  discussion  of  commemorating  the holocaust  in Germany,
Andrew Charlesworth (1994: 579) explains that the “very act of memorialisation, of capturing memory so
that we do not forget, can by its exclusivity push aside the claims of others for their own collective rights
and identities.”
15 The other key site is 5.18 National Cemetery.
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Many scholars also discuss the ways in which landscapes of memory are socially
produced (Kong & Law, 2002; Yea, 2002; Zelinsky, 1994). The key point to take from the
research into landscapes is that exploring the discourse around social constructions of
place and memory asks a question of something that is too often blindly accepted. Sites
of memory convey political messages – even subconscious and unintended messages –
that, until recent years, have been rarely studied (Yea, 2002). Lily Kong and Lisa Law
(2002) also examine the issue of socially constructed landscapes and state:
“To understand the contestations of landscapes involves unsettling extant
social  constructions  and exposing dominant  ideologies that  underlie  such
constructions, the institutions that aid those constructions, the groups that
are  privileged  by  them  and  the  urban  landscapes  that  naturalise  them”
(Kong and Law, 2002: 1504).
The study of landscapes, and the contestations within them, then, can act as a way of
uncovering  socially  produced  meaning  by,  what  Wilbur  Zelinsky  (1994:  29)  terms,
“peeling back” the central layers of our value systems and inviting all manner of social
and geographical questions. Accordingly, sites of memory act as spaces to debate the
relevance and meaning of the past for the present and the future. However, sometimes
imparting emphasis on particular aspects of the past can, conversely, distance the past
from the present, as the following section discusses.
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Invisible Monuments and the Sanitisation of History
“Anybody can stand quietly by the side of the road and allow glances to be
bestowed on him; these days we can demand more of monuments.”
Robert Musil Selected Writings (1986: 322).
Robert  Musil  once stated (1986:  320)  that  “there  is  nothing in  the world  as
invisible as monuments.” Now, some scholars claim that representing memory through
monuments  and  landscapes  is  unhelpful  and  that  sites  of  memory  actually  induce
forgetting.16 The argument that monuments are figures for forgetting relates to a point
made by Nora (1989: 7) that “there are lieux de memoire, sites of memory, because
there are no longer milieux de memoire, real environments of memory.” Real memory –
gestures,  habits,  skills  passed  down  through  generations,  unspoken  traditions  –  is
replaced  by  modern  memory,  which  is  “self-conscious,  historical,  individual,  and
archival…[and] necessitate[s] collective forgetting or amnesia” (Johnson, 1995: 54). In
Andreas Huyssen’s study of the German obsession with monuments he argues (1996:
199)  that  monuments  are  figures  for  forgetting  because  as  they  become  more
pervasive, the past becomes more invisible; because monuments act as symbols of the
past, they can often take the place of our memory.17 Sheila Jager and Ji-Yul Kim assert
(2007) that by placing the Korean War in a broader expanse of national history, what
they term “a larger story of the heroic overcoming of adversity” (p.30), the Korean War
Museum  in  Seoul  marginalises  the  actual  brutality  of  the  war.  Tessa  Morris-Suzuki
(2009) claims that the museum, for the most part, evokes “silence.” With a desire to
leave open a path to reconciliation with North Korea, the museum contains only small
references to massacres, by both North and South Korean troops, of prisoners of war
and civilians, thus, sanitising the atrocities of the war (Morris-Suzuki, 2009).
16 Bell, 2003; Gillis, 1994; Huyssen, 1996; Johnson, 1995; Klein, 2002; Nora, 1989.
17 Huyssen believes that the goal of Germany’s monumental obsession is redemption through memory. So
the events of the holocaust for example, can be redeemed by memorialising the victims. However, he also
claims (1996: 184) that this mass memorialisation actually obscures the events of the holocaust, thus,
equating to “entsorgung, the public disposal of radio-active historical waste.”
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The  turn  towards  memorialisation has  increased  a  tendency towards what
Kerwin  Klein  describes  (2000:  133)  as  “ironic  historical  representations  of
postmodernity.”  Monuments  and  museums  sanitise  history  by  promoting  certain
memories over others or marginalising the actual historical events they are dealing with
in  favour of images that  are easier  for people  to understand or relate to,  but may,
nevertheless, have less meaning. Anna Funder (2003, 2009) and Linda Richter (1999)
both claim that many sites of memory have become ‘disneyfied’ because they privilege
benign  narratives  of historical  events.  For  example, Funder  (2003:  276)  writes  that
monuments to the Berlin wall are “sanitised Disney version[s]…[they represent] history,
airbrushed for effect.”18 Linda Lewis (2002a), too, notes a touristic emphasis in Gwangju,
where  5.18  now  has  its  own  mascot  and  souvenir  items  related  to  the  event  are
available at various gift shops. Lewis (2000, 2002, 2003) and Yea (2002) both discuss, in
depth, the potential sanitisation of 5.18 that has occurred by memorialising the event.
Milan Kundera claims (1984: 278) that, ironically, “before we are forgotten, we
will be turned into kitsch.”19 Kitsch refers to the creation of ‘sanitised’ views of the world
in order to exclude the things that people find difficult to come to terms with. If we take
this line  of thought then sites of  memory are  sanitised representations of the past,
‘dumbed  down’  and  lacking  in  meaning.  Memorialising  an  event  in  a  museum,  for
example, implies that interpretations of the event are over, that the event is history.
This  causes  problems,  in  the  case  of  commemoration,  when  the  events  being “put
behind glass” (Funder, 2003: 276) are not yet over, when readings of the event (such as
the collapse of the German Democratic Republic, the Korean War or 5.18) are still being
constructed. Therefore, monuments, and commemoration in general, can be used for
exclusionary ends, as catalysts to forgetting or accepting an event, of which the meaning
18 Likewise  the  new  museum  to  the  ‘German  Democratic  Republic’  (GDR)  deals  in  tourism  and
memorabilia and yet, Funder (2009) argues, even now twenty years later, there are still people for whom
the GDR exists, at least as a representation of their identity. Interpretations of the GDR are ongoing, but
the sanitised  views  of  the GDR painted by memorials  and museums are becoming,  amongst  younger
generations, the reality and marginalising the actual events that occurred (Funder, 2009).
19 Kitsch is  the unoriginal  mass production of  cultural  icons,  but  Kundera relates it  to  totalitarianism,
particularly in relation to his country of birth, the Czech Republic.
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is still being contested. In other words, rather than memorials ensuring that nothing is
lost, they ensure that only certain things are not (Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003).
Critics of monumentalism and memorialism have been termed part of an ‘anti-
monument  movement.’  They  argue, along  the  same  lines  as  Bell  (2003:  73), that
“buildings, archives, poems and all the other artefacts, symbols and rituals that cultures
imbue with meaning, do not remember. And neither are they necessarily spurs to us
remembering.” According to Gillis (1994), then, this movement calls for the return to
memory as an everyday part of life, going back to Nora’s aforementioned milieux de
memoire, real environments of memory, and rejecting memory sites, rejecting sanitised
memory, rejecting kitsch. In this way, Gillis argues, the gap between the past and the
present – between memory and history – can be closed.
Contesting the Past in the Present: Global Concerns with Memory
“The  struggle  of  man  against  power  is  the  struggle  of  memory  against
forgetting.”
Milan Kundera The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (1979: 4).
The global spread of memorialisation that we are currently witnessing (Bell 2003,
2006; Huyssen 2000; Nora 1989, 2002), has called forth increasing examples of attempts
to ‘decenter’ history. The globalisation of specific responses to memory is seen most
prominently in the pervasiveness of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (Bell, 2006),
and a  ‘world-wide  memorialism’ involving attempts  to  reconcile  the  past  with  the
present (Nora, 2002). Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established in
2005  as  the  relatively  progressive  Roh  Moo-Hyun  government  emphasised  a  need
among Koreans to uncover more of the truth about past events. Attempts to ‘recover
memory’ have spread worldwide: in Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of  the Soviet  Union, in  Latin  America  following the fall  of  military
dictatorships, in  South  Africa  following  the  end  of  Apartheid.  This  global  memory
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recovery still exists today, with truth and reconciliation commissions now established in
countries as diverse as South Africa, Chile, Peru, Fiji, Sierra Leone, and even Canada and
the United States.
The past continues to haunt the present, as the responses to the wars of the
1990s, such as the Gulf War, civil wars in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, and the Kosovo War,
highlight (Bell, 2006). In Chile, this haunting, in the form of reverberations from years of
right-wing military dictatorships, has enabled political action, with social reconciliation
acting as a tool to collectively resolve the wrongs of the past (Frazier, 1999: 110). In
post-Apartheid South Africa the desire to re-interpret colonial history has led to the
creation of a more superficially appealing narrative of past atrocities, but one that also
fails to really address the “spectre” of the past (Meskall, 2006: 16).
National unity and memory also go hand in hand in many countries without truth
commissions.20 However, the implications that conflicts over representing the past have
on wider development issues are less widely explored, particularly in Asia, where many
countries are going through transitional periods of governance and identity in which
memory has proven to be a key issue (Bell 2006). Because perceptions of the past can
deligitimise previous regimes and support new claims of legitimacy, there is a “dearth of
research on landscape contests” (Lily and Law 2002: 1508). Erishna Naidu, in her work
on community-centred  approaches to  memorialisation  in  the  Vaal  region  of  South
Africa, contends (2004: 1) that processes related to memory and memorialisation play a
significant role in reconciliation because of their ability to mediate between the past and
the present. There is potential to look beyond nationalist agendas to the impact that
20 For  example, Matthew  McDonald  (2009)  and  Paula  Hamilton  (2003)  argue  that  in  Australia,
commemoration of Australia’s role in World War One, particularly in relation to Gallipoli, is celebrated as
a ‘baptism of fire,’ marking the emergence of the Australian nation (Hamilton, 2003). Japan continues to
struggle in its quest for a particular cultural identity, in the context of globalisation, the loss of ‘old Japan’
and as a way of coming to terms with the horrors of war  memory (Saaler  and Schwentker,  2008).  In
Indonesia  (Adams,  1997)  and  Malaysia  (Kalb,  1997)  also,  memory  is  playing  an  increasing  role  in
reconciling state and local  conceptions of identity. These few examples  are representative  of a much
wider  scholarly  emphasis  on  more  inclusive  and  redemption-driven  attempts  to  (re)build  national
memory and identity.
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sites of memory, and the contests within them, have on a country’s interaction with its
neighbouring countries and the rest of the world.
By 1996 Nancy Abelmann (1996: 226) could write that, in South Korea, the 1980s
had  become  distant  and  receded  into  “history.” Furthermore,  the  state  has  now
appropriated many minjung concerns for its own populist claims and, therefore, some
argue  that minjung ideology,  too,  has  lost  relevance  (Lewis,  2002;  Yea,  2002).21 An
expanding  literature  now focuses  on  Korea’s  growing  multiculturalism  and  global
identity.22 With an increasing number of migrant workers and marriage immigrants now
living in Korea,23 more individuals are questioning the make-up of the Korean nation,
which historically has been built on the idea of Korea as homogenous and unified. While
the  concept  of  the minjung,  which posits  populist  forces  as  the  crucial  agents  of
historical progress and change, was important for Korea as it went through the process
of  democratisation,  its  dichotomising  tendencies  contradict  the  growing
acknowledgement of Korea as a multicultural, multiethnic society (Shin, 2006). Likewise,
sites of memory in Korea no longer represent the same links to resistance (and to the
minjung movement) as in the past. Instead, many of these sites (such as 5.18 National
Cemetery, or the Korea War Museum) were constructed by the state for the purposes of
national  unity and attempts to move on from the past. In Gwangju,  throughout the
1990s,  many  citizens  were  able  to  reclaim  their  identities  by  promoting  their  own
narratives of  the past.  Now, however,  these identities have also been appropriated,
conveyed  in  terms  of  national  and  Asia-wide  discussions  of  democracy  and  human
rights, and disconnected from the social issues of the 1980s (Lewis, 2002). Nonetheless,
conflicts  and  discussions  over whose  narratives of  Korea’s  past are  given  emphasis
remain. For  Linda  Lewis  (2002), many  individuals  in  Gwangju  still  offer  a  ‘counter-
history’ to the increasingly nationalistic portrayal of 5.18, a point that will be highlighted
21 Note that this is already dated; minjung has become even less relevant with the passage of another
decade.
22 Hwang & Jang, 2009; Jeong, 2008; Kim Andrew Eungi, 2009; Kim Youngok, 2007; Lim, 2009; Shin, 2006.
23 The number of foreign residents rose from 380,000 in 1997 to over one million in 2007 (Jeong, 2008).
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in  the  discussions  that  come  in  the  following  chapters.  Likewise,  the  recent
establishment of official organisations that seek to be more open about the past, such
as  the  Korea  Truth  and  Reconciliation  Commission,  indicate  that  history  still  holds
contemporary relevance in Korea.
In  recent  years  more  groups  have  been  given  the  chance  to  voice  and
commemorate their interpretations of the past, not only in Korea, but worldwide. Linda
Richter  argues  (1999)  that  while  the  number  of  heritage  sites  commemorating  the
marginalised has ‘exploded’ globally, this explosion has also increased contestation by
involving more interested parties.  Unlike  history,  “memory has acquired all  the new
privileges and prestige of a popular protest movement” (Nora, 2002). South Korea is an
example of this ‘explosion,’ and the city of Gwangju presents the most contested site
and is symbolic of the subaltern. The ongoing contestation over memory in South Korea,
and especially in the city of Gwangju, thus, offers an example of the increasing global
concern with memory and attempts to reconcile the past with the present
Summary
This literature review has discussed various contests over the representation of
the past in Korea and how these contests relate to wider studies of history and memory.
In Korea, and throughout the world, conflict over the meaning of place and space has
increased in recent decades, and is related to the emergence of sites of memory within
the  more  general  discourses  of  history  and  memory.  By  representing  given
understandings of memory through place – sites of memory – individuals and groups
privilege  narratives  around  which  collective  understandings  of  identity  can  be  built.
However,  emphasising a particular interpretation of the past  can also exclude other
voices and, thus, sites of memory become contentious and political spaces.
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Reflections on the Research Process
Before I conclude this chapter, I offer a personal and reflective discussion of the
research process: the motives, desires and fears I had when developing plans for my
research; the fun, the sadness, the dilemmas faced and the lessons learned in the field;
and the long, frustrating task of turning my research into a thesis.
In the early stages of building a thesis topic I was interested in how meaning and
power/identity relations are constructed in, and represented through, place and space.
My interest was brought on by a graduate class, which examined the geographies of
power, place and identity, and was informed by discourses surrounding power relations,
such as (post)feminism, post-structuralism and post-colonialism. This class opened my
mind to the innumerable conflicts that come up in relation to interpretations of place
and space. Elizabeth Teather states (2000), for instance, that landscapes of memory are
the contexts of, and hold the potential for, confrontations between profoundly different
discourses. This idea of discourse – as “a material condition (or set of conditions) which
enables and constrains the socially productive ‘imagination’” (McHoul and Grace, 1993:
5) – is  hugely important to the study of sites of memory. The conflict  of discourses
within sites of memory fascinated me because memory is such a subjective and socially
constructed notion. Principally, I am influenced by the post-structuralist viewpoint that
power  is  exercised  through  the  production  of  knowledge  and  truth,  and  that  all
‘knowledges’  and  ‘truths’  are  subjective  and  contested.  Therefore,  memory  can  be
conceived of as praxis rather than text, as an ongoing process of uncovering meaning.
The choice of Korea as a site to focus these initial theoretical ideas came later. I
am new to the field of Korean Studies. Only in 2008 did I learn what kimchi (spicy pickled
vegetable – the national dish) is and annyeong (hello) meant. I knew of key figures like
Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Il, that North Korea was isolated and involved in nuclear
proliferation, that there had been a war between the North and South in the mid 20 th
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Century, and that South Korea had co-hosted the 2002 Football World Cup. I was hardly
alone  in  having  such  basic  knowledge  of  Korea.  In  fact  this  widespread lack  of
knowledge  about  Korea  interested  me; the desire  to  look  at  something most  New
Zealanders do not study served as a reason why Korea became my research site. The
theoretical ideas that initially formed my plans for a thesis, like my background, also had
little direct connection to Korea. Ultimately, the choice of Korea as a research site was
an amalgamation of small things coming together, it’s as simple as that. Before I knew it
I  was  leaving  the  New  Zealand  summer  and  touching  down  in  near  freezing
temperatures at Incheon airport.
Of course, I needed to know more about Korea before beginning my fieldwork.
Scholarly  literature  has  provided  valuable  context  and  understanding.  My  reading
initially focused on Korean history, primarily since the Korean War. Meanwhile, I began
to study the language and to delve into Korean film. I continued to read sporadically
during my time in Korea. Much of this research gained specificity as I realised the niches
I wanted to explore. Obviously, my limited language skills have restricted the breadth of
my reading, an aspect of my research that I will always question. More specific research
since I returned to New Zealand has consisted of filling in gaps. Much of this reading is
dense and philosophical but, as shown in my literature review, it has been important for
me to go through these works and build my own understanding of the implications that
representing particular aspects of the past have, particularly in the context of Korea.
I look at my in-field research as split into two periods. The first, I now recognise,
was  a  time  to  find  my  feet  and  direction.  The  second  mainly  consisted  of  specific
interviews and travel between case study sites. Leaving Seoul for the first time after six
weeks completely changed my field experience, giving me a much broader conception
of Korea. Part of this was helped by finally choosing my case studies.
I  left  for Korea,  and spent  the first  weeks  of  my time there,  having not  yet
decided on the specifics of my research. What I learnt in this period contributed greatly
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to my overall understanding of Korean culture and society but, without case-studies,
never really felt like ‘research,’ it  was background. The sense of direction I felt after
finally  choosing  my  case-studies  changed  the  whole  nature  of  my  field  experience,
providing me with direction and confidence.
I decided that two case studies provided more advantages than one, and would
make my research more interesting, not only to read, but for me to carry out. Looking at
the docheong in Gwangju and Myeongdong Cathedral meant focussing on two slightly
different key moments of history and memory, 1980 and 1987 respectively, and two
very different  cities,  but  the two key cities  in  terms of  Korean democracy  protests:
Seoul,  the  capital,  and  Gwangju,  the  neglected  ‘outsider’  of  Korea’s  ‘imagined
geography’ (Yea, 1999: 230). Thus, part of having two case studies meant the ability to
compare attitudes and meanings held by people in Seoul with those in Gwangju.
When going through ethical approval processes (see Appendix One on page 113
for a copy of my Ethics Approval) I  developed the idea that I  would be carrying out
interviews  with  two  categories  of  people  about  my  research  –  ‘organisational
representatives’ and ‘site visitors’ – and that I would use a different structure, semi-
structured and informal respectively, to interview each of these types (See Appendix
Two and Appendix Three, on page 114 and 120 respectively, for copies of the Participant
Information  Sheets  and  Consent  Forms  that  were  used). In  reality,  the  distinction
between the two categories, and in how I carried out my interviews, proved almost non-
existent. Being flexible and hearing a wide range of opinions became more important
than the number and structure of interviews.
The informal nature of many of my interviews allowed for flexibility in whom I
spoke to and the information I gathered. However, it also meant that I rarely had any
background on the person I was talking to and, therefore, did not know the questions
that would best bring out their unique knowledge. By nature, I  am a relatively quiet
person and approaching random people was not easy for me to do, especially given
language and cultural differences. Many times I frustrated myself by turning away or
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making an excuse.  While  this  led  to missed opportunities,  overall  the nature of  my
research  was  character  and  confidence  building,  and  ultimately,  a  great  base  to
overcome some of my shyness and hear what ‘real’ Koreans had to say.
While  the  information  I  learned  from  interviews  forms  the  specific  and
legitimising base of my research, I would also like to acknowledge the importance of
more general conversations and experiences that I had throughout my stay. Whether
with friends, my host-family or just someone I met briefly at a gathering or backpackers,
the knowledge gained from these conversations – when people invited me into their
spaces – has really come to form the backbone of my current understanding of Korean
culture and of my research.
The little things made my experience real and brought me closer to Korea and its
people. It changed things for me to hear a friend recall her childhood in the late 1980s
when  tanks  and tear  gas  filled  the  streets,  or  talk  of  the  cousin  living  in  a  mental
institute as a result of brain damage inflicted by a police beating; or how as a child she
asked her mother – “what is it?” – on seeing a Caucasian person at the 1988 Seoul
Olympics; to hear another informant speak of dressing up in priest’s robes to escape
police, and jokingly explaining his arrest in the 1980s for being involved in an ‘anti-state
organisation’  on  the  basis  of  owning  a  copy  of The  Russian  Revolution,  before
completely  changing expression and soberly  recalling  that  he was “beaten like  hell”
because of this book. It moved me to see protesters get dragged away by police right in
front of me and to stand among hundreds of thousands of mourning Koreans at former
President Roh Moo-Hyun’s funeral. These conversations and experiences, rather than
the more academically substantive interviews I carried out, were what truly opened my
eyes and made my research feel real and important.
Friends and colleagues not only contributed to more personal understandings of
Korea, but were also involved in many of the interviews I carried out. Their involvement
brought up a range of benefits and complications.
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I  first  imagined that I  could carry out interviews without using Korean, but in
hindsight this was ignorant. The interviews I was able to carry out in Korean, with the
help  of  friends  translating,  provided  knowledge  that  has  become  essential  to  my
research. The hardest thing for me about using translators was that doing so took power
away from me. What I mean by power here is the ability to control the direction of an
interview: what questions are asked, what follow up is made to responses, what kind of
background is given. Initially I was relieved to have someone there to take the pressure
off me. But, very quickly, translation became a frustrating process. Because my friends
were  not  trained  translators  they felt uncomfortable  in  the  traditional  translation
format (ask a question, translate the question, receive answer, translate answer, ask
new  question,  translate  question…).  Rather,  translated  interviews  tended  to  be
conducted  almost  entirely  in  Korean  with  my  friend  taking  notes,  and  they  would
translate afterwards. Therefore, I had to discuss questions beforehand, which felt like I
was training friends to do my research for me. This structure meant being included and
excluded from conversations at the same time and interviews became disempowering
and mentally draining.
I have to always remind myself of the positives. Having any kind of translation at
all  immediately gave me more access to knowledge. The fact that almost half of the
most specific interviews I had were in Korean with a translator meant that this extra
knowledge  was  crucial.  While  it  may  have  been  less  frustrating  for  me  to  use
professional translators, I still feel that my friends were a better option. They knew me,
and my intentions and motives. They trusted me and I trusted them, which allowed for
much more personable, and therefore meaningful, conversations and interviews. During
the discussions that we had about the conversations they were a part of, my friends also
offered insights that I may have missed on my own. It was a great feeling to watch my
friends talking passionately about the topic I was researching – Korean people do care
about their history!
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Also important to my research was keeping a regularly updated diary. Writing
about interviews brought on new interpretations that I did not think about at the time.
More importantly, writing about my experiences helped me remember them. Most of
the reflections within this work and the narratives from my point of view are based on,
or  appropriated from, diary  entries  and the memories  brought  on by these entries.
Through a diary I  was also able to reflect upon the complications of living in Korean
society, and how these complications informed my work.
With my height, pale skin, freckles, blue eyes and red hair I definitely stand out
as a ‘foreigner’ within Korea, which Michael Breen (2004: x) describes as probably the
most homogenous place on earth. Being from another country and culture had both
advantages and disadvantages. As a foreigner I believe more leniencies were granted to
me in  terms of  following hierarchical  and cultural  protocols.  Often my friends were
shocked that I could approach organisations simply by phoning up and working my way
through the sections of power. Apart from the obvious disadvantages, such as language
and cultural misunderstandings, the main problem with being a foreigner was mental, as
I asked myself what right I had to research a topic that really has very little to do with
me.
Coming to terms with the ‘dressing up’ that was required of me in Korea also
took some time. An opinion of me could be based upon my business card and whether I
was wearing a suit (of course this is the case in some contexts everywhere, but was
much more extensive in Korea than I was used to). While not directly related to being
from a different country, religious differences also became important issues to consider.
I went to church more times in my three months in Korea than in my whole lifetime in
New  Zealand.  As  I  am  not  religious,  this  presented  some  difficulties,  and  further
requirements to ‘dress up.’  I  do not mean in terms of attending church – I  have no
problem attending church service generally – but rather, how I interacted with people at
church, or when talking about Myeongdong Cathedral. I believe that one of my friends,
when helping translate interviews, got into the habit of answering questions about my
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religion with the reply that my grandparents are Catholic (which is true, but ignored the
fact that I am not). I think it is safe to assume that many of the Christian Koreans I talked
to would have altered their replies based on assumptions about my religious beliefs.
After three months my research was over and I came back to New Zealand. One
of the hardest things about coming back was the sense that I, almost immediately, lost
the same level of personal association with my research. Thus, one of the concerns I
have always tried to pay attention to is attempting to keep a ‘foot’ in Korea. Writing a
thesis  is  a  constant  battle  to  make  sure  that  it  does  not  become a  piece  of  work
disassociated from a sense of personal attachment; a fight to, as Ruth Behar (1996: 9)
asserts, “bring the ethnographic moment back…to communicate the distance, which too
quickly starts to feel like an abyss, between what we saw and heard and our inability,
finally to do justice to it in our representations.” While it has been hard at times, I feel
like I have managed to keep the ‘Korean’ part of myself intact, and in some ways even
built on it. Building on the Korean part of my identity by reading Korean news and blogs,
emailing friends and former host-families, and continuing to study the language has also
brought a new level of interpretation to my research.
The process of coding my research and interview notes was a frustrating one.
Looking beyond the tediousness of the work, the most frustrating aspect was the way
that coding de-personalises individual voices. By taking sections of conversations from
their context and appropriating them to fit other categories, one loses the narrative that
makes these voices so meaningful in the first place. Therefore, keeping a sense of the
original context was important. Likewise, where possible I have referenced people by
name in order to keep the personal and contextual meaning intact. Of course, I have
adhered  to  ethical  guidelines  and  only  used  names  where  the  individual  gave  me
permission to do so. Everyone else is given a pseudonym or referenced more generally,
in  order  to  keep  their  confidentiality.  I  have  only  quoted people  who spoke  to  me
personally in English, given that the interviews carried out in Korean were interpreted
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through a translator.  The process of coding was not all  negative. Stepping back and
reorganising my research notes, ultimately, gave me a fresh perspective and a further
chance to reflect on my research and how the various aspects connected together.
My thesis is not a story, but I have tried to weave myself – stories of my own
experiences in Korea – into the text throughout. While all of the sections within that are
told from my point of view are summaries, amalgamations and expansions of journal
notes,  they  are  also  interpretations  of  these  notes  made  months  after  they  were
written. Therefore, they are built from my memory, of the events and of the meaning
behind  the  words  themselves.  Every  time  I  look  at  my  writing  I  remember  it  in  a
different  way  –  the  version  of  events  shifts  and  mutates  –  and  my  understanding
changes, so these ‘stories’ are representative of numerous times and states (and spaces)
of mind. As in the research I am exploring, any event can have multiple, complex and
often conflicting meanings. Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge that what is written in
this thesis is my understanding of the events that unfolded in my three months in Korea,
my interpretation of what others told me during that time, and my appropriation of
those words in order to create my own interpretation. Tying in my own experiences and
stories with those of the people I spoke to has been my way of attempting to break
holes  in  the  “fenced  boundary  between  emotion  and  intellect”  inherent  within
academia (Ruth Behar, 1996: 86).
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Outline of Thesis
The structure of my thesis took shape relatively quickly after I  returned from
Korea in June 2009. The core of my writing and of my research in general – and what
separates it  from other pieces of research – are the two case studies,  Myeongdong
Cathedral and the docheong, around which my thesis revolves. Chapters Two and Three
are descriptions of the situations I encountered during my fieldwork and analysis based
on  the  interviews  and  conversations  I  had  in  the  country,  as  well  as  scholarship
consulted back in New Zealand. I discuss the contestations and conflicts that have arisen
at  each site,  and the groups and individuals that have become involved, due to the
privileging of new readings of the past. The comparative chapter that follows consists of
my own reflections and judgments regarding the conflicts I witnessed at the docheong
and Myeongdong Cathedral,  and my attempt to relate  this  fieldwork to theory and
existing  literature.  Chapter  Five  acts  as  an  epilogue  and  has  grown  out  of  extra
reflections  and  narratives  regarding  the  contestation  over  representing  particular
aspects of the past. This chapter moves beyond my two case study sites, and sets my
research within the larger Korean context. I reflect on my experiences as a whole and
discuss  why  the  contestation  of  memory  is  so  resonant  in  Korea  and  why  I  think
collective memories of the past will continue to be contested in Korea for a long time to
come.
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Chapter Two – Case Study One: The Provincial Hall
(docheong) of Jeolla, in Gwangju
This place is being demolished…all citizens help us protect it, can’t you remember
the screams and the colour of blood in our province in May 1980?
Leaves fall on Gumnamno like…blood, blood, blood. Protect the 518 Provincial
Hall to the end.24
The clatter and murmurs from the office space and dining area disappear below,
as we walk through the hollow remains of this building that once housed citizens as they
prepared for their final stand against a military crackdown during the Gwangju Uprising
of May 1980. Floorboards  are  ripped up,  windows  are  cracked  or  smashed in,  light
sockets  hang  limply  from  the  ceilings,  post-it  notes  are  scattered  around  the  walls
demanding preservation of the building and, by extension, the memory of the uprising. I
have just finished talking to a couple of enthusiastic people from the Gwangju Uprising
Bereaved Family (BFA) and Wounded Persons Associations (WPA) and, with the help of
two friends who have come along to translate, have asked whether I could take a look
around this Gwangju landmark.
The bottom floor of the byeolgwan to the former docheong of South Jeolla has
been converted into temporary offices, where volunteers in the 5.18 associations have
meetings, make calls, answer emails and update their websites. Tubs of drinking water
line the walls,  instant coffee packs and plastic cups crowd the desks,  and chairs are
bunched sporadically throughout this muddled but seemingly ordered space. On the
second floor, a presentation has just finished – a group of 300 university students from
Gyeonggi Province (in the north-west) have come to Gwangju to learn about 5.18 as
part of a ‘Gwangju Pilgrimage’ (Gwangju seongji sullye) – and people have gathered in
the sparse kitchen and eating area. Some of the individuals I run into essentially live
24 My translation of two pieces of writing hung from the walls of the byeolgwan by protesters from the
5.18 associations (16/04/09). Original Korean:
- Phrase one = Igoteul Cheolgeohandamnida…1980 Nyeon 5 Wol, Gu Pibit Cheolgyureul Ge-eok
Hasimnika? I-Je Siminyeorobungeseo Jekyeo Jusipsi-o.
- Phrase Two = Kkot Ipcheorom Geumnamro-e…pi, pi, pi.
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here; whether working, eating or sleeping, this building has become the focus of their
lives.
As we make our way up the flights of stairs, the reality of the situation becomes
clearer.  One overly  literal English  rendering  for byeolgwan in  Korean  dictionaries is
‘outhouse,’25 and in  some ways the unintended connotations are almost  fitting.  The
building was left out of plans to construct a new ACC in the area, overshadowed by the
more pervasive symbolism of the former docheong building beside it. Now it’s a shell,
filled with echoing empty space and set for destruction. The main reason the byeolgwan
remains standing is the people camped out below. Up on the roof a flag of Korea hangs
limply  in  the  still  air.  Looking  down  on  May  18  Democracy  Plaza  and  towards
Geumnamno brings to my mind the dozens of images I have seen commemorating the
gatherings, the battles, and the deaths that occurred here. In the other direction there is
nothing but dirt and machinery, the remains of this neighbourhood.
The docheong in Gwangju is located at the crossroads of a key intersection on
Geumnamno,  one  of  the  main  arteries  in  downtown  Gwangju.  With  most  of  the
surrounding  buildings  demolished  the docheong stands out  even more  than  in  past
images of the area. The building, though, is most well-known as a key site of resistance
during  the  Gwangju  Uprising  (5.18) and  now  represents  an  important  symbol  in
remembering this event. In 2008, construction was begun on an Asian Cultural Center
(ACC)  in  and around the docheong as government officials  progressed with plans to
promote Gwangju as a hub city of Asian culture.
This chapter draws on the conflict that arose when this construction began to
discuss the contestation over the ongoing re-interpretation of 5.18, and its meaning, in
Gwangju and Korea. The history of Gwangju, which is associated with marginalisation
and protest, has contributed to the creation of a resistant and dissident image of the
city. Therefore, I  begin the discussion by  documenting  the historical  background  of
Gwangju,  making particular  note of the uprising that  the city  is  famous for  and the
25  “ ( ) [Byeolgwan]): an annex 《to a building》; an extension; an outhouse; an outbuilding”
(Naver Korean-English Dictionary, 2009).
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buildings that now symbolise this uprising. I then give an overview of the ‘Hub City of
Asian Culture’ (HCAC) (Asia Munhwa Jungsim Dosi Gwangju) project before describing
the conflict that arose over the construction of the ACC, including the groups involved
and  the  concerns  they  raised.  The  discussion  then  turns  to  the  underlying  reasons
behind the docheong conflict. The contested meaning of the site is illustrative of a larger
issue over how to negotiate competing understandings of 5.18 in Gwangju. Rather than
the construction of the ACC, the key issue at stake is the impact that re-interpretations
of 5.18 have for the city of Gwangju and its citizens.
Memory in Gwangju: City of Darkness versus City of Light
The Chinese characters that give Gwangju its name literally mean ‘city of light.’
However,  the city  has a dark past in which, as a result  of consistent neglect  by the
government, it became the site of many large protests and a resistance movement, and
developed a reputation as home to a radical, ‘rough-edged’ population. Gwangju is most
well-known for the uprising there from the 18th to 27th of May 1980. The uprising, 5.18,
has become one of the most re-interpreted, contested and debated events in Korean
history and is widely cited as an important, if not the most important, moment in South
Korea’s minjuhwa undong.26
The docheong was constructed in 1930 during the Japanese occupation of Korea
and is best known as the key rallying point for citizens to organise resistance during
5.18. On  the  21st of  May  1980, the  first  mass  shooting  of  Gwangju  citizens  by
paratroopers took place in front of the docheong. Five days later, on the night of the
26th, approximately 150 people gathered at the docheong to protect the building from
as many as 20,000 new military troops sent in to ‘re-capture’ the city. These 150 people
26 For example, former President Kim Young-Sam (in Choi Jungwoon, 1999: 36) has stated that “blood in
Gwangju was fertiliser for this country's democracy” and Mr. Seo, a university professor in Gwangju who
asked for confidentiality, has called it the key weapon in the mobilisation for democracy (Pers. Comm.
17/04/09).
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made their final stand in the byeolgwan in the early hours of the morning on the 27th of
May 1980 (Chung Sangyong, Rhyu Simin, et al, 2003: 360 and 366). Official government
statements  following  the  event  denounced  the  uprising  as  a  rebellion  and,  in  the
following years, Gwangju came to be viewed as a center of resistance, “a city of outlaws
– evok[ing]  the historical  treachery of  the periphery against  the state” (Linda Lewis
1988b in 2002b: 90).27
The image of Gwangju as a city of resistance relates to a history in which the
Jeolla provinces are chronicled by annals of dissent (Yea 1999). In the “imagined map”
(Yea,  1999:  230)  of  South Korea’s  political  geography,  Jeolla is figured as a  deviant,
resistant and marginalised space, an image that goes back at least as far as the Donghak
(Eastern  learning)  Peasant  Rebellion  of  1894-1895,  which  started  in  Jeolla.  Jeolla’s
dissident history is closely wedded to its agrarian landscape, or rather that the province
remained agrarian while other parts of the country industrialised. Gwangju, and Jeolla in
general, largely missed out on the investment and rapid development in other parts of
the country during South Korea’s economic boom, which occurred from the 1960s on.
While cities  like  Busan,  Masan  and  Pohang,  in  President  Park  Chung-Hee’s  home
province  of  Gyeongsang,  in  the  southwest  of  Korea,  underwent  rapid  industrial
development, Jeolla was largely disregarded. Thus, north and south Jeolla, “were left
alone to feed rice to Japan in the colonial period, and they were left alone again as the
[Park Chung-Hee] regime  poured all kinds of new investment into the southeast [North
and  South  Gyeongsang  provinces]”  (Cumings,  1999:  21).  Therefore,  the  discursive
construction of Jeolla as a resistant  space is  strongly related to long-held frustration
amongst its citizens following decades of marginalisation. Images of Jeolla and Gwangju
have changed since Korea democratised after  1987, most  notably  after 5.18 gained
official  recognition  as  a  nationally  important  event  in  Korea’s minjuhwa  undong.
27 Accurately counting the number of fatalities attributed to 5.18 is impossible, but estimates have been
made. According to Gwangju Metropolitan City data obtained in 1999, 163 died during the turmoil of 5.18
(Na Kahn-Chae, 2008: 712). The HCAC information centre states that 3872 people had harm inflicted on
them, which includes not only 166 deaths, but 64 missing and 3642 arrested. Others argue that closer to
2000 people were killed during 5.18 (Katsiaficas, 2003: 263).
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However, many of the old stereotypes remain and Gwangju continues to be associated
with dissent.
Increasingly,  the connotations of dissent  have become unacceptable to many
residents  in  the Jeolla  region.  Therefore,  attempts  to change the regions image are
being made. This is particularly the case in Gwangju, which was the capital of South
Jeolla province until 2006, when the provincial headquarters were re-located to Muan,28
leaving Gwangju’s docheong without a use. In the lead up to this relocation, and as early
as 1995, plans over how to use the building were discussed. In 2002, as part of his
presidential  campaign, Roh Moo-Hyun made an assurance that, if  elected,  he would
initiate plans to see Gwangju become a cultural capital. Jeolla citizens were a major
source of support for Roh’s successful presidential bid, and his assurance materialised in
the form of a ‘gift’ back to the province, not only for their support but also to make up
for the  ill-treatment  and  marginalisation that the  Jeolla  provinces,  and  Gwangju
especially, had experienced in the past.
The HCAC  project was  initially presented in November  2003,  but  not  until
December 2005, after a contest, was the final design for the ACC was chosen. Approval
for  the final  plan was given  by  the  Chairman  of  the  Presidential  Committee29 in
September 2007, and a public announcement regarding the ‘Hub City’ project was made
in October 2007 (HCAC Information Centre, 2009). The HCAC project consists of four
phases, begun in 2004 with completion set for 2023 (HCAC DVD, 2008).
The  ACC  is  scheduled  to  open  in  May  2012 and is  part  of  a  much  wider
development programme for Gwangju. By the time the final phase is completed in 2023,
28 This lies on the coast to the south-west of Gwangju.
29 The committee is officially  known as the Executive Agency for  Culture Cities  under the Ministry  of
Culture and Tourism (Munhwa Gwangwangbu Asia Munhwa Jungsim Dosi Chujindan), but I refer to it as
the presidential committee throughout the thesis. The committee was established in March 2004 (HCAC
website). Song Gi-So, the first chairman of the committee, supervised the whole process,  choosing the
design and taking it through the relevant approval processes (Mr. Ryu, a representative of  the HCAC
project who asked for confidentiality, Pers. Comm. 24/04/09).
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Gwangju, as the ‘Asia Hub City of Culture,’ will be comprised of seven cultural zones. 30
The ACC is part of the core zone, referred to as the “epicenter” or “cultural power plant”
of ‘Hub City’ (HCAC Information Centre, 2009). ‘HCAC – Gwangju’ is the single largest
cultural project in Korean history and its missions have a cultural focus: establishing the
ACC as  a  production center  for  cultural  contents,  developing a  culture-based  urban
environment,  promoting  the  arts  and  culture/tourism  industries  and  heightening
Gwangju’s status as a cultural exchange centre (HCAC Information Centre, 2009). More
specifically,  the ACC is  expected to raise  individual  quality of  life,  provide economic
growth for the Jeolla region, raise national prestige and build relationships throughout
Asia and worldwide (HCAC Information Centre, 2009). The goals of HCAC and the ACC
are  related  to  the  national  turn  towards  ‘culture  industries,’  and  more  specifically,
promoting Gwangju and the Jeolla region as a culture and green economy hub. Further
in  to  this  chapter  I  discuss  why  the goals  of  the  ACC,  and  the HCAC  project  more
generally, with their promotion of cultural and tourism industries, conflict with some
local understandings  of  the  site  and  the  city.  I  highlight  the  turn  towards  cultural
industries by first discussing recent changes in the Gwangju economy.
Gwangju Economy
Many officials and citizens in Gwangju hope to break away from the image of
Jeolla as a peripheral, marginal and radical place. Thus, a primary consideration behind
plans for the ACC is  the economic boost  of  improving Gwangju’s status  as  an Asian
capital of culture, human rights and democracy. During my fieldwork I  attended the
annual Gwangju  International  Peace  Forum,31 in  which a  number  of  academics  and
organisational representatives from throughout Asia gathered to discuss human rights
and democracy  in  the region.  Gwangju  itself  is recognised as  a symbolic  model for
30 The overall cost of the ‘Hub City’ project is estimated at 5.3 trillion won (approximately NZ $6.6 billion in
2010).  Of  this  53  percent  will  come  from  national  government  expenditure,  15  percent  from  local
(Gwangju) government expenditure, and the final 32 percent from “private capital” (HCAC DVD, 2008).
31 From May 15 to May 18 2009. Hosted by the May 18 Memorial Foundation.
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democratisation movements in  Asia,  and there  is  also  a  major  human  rights  award
named after the city.32 As Jung Keun-Sik states (2000: history-49), 5.18 “showed that
democracy was possible in the third world. Especially, its influence is ever increasing
among  south-eastern  Asian  democratisation  movement  groups  in  Thailand,  the
Philippines,  Myanmar,  and  Indonesia.”  Gwangju  activists are  now  also working in
solidarity  with  the likes  of  the Asian  Human  Rights  Commission  in  Hong  Kong,  the
Democratic Movement Organisation for Burma, and Human rights groups in Cambodia
(Katsiaficas and Na Kahn-Chae, 2003: 157).33
In addition to a new focus on international solidarity, Gwangju is emphasising
many other aspects of the economy, almost as if the city is rapidly trying to catch-up on
decades  of  neglect.  The  city  is  strengthening  its  status  as  a  center  for  industrial
production  and  export,  with  a  focus  on  three  leading  industries:  LED,  autos,  and
electronics, as part of a future-oriented economic outlook, and large corporations like
Samsung Electronics and KIA Motors have now set up factories in the city (Gwangju
Metropolitan City website). Many of the city’s universities, such as Jeonnam University,
Joseon University and Gwangju University, have developed strong national reputations
and  attract  students  from  around  the  country.  More  importantly,  in  terms  of  the
reputation of the city nationally and globally, the economic expansion of Gwangju in
recent years has been dominated by two streams of development, one made up of
large-scale cultural events and the infrastructure that holds these events, and the other,
constructions and events related to conveying particular memories of 5.18.
Examples of cultural  events  and infrastructure include the Gwangju Biennale,
Gwangju Kimchi Cultural Festival (Gwangju kimchi munhwa chukje), the Jeongyulseong
32 The ‘Gwangju Prize for Human Rights.’ It has a reputation as almost being like an Asian Nobel Peace
Prize.
33 Every year Gwangju also hosts an Asian Human Rights Folk School.  According to the 5.18 Memorial
Foundation, in 2009 there were representatives of 21 different organisations in attendance. These ranging
from Tuul Sleng Suicide Museum in Cambodia, to the Pirbhat Women’s Development Society Sindh in
Pakistan,  Taiwan  Truth  and  Reconciliation  Association,  National  Protection  and  Durable  Solutions  for
Internally Displaced Persons Project within the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the Youth Initiative in Nepal.
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Music  Festival  (Gwangju  Jeongyulseong  Gukje  Eumakje),  and  the  Kim  Dae-Jung
Convention  Center.  Currently  a  nationwide  campaign  is  trying  to  promote  unique
aspects  of  Korean culture: hangeul (the Korean  alphabet),  hansik (traditional  food),
hanbok (traditional clothing), hanok (traditional housing) and hanji (traditional paper)
(Korean  Tourism  Organisation  (KTO)  website,  2009).  The national  campaign  has a
regional  bent, and associates different regions  and  cities  with given aspects of  the
national  culture in  order  to  build  distinctive local identities.  The  cultural  events  in
Gwangju are part of the rise of this ‘culture industry’ in Korea and Jeolla’s new status as
the culture and green economy hub of Korea.
The first  major  construction built  to  memorialise  5.18 was the 5.18 National
Cemetery in Mangwol-dong, which opened in May 1997.34 The cemetery was created to
recover the honour of the people affected by 5.18, as explicitly desired by a number of
associations  set  up to  protect  the memory of  5.18.35 Approximately  550 people are
currently buried in the cemetery (see Figure 2 on page 42), which is now considered “a
democratic sacred ground for human rights activists” (HCAC information centre). More
recent developments related to memorialising 5.18 include the 5.18 Liberty Park36 and
the 5.18 Memorial Park and Culture Center (see Figure 3 on page 42). A ‘pilgrimage’ of
all  26 ‘important’ 5.18 sites,  from Jeonnam University to the ‘old’  5.18 Cemetery at
Mangwol-dong, is also possible and these sites can all be visited on a 5.18 bus.
34 And was officially recognised by the government as a national cemetery in 2002.
35 See page 46 for a description of these associations.
36 At the site of Sangmudae, a former court and prison, in which those arrested during 5.18 were held.
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Figure 2: 5.18 National Cemetery during 5.18 anniversary commemorations, Gwangju
(Photo: Thomas Vink, 18/05/09).
Figure 3: 5.18 Memorial Park and Culture Center. Gwangju (Photo: Thomas Vink,
18/04/09).
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The  Korean  term  for  Gwangju  pilgrimage  – Gwangju  seongji  sunrye37 – is
interesting to explore, especially when contrasted with the material that promotes the
pilgrimage itself. One of the implications of the term seongji is sacred place,38 which
indicates that Gwangju is, in some sense at least, considered a sacred space because of
its importance to the achievement of democracy in Korea. The 5.18 pilgrimage is widely
promoted in various tourist materials published by Gwangju Metropolitan City and the
May 18 Memorial Foundation. The 5.18 sites are represented by either the 5.18 mascot,
Nuxee, in the Gwangju City materials,  or cartoon images of burning buses, bandana-
wearing demonstrators and faceless riot police in the Memorial Foundation materials.
The connotations of Gwangju as a sacred space appear to contrast with the images
portrayed by the promotion material, which is a combination of comic relief and tourist
information.
Likewise,  the  sites  constructed  in  relation  to  the  memory  of  5.18 also  offer
“sanitised” readings of the event (cf. Funder, 2003: 276. See also Klein, 2000; Kundera,
1984;  Yea,  2002).  As  a collection  of  monumental  constructions,  wide  concrete
walkways,  emotion-charged  photo  exhibits and  video  displays, the  5.18  National
Cemetery resembles an open-air museum dedicated to 5.18 more than a cemetery. In
its original conception, 5.18 Memorial Park and Cultural Center was even presented as a
theme park: “May 18 Memorial Park and Theme Park” (Yea, 2002: 1559). Linda Lewis
also notes a touristic  emphasis,  or  “disneyfication,” (cf.  Yea,  2002;  Richter,  1999) of
5.18, when she states (2002a: 165-166) that “the twentieth anniversary [of 5.18] saw
the introduction of a cute cartoon 5.18 mascot, Nuxee, whose visage graces T-shirts,
post-cards, ballpoint pens and other souvenir items available for sale in the May 18
Cemetery gift shop.”
Many Gwangju citizens have termed the recent proliferation of memorials and
37 A phrase that I first heard when Gang Gu-Yeong of the 5.18 Wounded Persons Association used it, but
which is also seen in official material released by Gwangju Metropolitan City and the May 18 Memorial
Foundation.
38성지 ( ) [seongji] shrine, sacred place, the Holy Land (Naver Korean-English Dictionary, 2009).
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parks  dedicated  to  5.18  a  “memorial  industry”  (ginyeom  sa-eop)  (Yea,  2002:  1559).
However, the collective understandings of 5.18 in the city are increasingly influenced by
the promotion of Gwangju as a cultural capital. The desire to promote new images of
Gwangju over the memory of its tragic history is part of an increasingly widespread view
that, “Gwangju  cannot  sustain  itself  on  memorialising  5.18” (Mr.  Seo,  Pers.  Comm.
17/04/09). Individuals, like Mr. Seo, a university professor in Gwangju who asked for
confidentiality, see a need to break away from the 5.18 image in order to create a new
sense of place within the city. Catharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone claim (2003: 7)
that “to emphasise memory over history, perversely enough, can mean to remain past
rather than future-oriented.” That the memorialisation of 5.18 in Gwangju has been
termed an industry in itself indicates the influence that the event continues to hold on
the city. Nevertheless, the association of Gwangju with 5.18 is a key reason behind the
continuing image of Jeolla as a peripheral and marginal place. Therefore, the promotion
of new images of the city could act as a way of moving on from the past.
The  Gwangju  Biennale  is  an  example  of  the  conflict  over  emphasising  new
images in the city. The Biennale is a cultural event first organised in 1995, 50 years after
independence from Japan, “to uplift  the cultural value of the Gwangju spirit” (HCAC
Information  Centre,  2009).  Park  Hae-Gwang,  a  professor  of  Cultural  Sociology  at
Jeonnam University, claims that most people in Gwangju and Korea do not care about
the  Biennale  because  it  does  not  relate  to  5.18  and,  thus,  according  to  Park,  the
Biennale has failed to build a new image of Gwangju. However, to many others, the
Biennale is considered a major success, and the event attracts large numbers of people.
According to Matthew Kelley (2008), the organisers of the Biennale say that Gwangju’s
“tragic past” is an inspiration for their work today39 and Anna Schneider claims (2009)
that the Biennale is actually a more democratic space than a museum because it offers a
way to engage in the production of cultural value. The Biennale is recognised in Asia and
39 The  Biennale  also  “linked its  founding myth  to  the…May  18  uprising”  (Schneider,  2009)  and “was
founded to commemorate and honor the uprisings that led to the democratisation of South Korea” (Gioni,
2009).
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worldwide  as  a  leading  global  art  exhibition  and  as  the  largest  art  event  in  Korea
(Hoffmann, 2000; HCAC Website, 2008). Thus, the success of cultural events like the
Biennale is subjective to an individual sense of what the memory of 5.18 means. The use
of seongji in discussions of Gwangju suggests that there are many individuals within the
city who think of 5.18, and the buildings and landscapes that now represent its memory,
as sacred. Therefore, a major conflict exists in Gwangju over breaking away from the
image of the city as a resistant and marginalised space through cultural events like the
Biennale, and maintaining the connection to 5.18 that, to so many citizens in Gwangju,
represents a key aspect of their identities.
The National 5.18 Cemetery, which sought to create a national narrative of 5.18,
is another example of the conflict over which collective understandings of 5.18 are given
prominence. The old cemetery for the 5.18 victims was a space that enabled the on-
going connection between history, memory and resistance to be realised by Gwangju
citizens (Yea, 2002: 1570). Many local groups expressed concern that the new cemetery
would relegate the memory of 5.18 victims to history and marginalise the individual
meaning taken from the event in the name of national commemoration. With the HCAC
project  now  emphasising  international  connotations,  the  implications  the docheong
holds as a sacred historical space are also potentially being overtaken. The conflict at
the docheong is yet another contest over how to represent collective understandings of
5.18 in Gwangju.
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The Conflict
Out of concern for the memory of 5.18 and its victims, in the years following the
event, three associations (sadan beobin) developed40: the Minju Yugongja Yujoghoe or
‘Bereaved Family Association’ (BFA)41; the Minjuhwa Undong Busangjahoe or ‘Wounded
Persons Association’ (WPA)42; and the Yugongja Dongjehoe or ‘Detainees Association’
(DTA).43 Broadly speaking, the three 5.18 associations have five main goals44: the search
for the truth behind 5.18, the punishment of the people responsible for 5.18, to obtain
compensation  and/or  reparation  for  the  people  affected  by  5.18,  the  recovery  of
honour for those affected by 5.18, and the memorialisation of 5.18.
According  to  Kim  Byeong-In,  a  History  Professor  at  Jeonnam  University  in
Gwangju, the first three goals have been accomplished through the creation of a special
law45 that allowed for the prosecution of those responsible for 5.18; the fourth goal, the
recovery of honour, was brought about through the construction of the 5.18 National
Cemetery  at  Mangwol-dong;  and  the  fifth  goal,  memorialisation,  is  said  to  be
represented through the docheong.46 However, with the new plans to build the ACC, the
40 The English translations of the association names were made by Na Kahn Chae, 2008.
41 Established on the 31st of May 1980 (Lewis, 2002: 112). Family members or descendants of those who
died between the 18th and 28th of May 1980, are eligible for membership (Na Kahn-Chae, 2008: 712).
42 Established on the 13th of June 1982 (Lewis, 2002: 126). Membership is limited to one representative
from the immediate family of a person who was wounded or died during treatment received as a result of
5.18 (Na Kahn-Chae, 2008: 718).
43 No  official  establishment  date.  In  September  1980,  gatherings  amongst  family  members  began  in
relation to trials for those imprisoned as a result of 5.18. Over time these meetings became official (Na
Kahn-Chae,  2008:  722).  Those  detained  during  5.18,  and  their  family  members,  are  eligible  for
membership (Na Kahn-Chae, 2008: 721).
44 According to Kim Byeong-In, Pers. Comm. 25/05/09.
45 ‘Special Act on the May 18 Democratisation Movement,’ first passed on the 21 st of December 1995, with
various amendments made since.  This act prescribed prosecution rights against those who committed
criminal conduct around 5.18, provided guidelines for the payment and honorable treatment of those
affected  by  5.18,  and  provided  guidelines  for  how  the  government  could  promote  commemorative
projects  (May  18  Memorial  Foundation, A  Complete  Collection  of  the  Korea  Laws  and  Regulations
Concerning the May 18 Democratic Uprising, 2007).
46 Pers. Comm. 25/05/09.
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5.18 associations  have  expressed  concerns  over  whether  the ACC can  appropriately
represent the memory of 5.18 (See Figures 4 and 5 on pages 48 and 49 respectively for
images of the docheong and the planned ACC).
On the 24th of  June 2008,  the 5.18 DTA initiated a protest  over the need to
demolish the byeolgwan. The major argument made by protestors was that demolishing
the byeolgwan will reduce the symbolism of the site and diminish memories of 5.18 and
the family members who died there. By the 17th of February 2009, the DTA had been
persuaded  to  give  up  their  protest.  However,  at  this  time  the  other  two  5.18
associations, the BFA and WPA, had already moved in, stating that they would not leave
until  plans  were changed so that the byeolgwan would be preserved. Thus began a
stalemate.
From the information I gathered, there are two main reasons (openly spoken of)
why the government was reluctant to change plans for the ACC despite the protest:
increased cost and a matter of principle, as the plans had been agreed on by all parties
involved previously. According to Mr. Ryu, a representative of the HCAC project who
requested confidentiality, the committee would have had to fundamentally change the
architectural design of the complex in order to preserve the building.47 Furthermore,
changing the plans to conform to the demands of protesters would have cost around 20
billion won48 and delayed construction up to a year. Mr. Ryu also claims that the plans
for the ACC had been decided upon in 2005, and that the winning design was shown
throughout the city and then went through a series of open and democratic approval
processes. Most importantly, he asserts that the 5.18 associations agreed that the plans
could go ahead. Mr. Ryu claims that the presidents of the 5.18 associations attended a
meeting  three  years  before  the  protests  started, in  which the  demolition  of the
byeolgwan was discussed. I later obtained a copy of the evidence Mr. Ryu had talked
47 Pers. Comm. 24/04/09.
48 Approximately NZ$25 million in 2010.
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about, a Ministry  of  Culture,  Sport  and  Tourism  document that shows  that  the
presidents of all three 5.18 associations attended a meeting on the 18th of June 2005, in
which plans for the ACC – which showed that the byeolgwan would not be preserved –
were discussed. As one source who asked to remain confidential reasonably posits, it is
hard to believe that the Ministry of Culture would make documents like these up.
However, Gang Gu-Yeong, the WPA Director of Policy and Planning (Jeongchaek
Gihoek  Gukjang), stated (Pers.  Comm.  20/05/09) that  the bereaved  families  and
wounded persons had not been told about the demolition of the byeolgwan and that
the plans had been made without them. Gang also denied that changing the ACC plans
would  be  as  time-consuming  and  expensive  as Mr.  Ryu  had made  out.  The WPA
obtained a professional estimate, which, according to Gang, claims that the costs and
delays would be significantly less than suggested by the government.
Figure 4: The docheong (left) and the byeolgwan (right, covered in protest banners). In
the foreground is 5.18 Democratic Plaza. Gwangju (Photo: Thomas Vink, 17/04/09).
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Figure 5: Model of the completed Asian Cultural Center, with the byeolgwan removed.
HCAC Information Centre. Gwangju (Photo: Thomas Vink, 19/05/09).
As the conflict grew, more and more academics became involved in the issue. In
mid-April  2009,  19  professors  at  Jeonnam  University  signed  a  petition  to  save the
byeolgwan. Nonetheless, Mr. Ryu (Pers. Comm. 24/04/09) claims that, as with the 5.18
associations, a number of these professors had stated in 1995 that it was not important
to keep the byeolgwan in future developments in the docheong area. Mr. Ryu saw the
added interest in the ACC issue on their part as an appropriation of the memory of 5.18,
and claimed that both academia and the 5.18 associations were utilising the issue to
attack government policy in general. The conflict over the ACC became a struggle for
hegemony as the 5.18 associations hold quite a lot of power. However, Mr. Ryu claimed
that there is evidence that the relationships between and within the 5.18 groups are not
good and that they are working under ‘impure’ motives.
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Impurity and Fatigue
Mr.  Bae, an  organisational  representative  in  Gwangju  who  asked  for
confidentiality, asserts (Pers. Comm. 21/05/09) that the 5.18 associations are not ‘pure,’
by which he means that many in the associations are motivated by a desire for profit
and material gains. Mr. Bae also claims that the 5.18 groups are never satisfied and
always looking to make the most of new situations surrounding 5.18. As an example he
cited the case of Sangmudae, a former prison, which held detained citizens during 5.18.
In  2007,  the  government  wanted  to  build  an  education  center there,  but  the DTA
demonstrated and prevented it, arguing that their association should have a greater say
in how the center was built and operated. When the 5.18 Memorial Foundation building
opened  in  2001,  two  busloads  of  people  from  various  5.18 associations  came  and
demanded that  the profits  made from the vending machines at  the site go to their
associations (Mr. Bae, Pers. Comm. 21/05/09). Mr. Bae believes that the conflicts will
keep continuing, even after the complex is built, because the associations have political
heft and “are hungry for money all the time.” Likewise, Father Na Seung-Gu, a priest at
Sinwol-dong Cathedral in Seoul and a member of the Catholic Priests Association for
Justice (CPAJ), states (Pers. Comm. 02/06/09) that money is the most important issue
with the docheong,  and Kim Byeong-In similarly claims (Pers. Comm. 25/04/09) that the
5.18 associations focus on getting repayments from the government.
In  2002,  Linda  Lewis  argued  that  by  the  late  1990s  most  Gwangju  citizens
believed that the 5.18 associations had benefited sufficiently from the government and
that further demands were seen as self-serving and greedy; what separates the various
5.18  associations  from  each  other  (including  other  organisations  like  the  May  18
Memorial Foundation), is self-interest. Yet, the 5.18 associations appear to have grown
in  status,  achieving  greater  power,  in  recent  years. Mr.  Bae  alleges  (Pers.  Comm.
21/05/09) that if  these groups already had a similar  level of influence back in 1997,
when issues surrounding the 5.18 National Cemetery were being debated, the situation
may have turned out differently. However, according to Lewis (2002b) and Yea (2002),
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the key activists behind the construction of the new cemetery were bereaved family
members who believed that the old cemetery, small and hidden away from sight, did
not show appropriate honour to their dead family members. Thus, the construction of
the  monumental  new  5.18  National  Cemetery  was  a  success  for  the  BFA,  as  it
recognised the 5.18 dead as national heroes and ironically, according to Lewis (2002b:
122),  precluded any further demands. If  the BFA already achieved their  demands in
1997, and if, as Lewis argues, the public sympathy for the 5.18 associations had run its
course, then questions need to be asked here: If public sympathy is over, where is their
power coming from? What is the motivation for the continued demands from these
associations?
The growing  influence  of  the  5.18  associations clearly  follows  a  few  key
developments within Korean society. As Korea has democratised, some memories of
past events that were suppressed from general knowledge at the time have become
mainstreamed and commodified. 5.18, as an event and as a movement, has become
generally accepted as an important part of Korea’s past, rather than the mere incident it
was presented to be by government-controlled media at the time. Moreover, from 1998
to the end of 2007, South Korea had two relatively progressive presidents, Kim Dae-Jung
and Roh Moo-Hyun, who fostered an improved relationship between civil society and
the government. Kim Dae-Jung was the first elected President to have strong support
from the student-protest generation of the 1980s (the ‘386 generation’49). Even more so,
the election of liberal-minded Roh Moo-Hyun – a former human rights lawyer – in 2002
was seen as a triumph for the 386 generation, and for the first time Korea had a “leftist
government”  (Lankov,  2008).  Roh’s  administration  became  the  youngest  in  Korean
history with many of the 386 generation also represented on his staff (Lee, 2003). The
democratic ideals that were espoused so strongly during demonstrations in the 1980s
finally became part of mainstream politics and, during Kim’s and Roh’s presidencies, it
49 The “386 generation” (sam-pal-yuk sedae) was first termed in the 1990s and referred to those in their
30s (hence the ‘3’) who were starting to come into positions of power within Korean society, who had
attended University in the 1980s (hence the ‘8’) and were born in the 1960s (hence the ‘6’).
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became politically  correct  to pay attention to events related to commemorating the
minjuhwa undong. The recent progressions in Korean politics and society have given
groups like the 5.18 associations in Gwangju, credibility and power that they did not
have even as recently as 1997, when 5.18 National Cemetery was constructed.
Many now feel, however, that the 5.18 associations are using their new power
for gains not necessarily related to their five professed goals.50 Kim Byeong-In (Pers.
Comm. 27/05/09) states that the relationships between and within the associations are
strained, and Mr. Seo, a university professor in Gwangju who asked for confidentiality,
concurs, adding (Pers. Comm. 17/04/09) that the “activists are having problems in their
internal  leadership.”  The DTA is  perhaps the best  example of  these problems.  They
started the protests at the docheong, and “dragged” the other two 5.18 associations
into it (Mr. Bae, Pers. Comm. 21/05/09). When the government offered them the rights
to manage the docheong within the ACC and to make a profit from it, the DTA became
satisfied enough to leave.
Gang Gu-Yeong, though, believes that, to the 5.18 associations, the meaning of
the byeolgwan is greater than money; indeed, it overwhelms money. Gang claims (Pers.
Comm. 20/05/09) that there are eight key places within the docheong area related to
the symbolic representation of 5.18, including the byeolgwan. Whereas the docheong
itself  was  where key decisions  were  made by  Gwangju  citizens  during  5.18, the
byeolgwan was  where they lived and fought.  Gang maintains  that Koreans need to
remember this history, to remember the people who were arrested and killed there. He
believes that thought should be given to the value of the byeolgwan and the symbolism
that will be lost with it.
A good metaphor to represent Gang’s claims is the idea of “historical layers,” a
thought  that  Kim Byeong-In,  a  history professor  at  Jeonnam University  in  Gwangju,
mentioned when I interviewed him on the 25th of May 2009. According to Kim there are
three symbols represented through the docheong and its surrounding buildings. One is
anti-authoritarianism: the docheong is  a  symbol  of  democracy  and the fight  against
50 See p. 46.
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authority. Another symbol is community: the companionship and collective identity built
amongst Gwangju citizens during 5.18. Finally, the docheong is a symbol of those who
died in Gwangju during 5.18. At the time of the uprising the docheong became a site of
resistance. Following 5.18, and up until 1983, no memorials for 5.18 were allowed and
not until after democratisation in 1987 did memorial ceremonies become official events.
Thus, from 1980 to 1987, the docheong was an outlawed space. In more recent years,
the docheong has,  however, primarily represented a memorial  space. Now, with the
construction of the ACC, the ‘Gwangju spirit’ is being kept alive through new ways of
memorialising and commemorating (Kim Byeong-In, Pers. Comm. 25/05/09).
To Kim, the changing image of the docheong over time, and the three symbolic
meanings it now embodies, represent its historical layers. While the docheong is always
seen as a key symbol – the most pervasive symbol of 5.18 – to some, demolishing the
byeolgwan, too, is seen as a form of reconfiguring the symbolism of the site and thus
detracting from the area’s historical layers. Sheila Jager and Kim Ji-Yul argue (2007) that
the Korean War museum in Seoul places the Korean War within a larger narrative that
marginalises  the  event’s  actual  brutality.  I  believe  the  5.18  associations  too,  are
genuinely concerned that the ACC will  act in the same way. Thus, ‘monumentalising’
5.18 by getting rid of real sites of memory, like the byeolgwan, and replacing them with
alternate  but  more  sterile  memorialising  institutions like  the ACC could sanitise  the
memory of  what actually occurred during 5.18 or even cause it  to be forgotten (cf.
Funder, 2003: 276; Huyssen, 1996: 199; Musil, 1986: 320).
Despite the claims of the 5.18 associations being backed up by arguments in the
literature, a question still needs to be asked of whether they are actually damaging the
memory of  5.18 through their  continued appropriation of  the event.  For example,  I
believe  that  the  constant  interference  of  the  5.18  associations  in  memorialising
activities and developments has at least partly contributed to 5.18 fatigue in Gwangju
and throughout the country. A number of the people I interviewed (Park Hae-Gwang,
Lee Seong-Hun, Mr. Ryu, Mr. Seo, Mr. Bae) as well as academics like Linda Lewis (2002a:
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168) have mentioned a weariness or fatigue toward 5.18 felt by many Gwangju citizens
and, thus, a growing will to de-politicise, or potentially remove, the influence of 5.18 in
Gwangju. Getting rid of the byeolgwan, and diminishing the role of the docheong, is, in
their eyes, a step along the road to moving beyond 5.18.
Regionalism  has  also  contributed  to  the  growing  fatigue  related  to  5.18.
Although HCAC is the biggest government-funded cultural project in Korean history, few
outside Gwangju know about it, let alone the conflict surrounding the construction of
the ACC. Jung Hae-Gu, a Political Science professor at Seongkonghoe University in Seoul,
went so far as to assert (Pers. Comm. 13/05/09) that almost nobody in Seoul knows
anything about it and that it is an issue purely of interest in Gwangju, while Mr. Ryu,
exhibiting considerable frustration,  told me (Pers.  Comm. 24/04/09) the “rest  of the
country don’t care...don’t give  a  damn.”  Despite  recent  efforts  to  change the  way
Gwangju is depicted, the lack of interest in the ACC outside of the city suggests that
some  of  the  old  stereotypes  regarding  Gwangju  as  a  dissident  and  marginal  place
remain.  Gwangju  is  the sixth  most  populous51 city  in  Korea and yet,  amongst  some
Gwangju citizens,  feelings of neglect remain,  giving some individuals,  I  believe,  even
more reason to be weary of the continued appropriation of 5.18.
The  combination of  conflict  and  fatigue over  the commemoration of  5.18 in
Gwangju,  and  the  general  apathy  throughout  the  rest  of  the  country,  means  that
coming to an agreement has been a process that swings between vitriolic disputes and
studied silence and, therefore, a process lacking in progression towards a settlement:
“immobilism  [sic] pervades  over  Gwangju”  (Mr.  Seo,  Pers.  Comm.  17/04/09).  Kim
Byeong-In claims (Pers. Comm. 25/05/09) that money and time are not important, for if
the ACC is built, it will be a lasting institution with enormous potential to invigorate the
economy.  Whether or not the byeolgwan itself  is demolished,  ultimately,  is  not  the
most  important  issue.  More important is  the way given understandings  of  5.18 are
51 1.42 million people in 2007 (Gwangju Metropolitan City website). Behind Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon
and Daejeon.
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represented (Park  Hae-Gwang,  Pers.  Comm.  27/05/09),  and  the  symbolism  of the
building itself, the principles involved in deciding whether it will be preserved, and who
has a say in determining such issues.
Symbolism: What’s In a Name?
Great importance rests in the words that name a place or an event.  Korea is
currently  emphasising  the  creation  of ‘Hubs’  and  ‘Meccas’ in  conjunction  with  the
increasing  prominence  of  ‘culture  industries’ locally.  The  link  between  culture  and
naming has particular significance for building a specific cultural identity for a given site.
Thus Gwangju,  for  example,  is  being referred to  as  the ‘Hub City  of  Culture’  and a
‘Mecca of Democracy and Human Rights.’ Naming is also an important indicator of the
issues involved in the construction of the ACC.
In the days and months following 5.18, the government denounced the uprising
as  a  rebellion  or  a  political  conspiracy  led  by  then  dissident,  Kim  Dae-Jung,  and
regulated the press to prevent it from mentioning the truth about what happened in
Gwangju (Chung  Sangyong,  Rhyu  Simin,  et  al,  2003).  Many  activists,  in  Korea  and
globally,  offered  alternate  readings,  and  the  event  became  widely  known  as  the
Gwangju  Uprising  or  Massacre.  However,  it  was  not  until  years  later,  following the
achievement of democracy in the country, that 5.18 became officially recognised by the
government. More recently, official interpretations have removed the name of the city
itself and refer to 5.18 as the ‘5.18 Democratisation Movement.’ These interpretations
do rather “drain the blood from the event” (Lewis, 2002: 82).  However, this naming
recognises 5.18 as a mass political action rather than a mere incident and it also implies
more nationalistic relevance, rather than the regional or local focus the “Gwangju...”
implies.  The national  focus  is  also  evident within sites  of  memory in Gwangju:  5.18
National Cemetery, 5.18 Liberty Park and 5.18 Memorial Park, for example. A common
point within these names is the reference to 5.18, to the Gwangju Uprising, but without
the Gwangju focus. Regional division hindered the immediate recognition of the truth
behind 5.18, with the event reduced to a regional issue by the government (Jung, 2003:
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420). Thus, the new naming of the event, with its nationalising implications, suggests an
attempt  to  overcome  the  issue  of  regionalism  in  Korea,  and  the  historical
marginalisation of the Jeolla region.
While  the  names  of  the  new  developments  related  to  5.18  memory  are  all
“bloodless,”  to  quote Lewis  again,  at  least  they  clearly  evoke  the memory  of  5.18.
However, where is 5.18 or May 18 in the names associated with the ACC and HCAC
project? The name, Asia Munhwa Jeondang (literally, Asia Cultural Hall), is already up on
road signs and has been given to the closest subway stop, giving the impression that the
docheong is already history, and potentially (cf. Funder, 2003, 2009), on its way to being
forgotten.
Contradictions and Misunderstandings: The Bigger Picture
Contradictions and disagreements pervaded the discussions I had regarding the
construction of the ACC. Much of the conflict has been about one group disproving the
other and vice versa. In fact each side has produced books to back up their competing
arguments.52 Some claim (Gang Gu Yeong, Pers. Comm. 20/05/09; Kim Byeong-In, Pers.
Comm.  25/05/09) that  consensus  conveyed  that  the docheong and  its  surrounding
buildings were always to be preserved. Others (Mr. Ryu, Pers. Comm. 24/04/09; Mr.
Bae, Pers. Comm. 21/05/09) believe that as early as 1995 the consensus was that the
byeolgwan, and a number of other buildings in the area, could be demolished. Park Hae-
Gwang, an assistant professor of Cultural Sociology at Jeonnam University, believes that
the  ACC  plans  introduced  when Roh  Moo-Hyun  became president,  did  not  make  it
explicit that the byeolgwan would be torn down. The general population of Gwangju has
52 In  November  2008,  the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  Tourism  released  ‘Asia  Munhwa  Jeondangeuro
Saeropgetaeo Naneun Gu) Docheong Byeolgwan Chujingyeonggwa Bogoseo’ (Report for the Asia Cultural
Center on the ongoing progress with bringing forth evidence on the Provincial Hall annex building). Then,
in April 2009, the WPA and BFA jointly published ‘5.18 Minjuhwa Undong Sajeokji Yet Jeonnam Docheong
Byeolgwan Cheolgeo Gyeoljeong Gwajeongui Jaengjeomgwa Jinsil’ (Bringing the truth and disputing the
decision-making process regarding the demolition of the Jeonnam Provincial Hall annex building and the
achievements of the 5.18 democracy movement). (Note: my translations).
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been,  for  the  most  part,  left  out  of  discussions  (Park  Hae-Gwang,  Pers.  Comm.
27/05/09).
The general consensus within Gwangju is that the ACC should be built and that it
will benefit the city. Nonetheless, Park Hae-Gwang claims (Pers. Comm. 27/05/09) that
most people do not know about the proper plans and simply view the docheong as a
symbol. However, a wealth of information is available about what the ACC entails. I got
the  impression  that  most  people  were  unaware that  a HCAC  information  centre is
located across  the  road  from  the docheong on  Geumnamno.  Disseminating  HCAC
information more transparently would resolve many issues.
The plans for the ACC were made by artists [architects], who wanted to create an
aesthetically pleasing structure: “enlightenment in this old city” (Park Hae-Gwang, Pers.
Comm. 27/05/09). Park believes, however, that an artistic emphasis is not necessarily a
good way to represent a given understanding of the past. Other groups in Gwangju,
including the 5.18 associations, and many general citizens, are also of the opinion that
the ACC  cannot  properly  represent  5.18, because its design ignores  the docheong’s
symbolism, its historical layers. However, the bigger story behind the construction of the
ACC is worth noting. While the majority of the area surrounding the docheong has been
demolished  and  cleared,  the  intention  was  always  that  the  main  building  of  the
docheong be left as a memorial space because of its symbolism (Kim Byeong-In, Pers.
Comm. 25/05/09). According to a HCAC DVD (2008), the ACC is designed to remember
the spirit  of 5.18 and the meaning behind Gwangju’s history.  One only need look at
comments made by architect Kyu Sung-Woo, who designed the ACC plans, to see that
he indeed understood the meaning and symbolism inherent in this historic area:
“the overarching concept behind my design was the memory of
the May 18 Democratic Uprising.  Since the very site,  to begin
with,  is  associated  with  the  great  historical  event,  I  first  and
foremost thought of ways to conjure up such memories in the
mind  of  visitors…I  had  to  grapple  with  ways  to  preserve  and
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revive  the  dear  memories  of  the  site  where  the  May  18
Democratic Uprising took place.” 53
The docheong,  and other historical  sites for that matter,  are imbued with ‘layers of
history,’  symbols  that  hold  varying  and  often  contested  levels  of  meaning. The
comments  above  indicate  that  the  designers  behind  the  ACC  did  at  least  consider
symbolic and representative issues related to 5.18. However, while the docheong and
the byeolgwan do offer a clear symbol of the past, and help in remembering 5.18, bigger
issues are at stake in  representing  5.18  than  the  buildings  that  symbolise  it.  The
docheong and byeolgwan, as they stand, do not offer much more than symbols of 5.18,
even if that symbolism is affecting and important. Conversely, by providing a space for
people to learn about and debate the past, the ACC has the potential to do a better job
of representing multiple interpretations of 5.18, and the event’s importance to many
Gwangju citizens, than the docheong. An unanswered question now, given the state of
conflict, is whether the ACC will be able to bring about this desired result.
Conclusion
The  city  of  Gwangju  has  a  history  of  marginalisation  and  is  associated  with
resistance and dissent, most notably because of 5.18. To Gwangju’s citizens, 5.18 (both
the memories of it and the event itself), was essential to building a sense of collective
identity in the city. More recently, however, as the potential national and international
importance  of  5.18  was  recognised,  collective  memories  of  the  event  have  been
appropriated, creating contestation and conflict over which narratives of 5.18 are given
more  importance.  In  this  chapter,  I  have  discussed  the  recent  conflict  over  the
construction  of  an  Asian  Cultural  Center  in  Gwangju.  The  protests  made  by  5.18
associations  against  the  destruction  of  the byeolgwan,  a  building  with  important
symbolic resonance, are representative of a wider fear that the new emphasis on the
53 Kyu Sung-Woo is  an architect  of  Korean  descent,  who lives  and works  from  offices  in  Cambridge,
Massachusetts, in the United States. He was previously responsible for the Olympic Village at the 1988
Seoul Olympic Games (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, HCAC Website)
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city  as  an  Asian  hub  of  culture,  democracy  and  human  rights,  will  marginalise  the
meaning that 5.18 holds to local citizens.
Many of the images of Gwangju as a resistant and marginalised place remain.
The importance that 5.18 holds to the city is seen by many as a key reason behind the
persistence of these images.  Thus, an increasing number of Gwangju citizens have a
desire  to  remold  the  city’s  image.  Yet,  while  maintaining  the  relevance  of  5.18  in
Gwangju is clearly not desirable to everybody, for others, maintaining a sense of the
historical  layers  that  buildings  like  the docheong and  the byeolgwan represent,  is
essential to sustaining their sense of place and identity.  Ultimately, the conflict at the
docheong illustrates  that  the  process  by  which some memories of  the  past  are
emphasised over  others in  Korea,  especially  memories related to  5.18,  continues to
resonate with contention.
This  chapter  has  shown  that  contestation  over  the  privileging  of  particular
collective memories is  ongoing in Gwangju,  and that  the past  is  very much relevant
within this long-marginalised city.  However, to individuals in Seoul,  memories of the
past hold different connotations than they do to the citizens of Gwangju. In the next
chapter, I discuss the conflict over the emphasis on new understandings of the past at
another key site of memory in Korea, Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul, and show why
studying the cathedral helps to uncover different, but still important, concerns within
wider Korean society.
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Chapter Three – Case Study Two: Myeongdong
Cathedral in Seoul
I bustle through the barriers and up the stairs of Myeongdong subway station
and burst through into the bright lights and busy streets of one of the largest fashion
districts  in  the  world. That  one  of  Korea’s  most  important  historical  sites  (and  a
cathedral at that) is located amidst a sprawl of consumerism – short skirts, ice cream
waffles, iced coffees, business suits, camera-toting tourists, banks, and rows and rows of
clothing stores – strikes me as somehow distinctly Korean. I walk through the densely
populated streets, listening to the clatter of  high heels and the ear-splitting yells  of
colourful ‘human billboards’ (people wearing signs that promote nearby merchandise)
and evading stalls sizzling with fried food. Mopeds race by, dodging me on the way to
make their next delivery. I try to glimpse the Myeongdong Cathedral spires through this
glass and concrete jungle but sighting the building is almost impossible. Eventually, I
make my way past some road works and lift my eyes to see the sun-drenched bricks of
the first cathedral built in Korea. At the foot of the path leading up a small hill to the
cathedral I pass a temporary building, where people can sign up to donate their organs
when they die.54 Then the obligatory newspaper  stand,  instant  coffee machines and
Ajumma (middle-aged woman) peddling jewellery.
I  walk  up  to  the  cathedral,  picturesque,  silhouetted  against  the  hazy  blue
afternoon sky.  A service has just  finished and people are meandering down the hill,
opening their umbrellas or pulling down visors to block the sun, preparing themselves as
they head back into Seoul’s busy streets. I turn my head and follow their gazes to the
snapshot  of  globalisation below;  Korea  Securities  Corp,  Royal  Hotel,  Paris  Baguette,
Holly’s Coffee, Starbucks, the YMCA, various banks and restaurants, and a norae-bang
(karaoke room) line the street. Myeongdong Cathedral still offers a trip to the past in a
city of constant change. Stepping inside the oaken doors and into the cool air from the
mugginess of outside is like stepping into another world. The silence is eerie after the
54 A practice – ‘one body, one spirit’ – made popular by the late Cardinal Kim Sou-Hwan, who died on the
16th of February 2009 and donated his corneas to posterity.
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constant  hum of the streets.  I  find it  hard to imagine the history – both tragic and
uplifting – surrounding this place of asylum. Perhaps it is understandable, then, that
many  today  can  no  longer  relate  to  this  site  that  once  served  as  an  unparalleled
safehaven for protest in Korea.
Myeongdong Cathedral (See Figure 6 on page 62) represents the headquarters of
the Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Seoul. In the 1970s and 1980s, the cathedral
became increasingly involved in Korea’s fledgling steps toward democracy, developing
into one of the most important sites of protest  against authoritarianism and human
rights  violations  in  the  country.  This  chapter  documents  the  changing  identity  of
Myeongdong Cathedral over the years, focusing on how the history of the cathedral’s
involvement  with  Korea’s minjuhwa  undong is  now  being  represented.  First,  I  give
background on how the cathedral came to be associated with the minjuhwa undong and
socio-political demonstrations in Korea. The discussion then moves to shifting depictions
of  the  cathedral  with  the  coming  of  democracy  in  Korea,  and  changing  opinions
regarding  the  involvement  of  the  Catholic  Church  in  Korean  socio-political  issues.
Individuals whom I interviewed during my field research in Korea generally expressed
two contrasting views: firstly, that Korea, politically and socially, is in a better situation
than ever, and secondly, that Korean democracy is actually deteriorating in recent years.
I  consider,  therefore,  the way in  which  changing opinions over  the state  of  Korean
politics and society have affected the role of the Catholic Church and how the Church’s
changing position is related to an increasing disconnection, in official circles, between
religion  and  socio-political  concerns.  Finally,  I  discuss  a  potentially  growing  apathy
throughout wider Korean society towards history, and to social and political issues in the
present. The situation at Myeongdong Cathedral, where Church officials now focus on
religion and culture over democracy  and human rights, is  symbolic  of  a  contrast  in
Korean society between this  growing apathy and a continuing culture of  protest,  as
growing numbers question the country’s democracy.
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Figure 6: Myeongdong Cathedral, Seoul (Photo: Thomas Vink, 07/05/09).
Changing Identities: Painting a Picture of Myeongdong Cathedral
Built in 1898 for the first Catholic parish in Korea,55 Myeongdong Cathedral has
survived  relatively  unscathed  through  a  tumultuous  period  of  Korean  history:  from
Japanese imperialism in the first half of the 20th Century, through the Korean War and
then the decades of authoritarianism that followed. After its initial  construction, the
cathedral  dominated  the  skyline.  Now,  following  Korea’s  development  boom,
Myeongdong Cathedral is surrounded, the skyline dominated behind, by Seoul tower;
and in front, by the warrens of shops, hotels and restaurants of Myeongdong,56 and the
55 On the site of the first Catholic gathering in Korea, which occurred in 1785 (Inshil Choe Yoon, 2007:
365).
56 Myeongdong ranks  as  the  world’s  11th-most  expensive  shopping  district  in  terms  of  rental  rates,
according to  a report by the New York-based consulting firm Cushman & Wakefield  (Kim Hyung-Eun,
2009).
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towering office buildings and teaming traffic of Chungmuro and Euljiro. While the Seoul
skyline grew around it, Myeongdong Cathedral remained largely untouched and now
represents an important historical site and tourist spot. However, the cathedral is most
well known for being a site of pro-democracy gatherings during the 1970s and 1980s,
and its continued appropriation as a ‘site of resistance’ since then.
Christianity  has  been  widely  embraced  by  Korea  and  when  Protestants  and
Catholics are combined57 can now claim more adherents than any other religion in the
country. 58 59 The distinct Korean appropriation of Christianity is representative of the
fact that it has often been seen as a symbol of three phenomena which seldom coincide:
modernity,  compassion  and  social  justice  (Lankov,  2007:  194). In  Korea,  Christian
Churches have frequently been associated with Western knowledge and education, and
because Korea was never colonised or occupied by a Christian nation, Christianity does
not  held  the same associations  with  an  oppressor  as  it  does for  some other  Asian
countries. In fact, given Japan’s occupation of Korea, where Shintoism was often pushed
on to the Korean population, Christianity offered distinctly anti-colonial connotations.
In the post-Korean War period Protestantism expanded its emphasis on social
outreach60; thus, offering support to South Koreans by bringing a sense of community
57 Koreans are inclined to draw a distinction between these two denominations of Christianity: “In terms
of their theology, church organisation, and experience, Korean Catholics and Protestants do not normally
see themselves as belonging to the same tradition or even the same religion” (Clark, 2002: 188).
58 This  statement  only  holds  if  we  discount  ancestor  worship  in  Confucianism.  As  James  Grayson
comments (2002:  234),  long  after  its  loss  of  effective  political  influence,  “Confucian  thought  still
dominates the thinking of the majority of the Korean people and it exercises a degree of influence on the
folk religion, Buddhism and Christianity.”
59 In Asia, South Korea is third only to East Timor and the Philippines in terms of the proportion of the
population that is Christian and if only Protestant denominations are taken into account then Korea has
the  highest  proportion  in  Asia.  In  2003,  the  South  Korean  government,  based  on  a  partial  census,
estimated  that  54  percent  of  Korean  citizens  had  a  religious  affiliation  (25.3  percent  Buddhist,  19.8
percent Protestant, 7.4 percent Catholic) (Baker, 2007: 3). This is up slightly on official data from the 1995
census (23.2 percent Buddhist, 19.7 percent Protestant and 6.6 percent Catholic) (for full summary of
1995 Korea census religious data see Grayson, 2002, p. 249).
60 Projects with labourers and prostitutes, and education, for example.
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and equality (Grayson, 2002: 164). As a result of the new emphasis, membership in the
Protestant Church doubled from 3 percent of the total Korean population in the late
1950s to 6 percent in the late 1960s (Grayson, 2002: 164). The adoption of evangelical
methods (p. 165),61 the “Koreanisation” of the clergy, and the increased urbanisation of
the Church also helped the rapid development of both the Protestant and the Catholic
Churches in the post-war period (Grayson, 2002: 234).
While Protestantism was the dominant Christian denomination in the post-war
period, from the 1970s through the 1980s, the Catholic Church grew in prominence as
one of the few institutions that criticised the military dictatorships. A major reason the
Catholic  Church  became  more  involved  than  the  Protestant  Church  in  issues
surrounding human rights and democracy is that Korean Catholicism has traditionally
been more representative of lower social classes and had fewer ties to the government.
62 As James Grayson (2002: 175) explains,
“more so than Protestants, Catholics have been noticeably involved in social
movements concerned with the welfare of the industrial worker in Korea’s
rapidly changing society which is undoubtedly a reflection of the roots of the
church in the poorer sector of society.”
What’s more, among Catholics a “ghetto mentality” also persisted until the late 1970s.
This mentality was established through years of persecution experienced by followers of
Catholicism going back to the Joseon period (Grayson, 2002: 171).63 In contrast to the
Catholic Church’s association with the poor, from the 1950s onwards, the Protestant
Church emphasised ‘Church Growth’ (gyohwe seongjang) and, thus, became associated
61 Charismatic ministers being the most notable example.
62 With prominent Catholics such as politician, Kim Dae-Jung and poet Kim Ji-ha (famous for his satirical
attacks on the Park government) voicing such strong criticism, Catholicism also became identified with the
opposition (Clark, 2002: 196).
63 From the early  1800s  up  until  the  1870s,  followers  of  Catholicism were  severely  persecuted.  This
included the “Great Persecution” of 1866-1871, where some 8000 believers were executed (the most
severe persecution in the entire 500 year history of the Joseon dynasty) (Grayson, 2002: 146).
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with wealthier  sections  of  Korean  society  (Grayson,  2002:  164).  Denominational
fragmentation within Protestantism has also impeded a united Protestant response to
social concerns.64
The Catholic Church’s involvement in the minjuhwa undong was initiated in the
mid-1960s  when  the  ‘Second  Vatican  Council’  (1962-1965)  pursued  an ecumenical
emphasis within the Catholic Church (Grayson, 2002: 234). As a result of the Vatican’s
new emphasis, progressive movements arose in many Catholicised parts of the world,
including South Korea. Liberation theology is a movement, predominantly within the
Roman Catholic Church, that attempts to unite theology with sociopolitical concerns;
known in Korean as minjung sinhak (literally, theology for the people or for the masses),
it has had a strong influence on Korean priests. With its aim of overcoming exploitation
and  injustice,  liberation  theology  is  also  strongly  associated  with  class  struggle  and
informed  by  Marxism  (Webster,  2009).  In  Korea,  the  political  involvement  of  the
Catholic  Church  “began  as  a  contest  between  issues  of  national  security/economic
development on the one hand, and democracy and human rights on the other” (Chang
& Kim, 2007: 347). By turning activism in to a religious act, however, minjung sinhak
provided Korean Catholic activists with a theological  justification for political protest
(Chang & Kim, 2007).
Myeongdong  Cathedral  began to  play  a  significant  role  in  Korean  social  and
political  life from the 1970s.  In 1974, a well-known activist  priest,  Father Ji Hak-Sun,
along with more than 200 young people, was arrested at Myeongdong Cathedral during
a drive by Park Chung-Hee to extirpate social movements around the country. Ji Hak-
Sun was the first Catholic priest to be arrested in Korea,65 and his arrest acted as a
catalyst for the establishment of the Catholic Priests Association for Justice (Jeongeui
64 In the mid-1990s the official number of Protestant “denominations” was 96, while the Catholic Church,
officially, continued to have one (Clark, 2002: 202).
65 Not to discount the long history of persecution experienced by Catholics (cf. Grayson, 2002).
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Guhyeon  Sajedan) (CPAJ).66 The  families  of  those  arrested  also  began  to  hold  large
gatherings at Myeongdong Cathedral to pray for the release of their loved ones. From
1974, the gatherings gained momentum and, in the process, Myeongdong Cathedral
became  ingrained  in  citizens’  minds  as  a  ‘site  of  resistance.’ Constant  interactions
between the Catholic Church and the general public built a sense of trust amongst the
Korean population (Yeong Gyeong-Hi, Pers. Comm. 13/05/09). Myeongdong Cathedral
became an ‘umbrella’ under which those fighting for human rights and democracy in
Korea made a stand against the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-Hee and, later,
Chun Doo-Hwan.
In 1976, 11 prominent Christians – priests, university professors and politicians –
with progressive leanings gathered at Myeongdong Cathedral (Lee Mun-Yeong, Pers.
Comm. 16/05/09),67 and issued a signed statement demanding that Park Chung-Hee
stand down.68 The event is now recognised as an important step in Korea’s democracy
movement and, as a result,  Myeongdong Cathedral has been permanently identified
with minjung Christianity (Clark, 1995).
Myeongdong  Cathedral’s  status  as  a  symbol  of  democracy  was  confirmed in
1987. By this time, it had become a natural progression for demonstrations to end up at
the cathedral  (Yeong Gyeong-Hi,  Pers.  Comm.  13/05/09).  On  the 10th of  June 1987,
following the torture and homicide of student, Park Jong-Cheol, by police, more than
one  million  demonstrators  marched  towards  Myeongdong  protesting  against  the
authoritarian government. Hundreds gathered on the Myeongdong Cathedral grounds
seeking  shelter  from  riot  police.  Cardinal  Kim  Sou-Hwan  was  at  the  forefront  of
66 Which became known through a statement issued at Myeongdong Cathedral in 1974 (CPAJ Website,
2009).
67 The gathering included Kim Dae Jung, former President (from 1960-1962) Yoon Bo-Seon, and Fathers
Ham Seok-Hoon and Ham Se-Eung (now the President of the Korea Democracy Foundation).
68 The “Declaration of Democratic National Salvation” (CPAJ website, ‘History’). This statement had four
declarations, demanding the restoration of the democratic constitution, the release of Ji Hwak-Sun and
other “fighters for democracy,” to guarantee freedom of speech and a minimum living standard (see Inshil
Choe Yoon, 2007, p. 374 for a full copy of the statement).
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negotiations with  the government and in the negotiations Kim made a now famous
speech:
“If the police come into the church, they will see me. Once they knock me
down,  they will  see other  priests  and nuns.  Only  when they knock them
down too, [will they] find the students” (In Kim Sung-Hee & Sung-Ho Baik,
2009).
After almost eight years of strict and abusive military rule under Chun Doo-Hwan, the
demonstrations  of  1987  affected  a  change.  Under  the weight  of  citizen  unrest  and
discontent, Chun Doo-Hwan’s authoritarian regime finally announced concessions to the
demands of civil society groups and the opposition party, including the adoption of a
direct presidential election system. Chun Doo-Hwan stood down as president and South
Korea held its first ever ‘democratic’ elections.
Following Democracy: Changes Afoot
The intersection at  the bottom of  the path leading up to the cathedral  is  an
invisible barrier that signifies the beginning of Church-owned land and police forces can
not  –  due  to  an  implicit  understanding  –  cross  it. Protesters  use  this  advantage  to
demonstrate. Because police are also not able to touch priests – out of issues of respect
– during the democracy protests of the 1970s and 1980s, priests would extend the area,
pushing the protests further into the streets and increasing their impact (Yeong Gyeong-
Hi, Pers. Comm. 13/05/09).
Until  1987, protests at Myeongdong Cathedral were common and progressive
priests  vocal.  After  1987,  and  the  coming  of  democracy, however, Myeongdong
Cathedral experienced another  identity  change  and  became  the  place  for  labour,
migrant,  and  farmer  unions  to  have  strikes. Police  forces  broke  the  long-held
understanding not to cross the invisible barrier for the first time in June 1995 when they
came  on  to  Myeongdong  Cathedral  grounds  to  arrest  telecommunication  unionists.
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Then, in 2000, after “a messy demonstration by telecommunication unionists who beat
female churchgoers, vandalised church property and left behind piles of trash during six
days  of  rallies” (Lee,  2002), the Myeongdong Cathedral  Council  of  Worshippers  and
Office Workers (Pyeongsindo Samu Hyeopuihoe) issued a declaration banning people
from using Myeongdong Cathedral as a protest site without prior approval.
Renovations on the cathedral were carried out between 2004 and 2008.69 The
renovations cost approximately 10 billion won,70 with seventy percent coming from the
government  and  the  rest  collected  from  church  members  (Yang  Hyeon-Hong,  Pers.
Comm.  16/05/09).  Myeongdong Cathedral  Council  has  begun  work  on  the  grounds,
installing  European-style lighting  to  make the  cathedral more  prominent at  night.
According to  Yang Hyeon-Hong,  the vice-president  (buhwejang)  of  the Myeongdong
Cathedral Council, the shift in emphasis has arisen because the cathedral is a ‘Korean
treasure.’71 Myeongdong Cathedral has also been holding more cultural festivals.  For
example in 2009, during May, the sacred month of Santa Maria, cultural and religious
events (concerts, performances and presentations) were held almost daily.
Increasing investment in the cultural and religious side of Myeongdong Cathedral
is  indicative  of  an underlying attempt  to  depoliticise  the site  and distance its  more
radical history. This desire has arisen in part because, as the next section will highlight,
many church officials claim that the social and political climate in South Korea is better
than ever
69 For these renovations clay was taken from Jeoldusan (which literally means the ‘hill of beheadings’).
During the “Great Persecution” from 1866-1871, Jeoldusan was an execution site for native Koreans who
had converted to Catholicism (Grayson, 2002: 175). So, almost literally, the blood and sweat of the people
who died for the Catholic Church is now in the foundations of Myeongdong Cathedral (Yang Hyeon-Hong,
Pers. Comm. 16/05/09).
70 Approximately NZ$12 million in 2010.
71 Pers. Comm. 16/05/09.
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Figure 7: Tour bus outside Myeongdong Cathedral, Seoul (Photo: Thomas Vink,
07/05/09).
“The Best Time We’ve Ever Had”
I  found it  difficult  to  find  officials  to  talk  to  within  the  Catholic  Church.  For
example, when I  visited the Myeongdong Cathedral Council  Offices (samugwan),  the
Church secretary told me that there are no people to talk to about the protest-related
aspects of the cathedral’s past. After my second unsuccessful visit to the samugwan, my
friend and I sat down outside to discuss where to go next. Out came a man who had
been sitting and methodically licking stamps in the background during our conversations
with officials inside. He was a volunteer at Myeongdong and told my friend and me that
the officials in the samugwan would not provide us with any information; priests move
every three years and, thus, none currently present would have been around in the
1980s. However, he went on, priests sometimes come back to work in an administrative
capacity at the archdiocese offices (gyogucheong), the administrative headquarters for
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the Catholic Church in Seoul. I approached officials at the gyogucheong, but again, I got
the answer that there was no one to talk to, and that I should try the samugwan once
more.
As I left the gyogucheong, feeling discouraged by the lack of “people to talk to,”
my friend, trying to comfort me, made a point of telling me that I should not take the
unwillingness of officials to talk personally.  Rather, what I  was encountering was an
important reflection of a larger trend in Korean society: there is  no talk about 5.18,
human rights and democracy anymore because officials are trying to depoliticise the
Catholic  Church.  The  most  important  information I  was  able  to  glean about official
Catholic Church opinion was that there was nothing they could tell me; there were no
people (officially) to talk to.
The impression I was given that Catholic Church officials would rather not talk
about, or make references to, the minjuhwa undong any more was highlighted further
in other conversations and interviews I had. Mr. Bae, an organisational representative in
Gwangju who asked for confidentiality, told me (Pers. Comm. 21/05/09) that on tours
he  used  to  organise,  which  included  Myeongdong  Cathedral,  church  officials  never
spoke about the more radical aspects of the cathedral’s past. I received a similar story
from  one  of  the  assistants  in  a  quaint  bookshop  across  the  courtyard  from  the
cathedral.  She told me that, when compared to the situation she experienced when
working in the shop in the 1970s and 1980s, Korea’s democracy is doing well now and,
therefore, the Catholic Church does not like to talk about the harder times of the past.
Furthermore, in her eyes, there was no need to protect protesters anymore because the
protesters are just fighting for themselves now. During the 1970s and 1980s (the ‘era of
upheaval’  as she put it),  protesters needed help and the Catholic Church needed to
intervene, but now the situation is different. Yang Hyeon-Hong made a similar point
when he told me (Pers. Comm. 15/05/09) that, unlike today, in the 1980s people had no
power and needed to fight for justice. In his view, the Catholic Church should not be
involved in politics for a few labour workers. Yang considers the Korea Confederation of
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Trade Unions (KCTU) (Jeon-guk Minju Nodong Johap Cheonyeonmaeng) ‘impure’ and i-
ikjipdan (people who pursue things for their own benefit), thus, their protests are no
longer  for  a  good  cause.  He  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  South  Korea  is  now  more
democratic than ever and that right now is the best time Korea has ever had. Thus, the
Catholic Church is totally against any involvement in political issues and Myeongdong
Cathedral is trying to emphasise its role as a religious institution. As two elderly women I
talked to before one evening service at the cathedral asked me, “isn’t Korea beautiful
now? Everyone says it is beautiful.”
“The Deterioration of Democracy”
 The view that South Korea is a democratic country now, and that the Catholic
Church should no longer be involved in protests, is now common. However, it contrasts
with  another  widely  held  view,  that  democracy  in  South  Korea has actually been
deteriorating since the election of the latest President, Lee Myung-Bak.72
On  the  second  of  May 2009,  Buddha’s  Birthday,  a  series  of  demonstrations
occurred throughout Seoul. The timing was important given that the day before, the
first of May, Labour Day, was also a holiday that has associations with demonstrations in
Korea and worldwide.  Most  importantly,  however,  the second of  May was also  the
anniversary of the so-called ‘candlelight protests’ of 2008.73 Participants were primarily
protesting  against  the  increasingly  authoritarian  way  in  which  the  government  was
dealing with civil society and public gatherings. In front of City Hall a group singing folk
songs were arrested, while others held up signs denouncing Lee Myung-Bak and the
police, such as ‘Myung Bak twejin. Gyeongchal haeche’ (Myung-Bak resign. Dismantle
the Police Force) (see Figure 8 below). The images that stayed with me are of the riot
72 Who was inaugurated in February 2008.
73 Where citizens had protested the resumption of US beef imports due to fears of mad cow disease. The
2008 protests turned into a mass questioning of  Lee Myung-Bak and his  government.  The gatherings
peaked on the 10th of June 2008 (the anniversary of the demonstrations in 1987 (6.10) that led to Korea’s
first democratic elections), where up to one million people filled central Seoul, while tens of thousands of
others participated in one or  other of  the 117 different  candlelight  protests held  around the country
(Hankyoreh, 11 June 2008).
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police:  dozens  of  buses  blocking  roads  and  thousands  of  grunting  ‘robots’  bearing
fiberglass  shields and batons.  In  a remarkably  short  time the police cleared out the
whole plaza and blocked off further entrance. In the dark of the night it was easy to
imagine  how  situations  like  the  protests  on  the  second  of  May  could  turn  into
stereotypical and ideological conflicts. On the internet many arguments developed in
the following  days,  discussing whether  the protesters  were legitimately  standing up
against a violent crackdown by police or whether protesters were distorting facts to
promote their own agendas.
Figure 8: A man holds up a sign asking for the resignation of President Lee Myung Bak
and for the police to dismantle. City Hall plaza, Seoul (Photo: Thomas Vink, 02/05/09).
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That evening 124 people were arrested and, in the following days and weeks,
discussions regarding democracy in Korea grew more frequent. As well as discussions in
the  media  and  on  the  internet,  many  individuals  I  interviewed  talked  of  the
‘deterioration  of  democracy’  occurring  in  Korea.  Kim  Jin-Hoe,  a  middle-aged
Myeongdong Cathedral church-goer, states (Pers. Comm. 22/05/09) that Korea was a
democratic country, but that the Lee Myung-Bak  government now shows similarities to
the  government  of  the  Park  Chung-Hee-period.  Lee  Dae-Hun,  a  professor  at
Seongkonghoe  University  in  Seoul,  echoed  Kim’s  statement  when he claimed (Pers.
Comm. 17/05/09) that police brutality was much worse than even a year before. Father
Na Seung-Gu, a priest at Sinwol-dong Cathedral in Seoul and a member of the CPAJ,
claims (Pers. Comm. 02/05/09) democracy in Korea is deteriorating. In his view, the core
of Korean society is in decline since Lee Myung-Bak took office, with many civil society
gatherings  now considered illegal.  Lee was elected in  a landslide victory,  but  within
months of his inauguration his popularity had fallen below twenty percent. At the same
time, the candlelight demonstrations occurred, thus, creating a level of paranoia within
the  Lee  Myung-Bak  government.  Now,  President  Lee  does  not  want  to  risk
demonstrations on the scale of the candlelight demonstrations happening again, so the
military  cracks  down  on  any  sign  of  protests  (Father  Na  Seung-Gu,  Pers.  Comm.
02/05/09). George Katsiaficas, a visiting professor at Jeonnam University in Gwangju,
also agrees with the claims that democracy is deteriorating in Korea. Katsiaficas (2009)
compares President Lee Myung-Bak to Chun Doo Hwan and Park Chung-Hee, and claims
that with the streamlining and empowerment of the police force, a discontinuation of
permits for large demonstrations, and a “bulldozing” of liberal policies, Lee Myung-Bak
has taken a “stranglehold” on South Korea’s democracy.
While democracy itself is a complex term and means different things to different
people, the comments regarding its ‘deterioration’ give a fair indication of a high level of
concern  within  Korean  society,  and  the  continued  fractiousness  of  Korean  politics.
Within the wider arguments over the state of democracy in Korea and the merits of the
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current government, are conflicts amongst individuals within the Catholic Church, and
thus,  conflicts  over  how  to  use  important  sites  imbued  with  religious and political
meaning, like Myeongdong Cathedral.
The Conflicting Role of the Catholic Church in Social and Political
Movements in South Korea
Conservative  Korean Christians  have often  lambasted minjung theologists  for
engaging in activities outside the obvious jurisdiction of the Catholic Church (Chang &
Kim, 2007: 350). Such criticism is related to an ongoing struggle for many Christians in
reconciling faith with political and social reality (Clark, 1995). The current relationship
between  the  Catholic  Church  and  the  CPAJ,  in  which  a  separation  is  increasingly
emphasised, exemplifies the conflict between faith and political/social involvement. The
official  position of the Catholic Church is  that the CPAJ is not a formal organisation.
Officials refuse to recognise the CPAJ and treat it as though it does not exist (Father Na
Seung-Gu, Pers. Comm. 02/06/09). In the past, identifying the views of the CPAJ with
those of the Catholic Church was common and the separation between the two factions
was minor.74 Catholic Church officials are now doing everything they can to make this
separation clear and to emphasise that the CPAJ is not part of the Church itself. Yang
Hyeon-Hong admits that many priests remain involved in political movements (like the
CPAJ),  but  claims (Pers.  Comm.  15/05/09)  that  this  involvement  is  unnecessary and
unrelated  to  the  outlook  of  the  Catholic  Church.  For  Kim  Jin-Hoe  (Pers.  Comm.
22/05/09), a large difference exists between the demonstrations now and those during
the years of military dictatorship, not just because of the changing political and social
context in Korea, but also an altered stance by the Vatican, who no longer want priests
involved in social movements, but instead, to focus on God and faith. To comply with
Vatican requests, the Catholic Church gave an order in September 2008 to send CPAJ
74 In  fact,  of  the  roughly  900  priests  in  Korea  in  the  1970’s  and 1980’s,  approximately  500  of  them
participated in the CPAJ (CPAJ website, 2009).
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priests away from Seoul to other regions, where priests have more difficulty making a
political impact (Father Na Seung-Gu, Pers. Comm. 02/06/09).
Despite  such  attempts  to  limit  the  socio-political  role  of  Catholic  priests,
members of the CPAJ continue to wield a notable influence within Korea. For example,
in  2008,  the CPAJ had significant  involvement in the candlelight  protests.  When the
government banned non-religious gatherings out of fear that they might become riots,
approximately 300 members of the CPAJ became involved in the protests, in order that
demonstrations could fall into the category of ‘religious gathering’ and, thus, helped to
keep the vigil  going (Katsiaficas, Pers.  Comm. 27/05/09).  The fallout from the CPAJ’s
involvement in the candlelight demonstrations has become ambiguous because of the
Catholic Church’s stance, denying that any of their priests were involved. The continued
political and social involvement of Catholic priests within the CPAJ, conflicts with the
Catholic Church’s current desire to separate religion from political and social concerns.
The  CPAJ  persist  with  the  view  that  Myeongdong  Cathedral  is  a  ‘site  of
resistance,’ and ‘borrowed’ it in May 2009 for a memorial service in honour of Roh Moo-
Hyun, the former president who had committed suicide a few days before. Given the
emotional nature of the service, the Catholic Church were under great pressure to say
yes  and  conceded  the  use  of  the  cathedral  (Father  Na  Seung-Gu,  Pers.  Comm.
02/06/09). Approximately 50 priests, and 2500 people overall, attended Roh’s service,
with a number of priests using the event to voice concerns about the state of Korean
politics. For example, Philip Kim Byeong-san, a retired priest currently involved as an
adviser to the CPAJ, compared the death of Roh to those of Koreans who had sacrificed
their  life  for  democracy  and  stated,  “this  [Lee  Myung-Bak]  government  has  been
destroying the political and social achievements of the past 10 years and erasing them
from our memory” (Union of Catholic Asian news, 2009).
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The CPAJ also use general church services for protest. Although, after sunset any
public gathering is illegal,75 church services are exempt from this law. Members of the
CPAJ  have  held  late  night  church  services,  which  created  further  tension  between
themselves  and the Catholic  Church,  who oppose the late night  services  (Father  Na
Seung-Gu, Pers. Comm. 02/06/09). In January 2009, six people died in conflicts between
protestors and police at a building in the Seoul district of Yongsan, where citizens were
forced to move out of their homes for a redevelopment project. Debate over the level of
police  violence in  the following months was  widespread,76 and  a  Catholic  memorial
service for the victims was held, at the site in Yongsan where the conflict  occurred,
every night (except Thursday when a Protestant service was held) throughout 2009.77
Hong Se-Hwa goes so far as to state (2009), “Yongsan is a self-portrait of our [Korea’s]
distorted society, the front lines on which we [Koreans] must fight those who oppose
democracy  and  human  rights.”  The  ‘Yongsan  tragedy’  also  has  connections  to
Myeongdong Cathedral, but not with the meaning that the daily services might suggest.
After  the event,  demonstrators  went  to the cathedral  to  protest.  Yang Hyeon-Hong
(Pers. Comm. 15/05/09) believes that, in this situation as well, the demonstrators, who
were not those dislocated in the development project, were people protesting for their
own benefit (what he again termed an i-ikjipdan) and looking to extort money from the
government using Yongsan as an excuse. Father Na Seung-Gu also claims (Pers. Comm.
02/06/09) that the priest (a member of the CPAJ) who ran the Yongsan services was
taking advantage of them to voice his own political views.
75 According to article 10 of the ‘Act on Assembly and Demonstration,’ no one is allowed to hold any public
assembly or demonstration before sunrise and after sunset unless they obtain permission from a nearby
police  station (Ney,  2009).  Many people therefore  gather  between  May and July  when the sunset  is
relatively late.
76 This debate continues into 2010. See the Hankyoreh’s discussion of the ongoing struggle of bereaved
family members (31/12/09) and Matthew Lamers articles in the Korea Herald about the wider impacts of
redevelopment projects in Seoul (19/01/10 and 20/01/10), for example.
77 On  the  30th of  December  2009,  announcements  were  made that  an  agreement  on  a  government
apology and compensation had been reached. A funeral was held for the victims on the 9 th of January
2010. However, there are still groups pushing for further investigations into the facts behind the deaths
that occurred (Hankyoreh, 31/12/09).
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The  dispute  between  the  CPAJ  and  Catholic  Church  officials  highlights  the
complicated debate over the state of Korean politics and society, and the role that the
Catholic Church has to play in this debate. As the headquarters for the Catholic Church,
and as a key symbol of democracy and resistance, Myeongdong Cathedral occupies a
key site in these debates. Many of those I spoke to point to the changing leadership (or
rather the loss of leadership) at Myeongdong Cathedral as essential to the changing
image of the Catholic Church and of the cathedral itself.
Kim Sou-Hwan: The “Conscience of Korea” 78
Cardinal Kim Sou-Hwan, the first archbishop in South Korea, died on the 14 th of
February 2009,  less than three weeks before I arrived in the country.  Thus,  feelings
about him and his legacy were still palpably visible. He is remembered with a great deal
of fondness and emotion; one of the first images I remember seeing in Korea was his
visage smiling down on me as I walked up the path to visit Myeongdong Cathedral (see
Figure 9 on page 78).
A number of people I talked to79 claimed that the real cause of conflict within the
Catholic Church in Korea is a lack of leadership, and that the leadership problem began
when Kim Sou-Hwan retired in 1998. Kim lived in the cathedral while serving as the
archbishop  of  Seoul  from  1968  to  1998  (Kim  Hyun-Eun,  2009).  In  this  period  he
performed  a  vital  role  as  the  key  spokesperson  for  the  Catholic  Church  and  its
participation in the fight for human rights and democracy in Korea. In 1998, leadership
roles started changing within the Catholic Church and the current cardinal,  Nicholas
Cheong Jin-Suk,  does not hold Kim Sou-Hwan’s ideals with the same reverence (Lee
Mun-Yeong, Pers. Comm. 16/05/09). To Cardinal Cheong, Myeongdong Cathedral does
78 Kwan Mee Yoo, 17/02/2009.
79 Lee Mun-Yeong (Pers. Comm. 16/05/09), Father Na Seung-Gu (Pers. Comm. 02/06/09), Lee Dae-Hun
(Pers. Comm. 17/05/09).
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not represent human rights and democracy, and Cheong’s decision-making reflects this
altered image by emphasising the cathedral as a religious institution (Father Na Seung-
Gu, Pers. Comm. 02/06/09).
Figure 9: Portrait of Cardinal Kim Sou-Hwan.80 Myeongdong Cathedral, Seoul (Photo:
Thomas Vink, 06/03/09).
A number of individuals claim that Cardinal Kim was actually more important as
a symbol of democracy in South Korea than the Catholic Church itself 81 and, thus, much
has been lost  with  his  death. When he passed away,  over  400,000 people  came to
Myeongdong Cathedral to pay their respects. Members among the younger generation
of church-goers whom I spoke to often told me they had no idea about the extent that
the Catholic Church had been involved in Korea’s democracy movement until Kim, and
his story, was mentioned in the media. The death of Cardinal Kim acted as a reminder of
80 The caption roughly translates as: Kim Sou-hwan Stefano we will remember you…
81 Yang Hyeon-Hong (Pers. Comm. 15/05/09) for example, believes Kim Sou-Hwan was the centre of the
democratic movement and Kim Jin-Hoe affirms (Pers. Comm. 22/05/09)  that Kim, as a person – as an
image – is one of the key symbols of democracy in Korea.
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Korea’s minjuhwa undong and of Myeongdong Cathedral’s role in its eventual success.82
The Catholic Church is even growing faster since he passed away, to the extent that Lee
Dae-Hun contends (Pers. Comm. 17/05/09) that Kim Sou-Hwan is being appropriated by
the  Catholic  Church.  In  Lee’s  view,  the  funeral  was  “commercialised,”  with  Kim’s
position on democracy issues pushed into the background. Therefore, while the funeral
– where hundreds of thousands of people waited in line for hours to pay their respects –
highlighted the wide level of respect held for Kim, it also showed that perhaps a lot of
respect was lost with him and that the Catholic Church is ‘selling out’ to attract more
members (Lee Dae-Hun, Pers.  Comm. 17/05/09).  The claim that the Catholic Church
appropriated Kim’s funeral relates to a wider argument that corruption is now more
evident  within  the Catholic  Church and that  the values  of  social  justice  and human
rights, so strongly enforced by the Catholic Church in the past, are now ignored too
often.
Impurity and Corruption
The Protestant Church in Korea is often compared to a huge business. Donald
Clark even argues (1995) that the Church in Korea is an authoritarian structure in itself.
Many Protestant churches have grown rich and Clark (2002: 202) claims that the biggest
churches actually resemble empires, with business enterprises and a strong influence in
areas outside the bounds of religion. With allegedly secret budgets and leaders who
exert great personal power, many Protestant churches are also suspected of corruption
(Clark, 2002). Now Lee Mun-Yeong believes (Pers. Comm. 16/05/09) there is corruption
even within the Catholic Church, and that rather than thinking about the prevailing of
justice, Korean Christians are talking about how they can bring wealth back in to their
own homes. Although involvement in political movements contributed to the growth of
the Catholic Church, Father Na Seung-Gu claims (Pers. Comm. 02/06/09) the Church was
also corrupted by its involvement. Father Na’s claim is supported by Clark, who states
82 Yang Hyeon-Hong even claims (Pers. Comm. 15/05/09) that right now people recognise Myeongdong
Cathedral as a site of democracy and protest more than ever.
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(2002:  202)  that,  ironically,  it  is  middle-class  prosperity  and  democracy,  and  the
corruption this has caused, that now poses the biggest threats to the future of South
Korea’s Protestant community. Thus, if Father Na and Lee Mun-Yeong are correct and
corruption is growing within the Catholic Church, then the Catholic community could
now be experiencing a similar threat.
Following the elections of 1987, divisions became more prominent within the
Catholic  Church and many arguments  developed between priests  (Yang Gyeong-Hui,
Pers. Comm. 13/05/09). Over the last two decades, official opinion within the Catholic
Church  has  evolved.  Church  officials  view labour  strikes  and  unification  protests  as
radical, selfish, and impure, and increasingly, have distanced themselves from the more
radical  factions  of  the  Church’s  past.  This  new  direction  is  understandable  at
Myeongdong  Cathedral,  where  many  officials  are  frustrated  by  the  continued
appropriation of the site to protest issues increasingly seen as irrelevant to the Catholic
Church, and sometimes even to wider society. However, the shifting focus appears to be
based on more than a mere intolerance of “impure labour unionists.”
In the past, many poorer people went to church. However, priests and nuns now
meet and interact with wealthier segments of society, who are increasing their impact
on decisions within the Catholic Church (Father Na Seung-Gu, Pers. Comm. 02/06/09).
Lee Dae-Hun agrees and makes further claims (Pers.  Comm. 17/05/09)  that Catholic
Church  leadership  has  regressed  because they are  no longer  concerned  with  issues
raised  by  poorer  sections  of  society,  and  Catholic  Church  officials  are  now  pro-
conservative and “openly antagonistic to pro-democracy groups.”
Myeongdong Cathedral has also come to enjoy a great deal of respect from the
government.  Among  Catholic  officials,  promoting  less  radical  perceptions  of
Myeongdong  Cathedral could  be a  way  of  making  peace  with  the  government  and
building on this respect. The recent renovations at the cathedral demonstrate that the
state  has  become more involved with  the affairs  of  the cathedral,  and the Catholic
Church in general, than in the past. The government has policies to control renovations
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of historic sites, so much negotiation was required before the Myeongdong Cathedral
renovations were allowed to proceed. That the renovations were approved, however, is
a potential sign of government respect for the Catholic Church, and acknowledgement
of  Myeongdong  Cathedral’s  significance  in  Korea’s  history  (Yang  Hyeon-Hong,  Pers.
Comm. 15/05/09).
The  move  by  Catholic  Church  officials  away  from  social  concerns  towards
building  relationships  with  the  government  and  wealthier  segments  of  society  has
contributed to the shifting image of Myeongdong Cathedral, and is also emblematic of
changes  within  wider  Korean  society.  Some  Koreans  now  appear  more  apathetic
towards events of the past, and to social  and political issues in the present, as self-
interest has taken prominence in Korea’s now neoliberal, growth-driven economy.
Apathy
In the past, the Youth Association at Myeongdong Cathedral played a large role
in the political mobilisation of students. Many people came to the Association for help,
and it became a symbolic leader, “like trade union headquarters,” says Lee Dae-Hun, a
professor  at  Seongkonghoe  University  in  Seoul (Pers.  Comm.  17/05/09). Lee  talked
animatedly of the students who pioneered the cultural  movement in the 1980s and
about his involvement at Myeongdong Cathedral, particularly with open theatre, which
he saw as a way to convey political criticism under the guise of Christian themes. Lee
himself taught theatre and traditional music there, despite not being religious at the
time, and was attracted to Catholic openness to these activities. You could, he says, “do
and speak, and produce anything on that compound [Myeongdong Cathedral].”
The  role  that  the  Youth  Association  played  in  the  1980s, indicates  the
importance of Myeongdong Cathedral  as a ‘site of resistance.’ It was not merely an
asylum, but provided space for citizens to discuss, and learn about, wider national and
global concerns. Although universities are often regarded as the centre of the Korean
democracy  movement,  Myeongdong  Cathedral  offered “a  very  free  space...even  in
university you have be careful” (Lee Dae-Hun, Pers. Comm. 17/05/09).
81
Claims that  many Koreans,  particularly the younger  generation, are apathetic
towards  their  history  and  the  current  political  situation  in  Korea  (both  in  terms  of
applications of democracy in the South and unification with the North) have become
more  widespread. For  example,  when  Lee  Myung-Bak  was  elected,  Koreans
overwhelmingly  declared  that  they  were  interested  in  economic  growth  and  higher
salaries rather then social concerns (Hardin, 2008: 119).83 The increasing apathy towards
history in Korea is an illustration of the arguments made in wider literature that history
is  “speeding  up”  and  that  in  the globalised  and  fast-changing  world  of  today,  only
aspects of the past can hold individual meaning.84 In my personal experiences, I  also
came across a potentially growing apathy towards social concerns. For example, I asked
one friend’s opinion on how the minjuhwa undong is being represented today. His reply,
that he had too much happening in his own life to think about rather than worry about
history, is not atypical. Of the younger Koreans I spoke to, knowledge related to 5.18,
the minjuhwa  undong,  and  Myeongdong  Cathedral’s  relation  to  these  events  was
limited, and what knowledge they did have usually came not from school or parents, but
priests, or popular culture and movies. One young woman told me the recent movie,
‘May  18’  (Hwaryohanhyuga), which  dramatises  happenings  in  Gwangju, opened  her
mind up to Korea’s past and motivated her to learn more. Like others I spoke to, she had
not even noticed that  the previous week had been the anniversary of  the Gwangju
Uprising.
During my interview with Yang Hyeon-Hong (Pers. Comm. 16/05/09), he even
expressed concern for me, and my thesis, believing I would not find enough people who
83 In the same poll,  only three percent of the Koreans asked, said that North Korea was an important
concern (Hardin,  2008:  119).  Kang Hyun-Kyung, in the lead up to the 2007 presidential  elections also
stated (2007),  for example,  “a growing number of younger voters have begun to show a conservative
political orientation and are interested in Lee Myung-bak as he has so far been portrayed as a candidate
who can create the most jobs” and Al Jazeera (2007) that, “unlike previous elections dominated by issues
such as security policy with rival North Korea or relations with the US, this year voters were focused on
economic  matters.”  Kim  Jin-Hoe  stipulated  (Pers.  Comm.  22/05/09)  that  if  Korea’s  democracy  is
deteriorating,  it  is not just  because of the government,  but also because of apathy amongst  younger
generations and a growing focus on individualism within Korean society.
84 cf. Huyssen, 2000; Klein, 2000; Kundera, 1979, 1984; Nora, 1989, 2002; Todorov, 2001.
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knew about the topic and gestured toward the young people sitting nearby.  It has been
so long now since 5.18, he said, that not many people can name the year in which it
occurred. The latest generation of Koreans has grown up in an environment removed
from the harsh authoritarianism of the past and, therefore, events like 5.18 are much
more distant and hard to comprehend. Some churchgoers I met talked of the cathedral
as  a  religious  site.  Others  acknowledged  the  role  of  the  Catholic  Church,  and  of
Myeongdong Cathedral,  in  Korea’s minjuhwa undong but  claimed that  this  role was
exaggerated.  Increasingly,  younger  generations  of  Koreans  grow  up  without  an
awareness  of  the  role  Myeongdong  Cathedral  played  as  a  political  site,  and  its
importance in achieving democracy  in  Korea. Thus,  it  appears  the shifting image of
Myeongdong Cathedral is not just because of the new emphasis privileged by Catholic
Church officials, but also because of a wider lack of awareness or empathy towards the
past in Korean society at large.
Conclusion
This chapter began by documenting the historical rise of Myeongdong Cathedral
to a ‘site of resistance’ and key symbol of democracy in Korea. Now the identity of the
cathedral is going through another identity change, as Catholic Church officials promote
the religious and cultural aspects of the cathedral over its radical and dissident past. The
new image of Myeongdong Cathedral is representative of an increasing disconnection,
made by  the Catholic  Church,  between religion and socio-political  concerns.  Church
officials argue that Korean society is in a better position than ever and that those who
continue to demonstrate are looking to make their  own personal  gains.  In  contrast,
many other individuals, such as members of the CPAJ, claim that democracy in Korea
has been deteriorating in recent years. This contestation over the involvement of the
Catholic  Church  in  socio-political  concerns  is  represented  through  Myeongdong
Cathedral, as the headquarters for the Korean Catholic Church, and as a key symbol of
democracy. Underlying the conflict within the Catholic Church is a wider issue in Korean
society: a potentially growing apathy amongst Korean citizens towards history and social
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and political issues in the present. However, the persistence of Korea’s protest culture,
most  clearly  seen  in  the  candlelight  demonstrations  of  2008,  illustrates  that  large
numbers of Koreans are still concerned about social and political matters. Clearly, many
individuals  in  Korea  still  need  a  space  to  come  together  communally.  Despite  the
emphasis  by  Catholic  Church  officials  away  from  Myeongdong  Cathedral’s  dissident
past, the site continues to incite contention and to be invested with political meaning.
Thus,  if  officials  allow it,  Myeongdong Cathedral  can still  provide that  space,  where
collective understandings of both the past and the present are debated and understood
into the future.
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Chapter Four – The docheong and Myeongdong
Cathedral: Comparison
The three of us walk into the byeolgwan and form a rough triangle, hunching
over on plastic pull-out chairs in the middle of a parched and dusty hallway that looks as
though it could collapse around us at any moment. A friend of mine, who has come
along to translate, is next to me and a bright-eyed Gang Gu-Yeong85 stands against the
opposite wall. It is the 20th of May, two days after the anniversary of 5.18, and the city,
like every year in May, has become focused on memory. The 5.18 National Cemetery,
relatively empty throughout the previous months, suddenly becomes the site of dozens
of school trips, memorial ceremonies and visits from human rights organisations. As we
go through a round of obligatory name-card exchanges,  head bows and thank-yous,
another relaxed looking middle-aged man brings in three steaming paper cups of the
sweet instant coffee that I have come to know so well. Others I had talked to in previous
days, spoke of the 5.18 associations as unaccommodating, yet, within the byeolgwan
the atmosphere is communal and convivial, and Gang’s warmth is genuine.
We end the discussion with a promise to meet again. Then, driving away through
the wide, angular streets of Gwangju, I ask my friend to give me a quick run-through of
the  conversation  (which  we  would  go  over  and  translate  in  depth  later).  As
contradictions  related to  facts  and figures  have come through,  I  consider  the other
views  that  those  in  favour  of  demolishing  the byeolgwan had  taken  up;  views  that
painted the situation caused by protests as a time-consuming and expensive exercise in
self-interest and corruption. Suddenly, the conversation takes a surprising turn, and my
friend undergoes a brief transformation. He animatedly explains how important (very!)
it is to keep the building and to remember what happened there. Most of the citizens in
Gwangju do not realise the full implications of demolishing the byeolgwan and building
a new cultural complex in its place, he tells me, they do not realise what will be lost. I
am dropped off at home, left alone to ruminate on this outburst of emotion and feeling.
85 The Director of Policy and Planning in the 5.18 Wounded Persons Association (WPA).
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As part  of  a week-long period to commemorate the 29th anniversary of  5.18
(5.18 minjung hangjaeng 29 ju nyeon ginyeom), an exhibition is also on display in the
former docheong next door. While some displays do not leave much to the imagination
– a shovel sticking out of the dead earth – others are more poignant. One powerful
image is a painting of a baby,  sleeping peacefully in  a cocoon of  toys, blankets and
plants, floating on a river of candles in a landscape of darkness. The suggestion is that
the candles represent those who perished during 5.18, fighting against the ‘darkness’ of
dictatorial rule and brought about the peace that the baby now blissfully enjoys. The
painting also suggests Korean youth of today, who enjoy peace and material gains, but
ignore the long river of hardship that led to these gains.
Another friend, who acted as translator for many of the interviews I carried out
in Seoul, converted from Protestantism to Catholicism86 as a result of these interviews.
The stories of social engagement and past events that priests, Catholic Church officials
and general church-goers told us heightened her impression of religion and the kind of
outreach it can have in Korea. At other times, friends would tell me things like, “the
people in Gwangju, they fought for us, what we have now is because of them,” with
such sincerity that for a second I would forget the quizzical looks that most youth gave
me when I asked them about o-il-pal (5.18) or the minjuhwa undong. These moments of
passion contradicted the more general impression I was given that many young people
in Korea do not know about, or do not care about, 5.18 or the minjuhwa undong.
The emotional outpouring I unexpectedly received from my friend in Gwangju is
an example of  a difference that exists between Seoul and Gwangju.  The memory of
Korea’s minjuhwa undong holds different meaning to the people of Gwangju, a city so
long associated with struggle and neglect. Taking the sense of difference between Seoul
and Gwangju – between Myeongdong Cathedral and the docheong – as a starting point,
this chapter works to elicit the wider meaning of my research. I begin by elaborating on
the generational and regional divergences that exist between Gwangju and Seoul, and
86 Which, given the distinction that Koreans hold between the two (cf. Clark, 2002: 188) is essentially the
same as changing religion.
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the impact  these divergences have on the issues at  the docheong and Myeongdong
Cathedral. I go on to compare the shifting understandings of Myeongdong Cathedral
and the docheong as new images of the sites are emphasised over those of the past. The
altered emphasis at each site is informed by multiple readings of place and space that
have created contestation over whose reading of the past should be given importance.
Finally,  I  argue  that  the  past  can  only  maintain  its  relevance  through  ongoing
contestations.  Therefore,  the  conflict  over whose representations  of  the past  are
privileged at the docheong and Myeongdong Cathedral still has the potential to have a
positive impact – despite widespread fears of the opposite – upon wider Korean society
and add contemporary relevance to the meaning of the past.
Generational and Regional Discrepancies
Many scholars claim that there is a large generational gap in Korea. For example,
Sheila Jager argues (2003: xiv) that unlike many “modern nations where the contests
between various groups have been drawn along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, in
Korea these contests have been drawn, broadly speaking, between the generations.”
Generational conflict in Korea is understandable given the speed with which the country
has developed and the vastly different  environment that generations born since the
1980s  have  grown  up  in.  The  so-called  ‘new  generation’  (sinsedae)  of  Koreans,  for
example, grew up in a prosperous economic environment, with democracy and easy
access to technology, and are increasingly conservative or “indifferent to politics” (Park
Sun-Young,  2007).  They contrast  with the previous,  political  and liberal-minded 386
generation,  who  were  the  first  Koreans  to  grow  up  relatively  free  of  poverty,  and
became politically active as students during the 1980s. Despite the disparities between
generations  in  Korea, in  the context  of  my research, discrepancies  between regions
appear more important than generational gaps in contestations over the meaning of the
minjuhwa undong. Gwangju’s history of neglect, its counter-hegemonic status, and its
ties to resistance have caused the city to build a local identity around which citizens –
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and generations – can coalesce more readily than elsewhere in the country (cf. Lewis
2002b; Yea, 1999, 2002, 2003).
When I chose my two case study sites, variety and difference were important
factors. Leaving Seoul for the first time and witnessing the diversity in Korea had a major
impact  on  me  and  was,  therefore,  a  difference  that  I  wanted  to  represent  in  my
research. Gwangju struck me as different straight away, not just because of the cleaner
air, the lower skyline and the thinner lines of traffic, but also the people. Other regional
centres in Korea are known for characteristics like their cultural and historical artifacts
(such as Gyeongju), their ports and access to surrounding islands (Busan and Incheon),
or their natural environments (such as Seokcho and Jeju Island). In contrast, Gwangju is
best  known  for  a  violent  uprising, an  association  that  the  city’s  citizens  have  also
inherited. Accordingly, as well as the memory of 5.18 forming a key feature of the city,
many  of  Gwangju's  citizens  have  also  incorporated  5.18  as  an  important  event  in
constructing their identities. Friedrich Nietzsche (1969: 61) argues that only that which
still hurts remains in the memory. I believe the ongoing importance of buildings like the
byeolgwan to Gwangju citizens, is partly because, to them, 5.18 does still ‘hurt.’ The
ongoing resonance of 5.18 in Gwangju illustrates the unique connection that citizens
there have to the event.  In Gwangju, I got the sense that the city's history is felt at a
personal level, whereas, to many in Seoul, 5.18 is a more abstract historical event. This
sense of meaning is reflected in how I have interpreted the issues at each of my case
study sites.
The regional and national connotations of the minjuhwa undong, especially in
relation to Gwangju and 5.18, are important in understanding recent contestations over
how  the  past  is  remembered  in  Korea.  The state’s appropriation  of  5.18,  through
structures like the 5.18 National Cemetery, was an attempt to create a singular, national
narrative of the event (cf. Yea, 2002). Now, 5.18 is being promoted as an event of global
and universal importance, with Gwangju at the centre, as a ‘mecca’ of democracy and
human  rights.  However,  many  in  Gwangju  still  present  personal  histories  that  are
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“counter-hegemonic” and “offer a site of resistance” to the imposition of national and
universal interpretations of 5.18 (Lewis, 2002: 153). Therefore, the ongoing conflict over
whose narrative of 5.18 to emphasise is a sign of fundamental local Gwangju differences
in perspective about 5.18 and the meaning it holds for various individuals and groups:
“after more than twenty years, Gwangju continues, inscribed on the minds and bodies
of its victims” (Lewis and Byun, 2003: 63). The contestation at the docheong over the
meaning of 5.18 is representative of these ongoing differences in perspective. Like the
historical positioning of 5.18 as a Jeolla concern, the conflict over the HCAC project is
largely thought of as a Gwangju problem, with Gwangju still widely recognised as a city
of  resistance.  However,  the  emphasis  on  5.18  as above  all a local incident  means
Gwangju  citizens  have built  a  communal  sense of  history from which they derive  a
strong sense of identity. Even members of younger generations, who have grown up in
an environment quite removed from the upheavals of the 1980s, feel connected to 5.18;
for them, the history of the city remains important and relevant.
The situation at Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul is different. The lack of concern
over shifting meaning of the cathedral is representative of a growing apathy towards
history in Korean society at large. Members of the younger generation, in particular, are
increasingly disconnected from the past in a climate that focuses on economic growth
and material gain. Even amongst weekly church-goers at Myeongdong Cathedral,  the
role  that  the  cathedral  played  in  the minjuhwa  undong was  widely  unknown  or
unimportant. While large-scale demonstrations in Seoul do still recall 5.18 and 6.10, the
‘new generation’ of Koreans in Seoul are generally more detached from the past than
their  counterparts  in  Gwangju. The  regional  discrepancies  over  the  meaning  of  the
minjuhwa undong are important. They help to understand the various, often conflicting,
reactions  that  arise  when  different  representations  of  the  past  are  privileged at
Myeongdong Cathedral and the docheong, as the next section highlights.
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Shifting Representations
Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul and the docheong in Gwangju are two of the
sites with the most symbolic resonance for remembering Korea’s minjuhwa undong.
They were both sites of resistance, where citizens gathered to demonstrate against the
state, and they occupy spaces in the two major cities of protest in contemporary Korean
history.  In  the changing political  and economic climate of  Korea,  with its  neoliberal,
growth-driven focus, self-interest has overtaken social issues as a key concern for many
Korean citizens. Therefore, associating with resistance does not hold the same liberating
connotations as it did in the 1970s and 1980s. Jeong Su-Man, then chairman of the 5.18
Bereaved Family Association (BFA), clearly expresses the move away from resistance in
his  opening  address  at  the  1997  memorial  ceremony at  5.18  National  Cemetery  in
Gwangju:
“Now,  as  an  unhappy  era  has  been  brought  to  a  close  and  history  is
victorious,  5.18  is  approaching  a  second  stage,  changing  to  a  spirit  of
universal humanity. Accordingly, the underlying tone of the commemoration
events must be stripped of the so-called antigovernment struggle style of
the past” (In Lewis, 2002: 152).
Newly sanctioned understandings of the past signal a move beyond the political and
resistant  images of  previous decades.  The docheong is  now in the process  of  being
(re)presented as the central site in the ‘Hub City of Asian Culture,’ while Myeongdong
Cathedral is presented as the centre of Korean Catholicism and as a national cultural
treasure.
When  I  arrived  in  Gwangju  the  situation  surrounding  the  demolition  of  the
byeolgwan had reached a stalemate, with none of the groups involved backing down on
their  demands. HCAC officials  have two main reasons for not  altering their  plans  to
demolish the byeolgwan. One is that officials believe they had been open about their
plans for the ACC and that all groups involved had previously agreed that keeping the
byeolgwan was  not  important.  The  second  reason  is  that  the  ACC  may  lessen  the
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importance that memorialising 5.18 has in Gwangju. Many individuals in Gwangju are
weary of 5.18 and its continued appropriation by the 5.18 associations, and believe that
Gwangju’s economy cannot be sustained through the memorialisation of 5.18 alone.
However, lessening the significance of 5.18 in representations of Gwangju – and thus
lessening Gwangju’s ties to resistance and anti-government attitudes – could also create
a  social  environment  less  critical  of  the  government. Therefore,  relegating  5.18  to
history could be seen as a political strategy to ease pressure on President Lee Myung-
Bak (Jung Hae-Gu, Pers. Comm. 13/05/09).
In  contrast,  however,  a  number  of significant  motives for protecting the
byeolgwan also exist. One is a genuine concern that, if removed, the building will take
memories of 5.18 with it, and that the museum-like ACC built in its place could consign
5.18 to the past. A kitsch effect would also operate here (cf. Kundera, 1984, p. 278;
Funder, 2003). The ACC may sanitise interpretations of 5.18, downplaying aspects of the
event, from which many citizens take personal meaning, in order to promote an image
that conforms to HCAC aims.87
Another motive is that some groups and individuals can make personal gains if
the byeolgwan remains. For example, officials, such as Mr. Ryu (Pers. Comm. 24/04/09)
and Mr. Bae (Pers. Comm. 25/05/09), claim that the 5.18 associations are impure and
corrupt. They suggest that rather than protecting 5.18 and its memory, some within the
5.18 associations are looking to profit out of memorialising the tragedy. The public, too,
is not sympathetic towards the 5.18 associations, who have achieved their professed
goals. However, they continue to protest at sites related to the memory of 5.18, like the
byeolgwan and, thus, their motives appear outdated. For over a decade, the docheong
area has been out of use and fallen into disrepair (See Figures 10 and 11 on page 92).
Only now, with potential re-development ahead, have the buildings been ‘re-inscripted’
with  meaning  (cf.  Yea,  2002:  1571),  implying  that  appropriation  of  5.18  could  be
87 Many of the images regarding 5.18 already conform to touristic ideals, with brochures and pamphlets
promoting a theme park experience when visiting the 5.18 Liberation Park or touring important 5.18 sites
on the bus.
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occurring. My own experiences strongly suggest that, while the 5.18 associations are
generally  well-meaning,  at  least  some  members  have  a vested interest  in  the
byeolgwan.
Figure 10: ACC construction site (view from the byeolgwan). Gwangju (Photo: Thomas
Vink, 30/05/09).
Figure 11: Inside the byeolgwan. Gwangju (Photo: Thomas Vink, 30/05/09).
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Given the lack of sympathy towards the 5.18 associations, tropes of impurity
arose often in my discussions in Gwangju. Demonstrators in Seoul, such as the KCTU,
continue to appropriate Myeongdong Cathedral’s reputation as a safehaven for their
own protests, despite the establishment of democracy in Korea. Therefore, the charges
of impurity and corruption at the docheong hold distinct similarities to the situation at
Myeongdong Cathedral, where Catholic Church members like Kim Jin-Hoe (Pers. Comm.
22/05/09) and Yang Hyeon-Hong (Pers. Comm. 16/05/09) claim that those who continue
to use the cathedral as a safehaven to protest are impure and members of an i-ikjibdan.
Catholic Church officials are also weary of re-interpretations of the past that continue to
associate Myeongdong Cathedral with resistance. Therefore, officials dismiss the claims
of demonstrators, asserting that protesters are merely using the cathedral’s reputation
as a justification for personal gain. At the same time, the Catholic Church has motives
for disassociating from the past, for as it has developed increasingly close ties with the
government it has seemingly been co-opted. The recent renovations at the cathedral,
which were 70 percent funded by the state, give an indication of these growing ties, and
appear as a reason behind the turn towards less radical understandings of Myeongdong
Cathedral and its once distinctly anti-government connotations.
The docheong and Myeongdong Cathedral, as important ‘sites of memory,’ are
and always have been variously interpreted by a diverse range of individuals and groups.
The contestation that arises from these different understandings, however, generates a
space in which to explore wider social issues and, thus, is a positive sign that alternate
interpretations may be voiced. The real concern will arise when contestations end and
such sites are represented by single narratives, and risk becoming ‘invisible monuments’
(cf. Musil, 1986: 322).
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Interpreting Place and Space
Both the docheong and Myeongdong Cathedral are typical ‘sites of memory’ in
the way their meaning is constantly recycled and re-inscribed. The literature on sites of
memory argues that the very substance of a memorial is political (cf. Richter, 1999: 109)
and  that  sites  of  memory  not  only  represent  political  conflict,  but  are  spaces  of
contention in and of themselves (cf. Yea, 2002: 1571). Given their history, the docheong
and Myeongdong Cathedral are also inherently political and contentious. Furthermore,
Myeongdong Cathedral and the docheong are liminal places, reforming their identities,
as collective understandings of the meanings they imbue shift. Both sites are caught in-
between  the  past  images  that  they  became  known  for,  and  representations  that
promote new uses for the sites in the future.
Because  the docheong is  not  yet  appropriated  with  ‘hub  city’  inclinations,  it
represents  an  in-between  space,  much  like  the  city  of  Gwangju  itself.  The  conflict
between Gwangju’s ties to its radical, neglected and violent past and its aspirations to
become a future-oriented, global city of culture are encapsulated in the docheong, a
relic of the past that is intended as a catalyst for future aims. The key issue is a concern
that the ACC does not pay heed to the various interpretations of place and identity
represented through the docheong,  and more generally  through sites  of  memory in
Gwangju. More specifically, the 5.18 associations claim personal and regional meaning
from  the  buildings  that  represent  5.18,  but  these  personal  and  regional  assertions
conflict with the goals of the HCAC project.
Myeongdong  Cathedral,  conversely, maintains its primary  use  as  a place  of
worship. Nonetheless, contestation over its symbolic connotations abound. Entering the
Myeongdong Cathedral grounds is like crossing a border. The invisible barrier that keeps
the  police  out  also  maintains  a  separation  from  the  growth-driven,  individual,
consumeristic society represented by Myeongdong’s shopping and business district (See
Figure 12 on page 95). While the cathedral no longer offers a sanctuary in the same way
as  the  past,  I  got  a  sense  from the  people  I  spoke  to  that  the  cathedral  does still
represent aspects of a more emotional, socially- and politically-driven past. Therefore,
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Myeongdong Cathedral is also, in a sense, caught between worlds. The history of the
cathedral, which associates Catholicism with the minjung and the site with resistance
against the state, is now at odds with the Catholic Church’s promotion of the cathedral’s
religious and cultural aspects.
Figure 12: Looking across the road from Myeongdong Cathedral, Seoul (Photo: Thomas
Vink, 06/03/09).
Two  primary  interpretations of  Myeongdong  Cathedral  exist:  that  it  is  an
important historical and religious site, or that it is a site of ongoing resistance towards
authoritarian  social  and political  institutions.  Father  Na Seung-Gu jokingly  suggested
(Pers. Comm. 02/06/09) making a copy of Myeongdong Cathedral, so that one can be
for religion and the other for protests.  In the past,  the two stances were intimately
connected via minjung theology, but now the connection is growing weak. The cathedral
has traditionally symbolised both Catholicism and democracy in Korea. However, the
increasing separation of these two symbolic meanings has created an identity conflict
for those (such as members of the CPAJ) who wish the two to be connected and to
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reconcile faith with political and social reality (cf. Clark, 1995). Without official support,
priests no longer have the same justification to stand up for their social and political
concerns as in the past.
Similarly, the conflict over the construction of the ACC in Gwangju, illustrates a
number of competing interpretations, this time over 5.18. The event itself, as well as the
marginalisation of Gwangju in the following years, built  a collective sense of identity
within  the  city  –  a  ‘Gwangju  spirit’  –  and  many  local  citizens  still  hold  a  personal
attachment to 5.18. Local understandings of 5.18 conflict with another narrative, which
gained prominence in the 1990s: that 5.18 is nationally important as a key event in the
achievement of democracy in Korea. The lessons learned, and achievements made, as a
result of 5.18 are now being promoted as of international importance. Like the identity
concerns at Myeongdong Cathedral, the changing meaning of 5.18 has created a conflict
of  identity  within  Gwangju,  as  local  readings  of  the  event  diverge  with  recently
privileged national and international interpretations.
Sites  of  memory  have  an inherent  capacity  for  transformation,  thus,  despite
conflict over what images of past should be privileged, each site still has the potential,
through  ongoing  appropriation,  to  act  as  an  inclusive  space  where  competing
interpretations can all be represented.
Myeongdong Cathedral can represent both Catholicism and democracy or social
justice, at least in a symbolic sense, because of the use of space at the site. As the head
cathedral for the Korean Catholic Church and as a highly recognised and often visited
site, the cathedral does still stand out within the city sprawl that has taken over the
Myeongdong neighbourhood.  An understanding of  the space the cathedral  occupies
highlights the potential to move beyond the dichotomous – centre of Catholicism versus
centre of democracy and human rights – image that has developed. The interior of the
cathedral does not have a history of association with democracy; the interior has always
maintained its religious emphasis, as a place to hold services and events. Images related
to the minjuhwa undong at Myeongdong are, instead, typically of the cathedral grounds,
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where  protests  were  held  and  demonstrators  camped (See  Figure  14  below).  The
unspoken barrier of asylum began as soon as one entered the cathedral precinct and
not merely the building itself. In this sense, therefore, Father Na’s suggestion to have
two cathedrals is not entirely a joke. Ongoing renovations to the grounds may allow the
cathedral to address these increasingly divergent functions and to exist as both a centre
of Catholicism and as a centre of democracy, resistance and social justice.
Figure 13 (left): One of the 'stations of the cross' inside Myeongdong Cathedral. Seoul
(Photo: Thomas Vink, 07/05/09).
Figure 14 (right):  Memorial service and prayer meeting held for Park Jong-Cheol.
Myeongdong Cathedral. 02/07/1987 (Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice website,
2009).
In addition to the use of space at the site, Myeongdong Cathedral also holds
importance beyond its symbolism. In the 1980s, education was one of the key factors
behind the development of the cathedral’s safehaven reputation (cf. Lee Dae-Hun, Pers.
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Comm. 17/05/09). By continuing to educate the public, the cathedral can act as a “real
environment of memory,” where memory is passed down through the generations and
maintains its personal connections (cf. Nora, 1989: 7). Myeongdong Cathedral not only
represents an important symbol of the past, but still has the potential, if allowed, to be
a  juncture  for  political  discussion –  a  space  that  actively  attempts  to  create
understanding of Korea’s history (cf. Portelli, 1991: 52) – and an aide to the democratic
values that numerous people in Korea are questioning. Many church-goers mentioned
the late cardinal, Kim Sou-Hwan, and even movies like 5.18 (Hwaryohanhyuga), as their
key  informants  regarding  Korea’s  contemporary  history.  Myeongdong  Cathedral  can
continue to be an important site of memory by performing a similar role to that of Kim
Sou-Hwan and acting as a catalyst to understandings of  Korea’s recent past and the
past’s relevance to the present and future.
Likewise, the ACC can, potentially, represent local collective understandings of
5.18 and provide a space to debate the meaning that 5.18, and the city of Gwangju,
holds in a national and international context. While the docheong and byeolgwan are
real symbols of the past, to those without personal connections to 5.18, the buildings
are mere monuments to the event. Not in the ‘disneyfied’ (cf. Funder, 2003; Kundera,
1984; Richter, 1999) sense that has the 5.18 associations concerned about the ACC, but
rather as ‘invisible’ (cf. Musil, 1986: 320) places that are imbued with meaning but do
not necessarily spur remembering (cf. Bell, 2003: 73). As the docheong site stands now,
the  scope  for  renewing  the  meaning  of  5.18  is  limited,  an  issue  that  I  believe  has
contributed to the growing fatigue towards memorialising 5.18 in Gwangju.
The ACC has the potential to create the space needed to renew the meaning of
5.18.  However,  issues  remain. Despite  the  appropriation of  5.18 as  of  national  and
international importance, very few outside of Gwangju know anything about the HCAC
project,  let  alone the conflict  over the byeolgwan,  which suggests that  conflict  over
whose interpretations of 5.18 are privileged, is still largely a local Gwangju issue. Though
the  HCAC  project  was  initially  approved  as  an  act  of  contrition  for  past  neglect
(Hoffmann, 2000), Gwangju and the Jeolla region remain separate from the rest of the
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country. While the marginalised image of Gwangju and 5.18 perseveres – in a project
that  is  meant  to  hold  important  national  connotations  –  a  question  remains  over
whether the HCAC project can represent multiple understandings of the docheong site,
and of Gwangju itself.
Conclusion: “The past is never dead; it’s not even past” 88
The emphasis on new representations of the past at the docheong in Gwangju
and Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul has created conflict and contention. Maintaining
the past in the present is not a universal desire, a point clearly illustrated by these case
study sites: the emphasis on new images at the docheong and Myeongdong Cathedral is
distinctly future-oriented. Nevertheless,  the re-interpretation of historical  events can
also maintain the relevance of the past events in the present. Jung Hae-Gu (Pers. Comm.
13/05/09)  believes that  the  events  of  Korea’s  recent  past  contain  lessons  that  are
relevant  to  the  present  political  and  social  situation  in  Korea.  Thus,  to  Jung,  the
contestation over and appropriation of memory in Korea is a sign that the past will not
be forgotten, and that events like 5.18 do still resonate with many Korean citizens.
In the wider literature on studies related to remembering the past, a question is
often asked of whether it is more important to ‘remember’ or ‘forget’ when building
collective identity?89 For Korea, in the 1960s and 1970s, forgetting helped the country
move forward and create a successful nation.90 In recent decades, the emphasis has
shifted to remembering with marginalised groups able to reclaim their own collective
understandings of history. Korea’s protest culture has helped to maintain the relevance
of the past for today’s society. However, the two case studies explored here illustrate
88 Faulkner, William. (1951). Requiem for a Nun.
89 cf. Funder, 2003: 52; Huyssen, 2000; Nietzsche, 1969; Nora, 1989, 2002; Ricoeur, 1999.
90 Yun Ch'oe and Mark Morris (2010) claim that forgetfulness of the extremity of past events may have
actually helped Koreans to move without fear into the future and build their modern nation and Cho Han
Hae-Joang asks (2000: 67) “Have South Koreans been walking so quickly and mindlessly in order to forget
the terrible experiences that they have had to go through?”
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that the conflict between violent aspects of history and the sanitised cultural future that
many officials are emphasising is growing. The question of memory explored throughout
the  literature  cannot  be  answered  in  the Korean  context either;  the  merits  of
remembering or forgetting the past are still in debate.
The  city  of  Gwangju  symbolises Korea’s  domestic subaltern.  Although  long
without a voice, citizens were able to reclaim their identities by promoting their own
local narrative of  the past.  Now this  ‘Gwangju  spirit’  is  being conveyed in  terms of
democracy and human rights in Asia. Gwangju sees itself as a role model for other cities
in Asia, providing a locale to build and strengthen international relationships. However,
the  memory  of  Gwangju’s  resistant  past  represents  a  core  part  of  many  citizens'
identities and Gwangju’s potential new role risks de-legitimising the meaning that 5.18
holds  to  them. At  the docheong,  the  construction  of  the ACC has  the  potential  to
consign local memories of,  and connections to, 5.18 to the past  by emphasising the
uprising’s  wider  national  and  international  connotations.  However,  the  contestation
over memory at the docheong has also created new debates over the meaning of the
site, rather than letting the docheong become an “invisible” space (cf. Musil, 1986: 322).
The ACC, by giving groups in Gwangju a chance to debate the meaning of 5.18, also has
the potential to construct a more visible and meaningful narrative of memory for the
city and the country.
The  contention over the  renewed  emphasis  on Myeongdong  Cathedral’s
religious and cultural aspects is not so much at the site itself, but rather a wider conflict
regarding social concerns in Korea. The reframing of Myeongdong Cathedral’s meaning
away from its symbolism as a site of resistance is representative of a growing apathy
within the Catholic Church, as well as some parts of the Korean population, about both
past  struggles against  authoritarianism, and to present social  and political  issues,  as
economic growth and individual concern has taken prominence. However, at the same
time, many citizens continue to gather and protest (See Figure 15 on page 101). South
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Korea has often been touted as a role model for development because of its rapid shift
from poverty to economic and technological powerhouse in a matter of decades. But
the rapid shift came on the back of harsh authoritarianism and human rights abuses that
the populace fought  against  for  years.  In  the current political  and social  climate an
increasing number of people are referencing this past  in relation to what they term
Korea’s  deteriorating  democracy. Continuing  restlessness  in  Korean  society  and  the
ongoing involvement of religious figures in political movements is a clear sign that sites
like Myeongdong Cathedral,  despite the growing apathy in some sections  of  Korean
society, still hold great relevance today.
Figure 15: The so-called 'candlelight demonstrations.' Seoul. 10/06/08 (S.H. Yoo. In R.
Hauben, 2009).
The privileging of particular representations of the past not only helps to build
collective  understandings  of  memory  and  of  identity,  but, by  acting  as  a  form  of
legitimisation, can also marginalise individuals and groups whose interpretations of the
past may differ. Many in Korea now use history as a justification for demonstration and
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protest,  relating abuses  and injustices  in  the past  to  those of  today.  With  so many
different  interpretations  of  history  –  so  many ways  of  justifying  its  appropriation –
deciding  whose representations of the past  are  privileged in  Korea, as  everywhere,
becomes necessarily a contentious and political process.  However, having the chance to
make that decision – the chance to debate the various meanings that the past entails –
is a positive sign that democratic values are established in Korea. Sites of memory, like
the docheong and Myeongdong Cathedral, may be inherently contentious and political
places, but that contention at least indicates there is space within Korean society to
discuss ongoing concerns and to move into the future knowing that  various groups,
even marginalised groups, have a space to convey their voice. Thus, the fact that sites of
memory in Korea are so contentious and political is not a problem. Rather, problems
arise  with  non-contested  spaces.  When  the  past  is  no  longer  contested  and  when
important historical sites present a fixed meaning, or convey a singular narrative of the
past;  that  is  when  representations  of  the  past  become  silent  and  ‘invisible,’  and
particular past events, firmly set in history.
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Chapter Five – Epilogue: Back to the Future
“Man – Just  remember that  the  things  you put  into your  head are  there
forever, he said.  You might want to think about that.
Boy – You forget some things don't you?
Man – Yes. You forget what you want to remember and you remember what
you want to forget.”
Cormac McCarthy The Road (2006: 12).
“There is a secret bond between slowness and memory, between speed and
forgetting…a person who wants to forget a disagreeable incident he has just
lived through starts unconsciously to speed up his pace, as if he were trying
to distance himself from a thing still too close to him in time”
Milan Kundera Slowness (1995: 39).
The air is charged and electric, with bouts of thunder gaining in frequency as I
wait patiently outside the former docheong of South Jeolla in Gwangju. It is the 26th of
May, which means the summer monsoon season is just around the corner. For now,
though, I just have to deal with a dull pattering on the temporary tents above my head
as I  stand in line behind those paying their respects to the late Roh Moo-Hyun. The
memorial  image fastened to  the docheong wall  depicts  a  smiling  Roh  pulling  his
grandson through the countryside on a bicycle.  Above the image are the words Uri
Daetongryeong (Our  President).  Roh  Moo-Hyun  was  born  and  raised  in Gimhae, in
South Gyeongsang province in the southeast of Korea. Rather surprisingly, however, in
this  country  where  antagonisms  between  regions  often have functioned  as  a  great
concrete wall in the middle of the political and social landscape, the citizens of Gwangju
revere  him  as  one  of  their  own.  As  president,  Roh  took  an  interest  in  their often
neglected region, and the votes he received from Jeolla residents went a long way to
helping him win the 2002 presidential election.
As I approach the memorial altar – as the people in front of me form a group and
bow as one – a volunteer to my left breaks down and starts weeping. A sense of guilt
swells in the pit of my stomach that I am there more to see this aspect of Korean culture
rather than necessarily pay my respects. Despite my ulterior motives, however, and the
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fact that I have no connections to this man, the ceremony was one of the most moving
experiences I had in Korea.
Three days later, I woke up with the first rays of the sun to catch an early bus up
to Seoul to witness the main funeral. Images and discussions of Roh filled the television
screen for the entirety of the three hour drive. Meanwhile, as I  scanned the Korean
countryside  out of my  window,  vehicles  and groups  lined the sides  of  the  road  or
camped on the hillsides waiting to get their view of the hearse driving the length of the
country with Roh’s body. I couldn’t shake the feeling that it would overtake us at any
moment, almost as if we were racing him to his own funeral.
Central Seoul itself is packed to the brim. I often reflect, on how the image of the
man  could  change  so  drastically.  Roh  Moo-Hyun died a  broken  man. When his
presidency ended in 2008, he left the office dogged by accusations of incompetence and
the reality that under his leadership the general mood of the public had shifted from
progressive leanings back to conservatism.  Then,  after  facing bribery charges,  which
broke his formerly clean image, he was widely derided. In May 2009, Roh jumped to his
death off a cliff near his home, leaving a typed message on his computer screen stating
that his life had now become a burden on others.
But, as I waded through the 500,000 people lining Sejongno – a well-known and
busy street in downtown Seoul – and crammed into City Hall Plaza, it was clear that
Roh’s supporters had been given rein to express their emotions publicly again. Many of
those gathered were dressed in his campaign colour, yellow, some lifted standards to
the air, and a woman wailed next to my ear as the funeral cortege passed by. Standing
in front of City Hall, my arms burning on the radiant heat of the people jammed next to
me and my clothing wet with sweat not all my own, the crowd joined in as performers
on the stage started singing. As voices swelled around me to the lines of Achim Iseul
(Morning Dew) – a  famous Korean song widely known as  an  anthem used at  mass
gatherings – the emotion was palpable. Roh was loved once more.
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Figure 16: People gathered in front of City Hall for Roh Moo-Hyun's funeral. Seoul.
Photo: Thomas Vink, 29/05/09.
The reports in the days and weeks following Roh Moo-Hyun’s suicide generally
set aside his faults in order to preserve the memory of the former president. In fact,
Roh’s suicide became a vehicle for anti-Lee Myung-Bak propaganda, with some going so
far  as  to  blame  President  Lee,  through general  policies  and  pressure  on  Roh  via
prosecution that appeared politically motivated, for Roh’s death. A memorial service for
Roh at Myeongdong Cathedral was appropriated by the CPAJ in order to voice concerns
about  the  state  of  Korean  politics.  Others  predicted that because  of the  emotion
involved  and  its  timing  at  the  beginning  of  the  “summer  [protest]  season,” the
anniversary of Roh’s death would be an important day in the future for anti-government
protests.
October 2009 marked the 30th anniversary of former president Park Chung-Hee’s
death. While the truth regarding the human rights abuses and harsh authoritarianism of
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his regime is becoming more widely known every year, many Korean citizens now recall
Park with a sense of nostalgia. As Korea’s democratic presidents have failed to achieve
the level of economic growth set by the dictatorial leader, the collective memories of
Park Chung-Hee have shifted to create a more accommodating image of the former
President.91 Like  the  nostalgia  for  Roh  Moo-Hyun,  as  circumstances  change,  good
memories can come to override the negative: “In the sunset of dissolution, everything is
illuminated by the aura of nostalgia, even the guillotine” (Milan Kundera: 1984: 4). In
the 1990s, as Korean democracy became established, and former presidents Chun Doo-
Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo were put on trial for their roles in 5.18, the costs of Korea’s
rapid  development  gained  more  attention. Nevertheless,  in  more  recent  years  a
question is commonly asked of whether economic growth could have been achieved
with a more open and democratic system. Park’s leadership was dictatorial, however, it
also resulted in relatively even social and economic growth throughout Korean society
and brought almost  the whole  population out of  poverty in  a  matter  of  decades, a
unique achievement. The drive to develop in the 1970s has been described as a straight
line to which all else must bend: “If planners wanted to build a straight road and there
was a tree in the way…they moved the tree.” (Oppenheim, Robert, 2008: 48). But, that
dogmatic approach enabled Korea to, essentially, “make something out of nothing,” and
impressed  a  strong-minded work ethic  upon the Korean people  that  remains  today
(Kang Hyun-kyung, 2009).92
Under the rule of Chun Doo-Hwan, Korea’s economic growth remained strong,
yet  there  is  no  sign  of  any  such  reverence  for  Chun.  Park  Chung-Hee  was  widely
acknowledged as a modest and honest person, who was working for the good of the
91 Michael  Breen goes so far as to claim (2004:  255) that “Koreans are haunted by the ghost of Park
Chung-Hee” and Seungsook Moon (2009) states that Park has achieved a “phantasmagoric afterlife” as
images have shifted from “an antinational, fascist  dictator to that of a superhuman hero and national
savior.”
92 Choi Yearn-hong (2009),  too, claims that Park was a “necessary  evil  for the nation” and Seungsook
Moon states  (2009)  that  “the  nostalgic  memories  glorifying  Park  justify  his  authoritarian  rule  as  the
inevitable  condition  for  the  achievement  of  rapid  industrialisation  in  a  “less-developed”  country  like
Korea.”
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nation rather than for selfish ends.93 By the time Chun came into power, however, a new
generation of middle-class Koreans, who had grown up relatively free from poverty,
were becoming politically active and saw democracy, not only as a possibility, but as a
necessity. Furthermore, Chun was never able to eliminate the stigma attached to him as
a result of the brutality of 5.18: “The ghosts of murdered protestors haunted Chun Doo-
Hwan” (Breen, 2004: 216).
The changing images of Roh Moo-Hyun and Park Chung-Hee are representative
of a nostalgic view of the past, where “the absent/gone is valued as somehow better,
simpler,  less  fragmented,  more  comprehensible,  than  its  existent  alternative  in  the
present” (Hirsch & Spitzer, 2003: 82). As millions of Koreans lost their jobs in the 1997
financial crisis, the costs of Park’s regime, again, fell under the veneer of the economic
growth and wealth  generation  he had brought,  and  calls  for  a  Park  Chung-Hee-like
savior intensified. Nevertheless, while Park’s motives may have been genuine, the costs
of his regime were still  surprising and horrific. Thus, the nostalgic image of Park has
consequences. Yun Ch’oe and Mark Morris speculate (2010), for example, that speaking
of historical events with a sense of nostalgia is like “ignoring pains that have not yet
faded from the minds and the hearts of the Korean people, from all generations who
lived through these events. Their impact is still very much at the core of Korean society.”
As the images of significant figures, like Park Chung-Hee and Roh Moo-Hyun,
have changed following their  deaths, so to have the memories of Korea’s minjuhwa
undong after the movement ended. The achievement of democracy in Korea was built
on decades of dissent and a movement that came to incorporate a large proportion of
Korean society.  Following the successful  demonstrations  of  1987,  and most  notably,
with the advent of procedural democracy in the 1990s, the minjuhwa undong had finally
achieved its primary goal. Why, then, given that Korea has been a democratic country
93 For  example,  Kim Choongnam claims (2007)  that  Park  was  committed  to doing what  was  possible
(economic  development)  to  improve  the  nation,  rather  than  what  was  desirable  (democratic
development).  Park  was  apparently  disinterested in personal  luxuries  and wealth  and did not  accept
bribes;  an  image  that  Seungsook  Moon  (2009) terms  “a  thrifty,  modest  and  incorruptible  life
(Jeongnyeom Gyeolbaekhan Saenghwal).”
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for over 20 years now, do the streets still  continue to convulse at  times with mass
demonstrations?
The iron shackles are broken,
In the aloneness of freedom,
I long for your order of oppression.
I shall have no dreams;
I will not stop this business of
Bearing pain with dreams.
I will live from day to day without feeling
This life I cannot bear.
Kim Ji-ha, ‘The Aloneness of Freedom’ (In Robinson, 2005: 25).
Kim Ji-ha, a famous Korean poet, widely known for his  satirical criticism of the Park
Chung Hee government,94 writes above of the dissolution felt by many Koreans since the
achievement of democracy.  Around the minjuhwa undong large numbers of Koreans
formed a collective sense of identity and purpose. The loss of the “order of oppression”
that came with the achievement of democracy, though, “has created an identity crisis”
(Linda Lewis, 2000: 184). With the rise and fall of the minjung movement, and now with
a growing emphasis on multi-culturalism in Korea, more voices are represented than
ever before. A great contrast is evident within Korean society as a greater number of
citizens seek to move beyond the past while many others still appropriate past events
and reputations to demonstrate against present concerns.
Furthermore, the political terrain in Korea remains fractious. The ten-year period
of progressive politics under Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun was seen as a sign that
the social ideals fought after for so long were finally coming to fruition. Yet, many within
Korea’s new generation hold a conservative mind-set and are more concerned by un-
employment  and  competition  for  jobs  and  university  entrance  than  the  ideological
issues that were the focus of the 386 generation (Park Sun-Young, 2007). Immediately
following the term of President Roh (seen as the ultimate success of the liberal-minded
386 generation) the conservative Lee Myung-Bak was elected and the Korean populace
overwhelmingly declared their interest in economic growth and higher salaries.
94 In 1976 he was sentenced to life imprisonment because of this, but was later pardoned.
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In  2005,  under  Roh’s  presidency,  the  Korean  Truth  and  Reconciliation
Commission was formed to uncover the truth behind past events and help the country
reconcile with the past. Dr. Kim Sung-Soo, the head of the International Cooperation
Team at the Commission and one of their key translators, was one of my first contacts in
Korea, and he was a great help to me during my stay there. In the final weeks of writing
my  thesis  I  received  emails  from  Kim  discussing  concerns  within  the  Commission.
President  Lee Myung-Bak  made it  clear  that  the  Commission's  mandate  will  not  be
renewed  when  it  expires  at  the  end  of  March  2010.  In  December  2009,  a  new
Commission president, Lee Young-Jo, an academic known for his past association with
the New Right  Union, was selected with government backing (McDonald, 2010).  Lee
Young-Jo has banned the distribution of a new report by the Commission regarding their
historical findings on the grounds that it has “translation errors.” Kim Sung-Soo believes
this ban is an attempt to get rid of a perceived left-wing bias within the Commission.
Now that the Commission’s term is running out, Kim is concerned about work that is yet
to be done, and that the conservative administration will override much of the work
already completed and the recommendations the Commission has made.
In Gwangju, while the conflict at the docheong is essentially over, the future of
the byeolgwan, and of whose narratives of 5.18 are emphasised more generally in the
city, remains uncertain. In the days before I left Gwangju in late May 2009, I was told of
a new plan suggested by the 5.18 associations, that the government could incorporate
the byeolgwan as an entrance to the ACC complex (Park and Katsiaficas, Pers. Comm.
27/05/09). I saw this as a sign that the conflict at the docheong was finally coming to a
resolution. By August 2009, the 5.18 associations had given up their protests and
entrusted the “Commission of Civil Organisations” (Simin Daechaek Wiwonhoe), a group
of labor organisations and labor party activists, to negotiate with the government (Park
Hae-Gwang, Pers. Comm. 12/08/09).  By February 2010, as I finish this thesis, the future
of the byeolgwan, though, remains unclear. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism agreed,
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in principle, to preserve as much of the building as possible. However, the byeolgwan is
in such disrepair that part of it may have to be demolished anyway to keep its integrity.
The opening of the ACC has now been delayed until 2014, two years behind schedule
(Mr. Ryu, Pers. Comm. 16/02/09).
At Myeongdong Cathedral, renovations to emphasise the site as a historical
treasure have now been completed, and the situation remains the same: the Catholic
Church continue to emphasise the religious and cultural aspects of the cathedral.
Perhaps, though, there are other sites ready to take up the role that Myeongdong
Cathedral, at the behest of officials in the Catholic Church, is leaving behind. Buddhist
Koreans are showing an increasing ambivalence towards the government, as Protestant
president, Lee Myung-Bak, shows apparent disrespect and discrimination towards the
Buddhist faith (Do Je-hae, 2010). A number of monks, for example, played a vocal and
visible role in the candlelight protests of 2008, and on the 16th of June 2009, the
Hankyoreh reported that “some 1400 Buddhist monks have joined the declaration
movement [for the ‘restoration’ of democracy in South Korea].” Six of the leaders that
took part in the 2008 candlelight protests later sought refuge in Jogye Temple, in central
Seoul (Kim Rahn, 2008). Like Myeongdong Cathedral, Jogye Temple offers a rare
sanctuary in the middle of Seoul, in that, as a religious site, police can not enter the
grounds. Apparently, some individuals in Korea still see a need for a ‘sanctuary’ or a ‘site
of resistance,’ whether Myeongdong Cathedral continues to provide it or not.
As I finish this chapter I realise that I first arrived in Korea to begin my fieldwork
almost a year ago to the day.  In  that year memories of the past have continued to
resonate across Korean society. Roh Moo-Hyun’s suicide came in between the deaths of
two of  the most  important  figures  in  the history  of  Korea’s  democracy  movement:
former Cardinal, Kim Sou-Hwan, in February, and former President, Kim Dae-Jung, in
August. What’s more, with the full effects of the global financial crisis still unclear and
the current president, Lee Myung-Bak, continuing to fall short of his election promises
to improve South Korea’s economy, nostalgia for another deceased former President,
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Park Chung-Hee, and the rapid economic growth he brought remains strong.
Despite  the  evidence  of  growing  apathy  amongst  sections  of  Korean  society
towards the nation’s troubled past and towards present socio-political concerns, the
candlelight  demonstrations  of  2008,  and  the  apparent  ‘deterioration  of  democracy’
occurring since Lee took over the presidency, highlight that political concerns can still
bring  people  out  to  protest  in  Korea en  masse. The  issues  at  the  Truth  and
Reconciliation Commission, too, still ongoing as I print off this thesis, are a clear sign of
the  ongoing  contestation  over  interpretations  of  memory  in  Korea;  the politics  of
collective  remembering  are  still  controversial  and  relevant.  Indeed,  remembering  or
forgetting  a  particular  aspect  of  the  past  is  at  the  core  of,  not  only  collective
understandings of Korean identity, but of given representations of identity throughout
the world. The past is never dead, rather, its meaning is forever shifting; Korea, and the
ongoing contention over how its past is represented and remembered, is emblematic of
this change.
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Appendix Two: Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form for
‘Organisational Representatives’
Participant Information Sheet for Research on Representations of Pro-Democracy
Movements in South Korea in the 1980s
1980 representations
Researcher:  Thomas Vink – School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences,
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
: - , ,
:
I  am a Masters student in  Development Studies at Victoria University of Wellington,
New Zealand.  As part of this degree I am undertaking research that will lead to a thesis.
This research looks at how a number of different sites of memory in South Korea related
to pro-democracy movements, and their suppression, in the 1980s, are currently being
represented  and  reinterpreted.   It  is  intended  that  this  research  will  contribute  to
further understanding about how South Korea’s past is affecting its future and bring
insights  to  how  important  events  can  be  interpreted  to  meet  different  ends.   The
university  requires  that  ethics  approval  be  obtained  for  research  involving  human
participants.
.
.
1980
.
,
.
.
I am carrying out interviews with people who have visited these sites to find out why
they visit and what meaning the site(s) hold for them.  I am also interviewing people
who have done research related to the suppression of pro-democracy movements in
1980s South Korea and how the memory of this suppression is represented.
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. 1980
.
Some of  the  interview questions  deal  with  sensitive  issues  and you may decline  to
answer  any  question  without  having  to  give  reasons.  Should  you  feel  the  need  to
postpone or end the interview you may do so without question at any stage.  Likewise if,
for any reason, you decide after the completion of the interview that you do not want
any of the information given to be used, let me know and I will destroy it or return it to
you.
. ,
. ,
,
.
The interview will take approximately … minutes and will be one-off, unless we agree at
the time that a follow up interview would be beneficial.
___ . ,
.
Interview responses will provide specific insights that will be combined with my observational
and  literature  research  to  form  the  basis  of  my  thesis.   This  interview will  follow a  semi-
structured format and will be tape recorded unless otherwise requested.  You may request that
any  information  you  provide,  including  interview  notes  and  tape  recordings,  will  be  kept
confidential.  If this is the case personal pseudonyms will be used for all identifiable information.
You may choose the pseudonyms.  You may also request to see my interview notes at the
completion of the interview.  No other person beside my supervisor, Dr Stephen Epstein, and
myself will see the interview notes or hear the tape recordings.  Notes will be destroyed, and
tape recordings wiped, two years following the completion of my thesis.  Interview transcripts
will also be destroyed unless you request that they be returned to you.
. ( )
, .
. ,
.
. ,
.
.
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2 .
.
The thesis will be submitted for marking to the School of Geography, Environment and
Earth Sciences and deposited in the University Library. A summary of the thesis may be
presented at academic or professional conferences and it is intended that one or more
articles will be submitted for publication in scholarly journals. In addition, an executive
summary will be produced and be made available to all participants.
If  you  have  any  questions  or  would  like  to  receive  further  information  about  my
research, please contact me on my cellphone (010-2233-4232); at my home address (Ka-
320, Hanil Village, 275-11 Seongsan-I-Dong, Mapo-gu, Seoul); or from the 3 rd of June at
my  postal  address  in  New  Zealand  (PO  Box  29052,  Ngaio,  Wellington  6043,  New
Zealand), phone (+640210642689), email (vinkthom@gmail.com).  You can contact my
supervisor, Dr Stephen Epstein, at the Asian Studies Institute, School of Languages and
Cultures, Humanities and Social Sciences at Victoria University, P O Box 600, Wellington
6140, New Zealand, phone: +6444635703, email: Stephen.Epstein@vuw.ac.nz.
Thomas Vink Signed:
,
.
.
,
.
, .
010-2233-4243
1 275-11 320 . 2009
6 3 .
PO  Box  29052,  Ngaio,  Wellington  6043,  New  Zealand
+640210642689, vinkthom@gmail.com .
P.O. Box 600, Wellington 6140, New Zealand, : +6444635703,
Stephen.Epstein@vuw.ac.nz. .
: _________________________
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Consent to Participation in Research on Representations of Pro-Democracy
Movements in South Korea in the 1980s
1980 representations
[Please tick the appropriate box] V .
“I  have  been  given  and  have  understood  an  explanation  of  this
research project. I have had an opportunity to ask questions and have
them answered to my satisfaction.”
“
.
.”
“I understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have
provided)  from this  project  (before  data  collection  and  analysis  is
complete)  without having to give reasons or without penalty of any
sort.”
“ ,
.”
“I  understand that  if  I  withdraw from the project,  any data I  have
provided will be destroyed.”
“
.”
“I understand that two years following the completion of the thesis
the information obtained will be destroyed.”
“ 2
.”
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes No
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“I understand that the information I have provided will be used only
for  this  research  project  and  academic  articles/conference
presentations arising from it, and that any further use will require my
written consent.”
“
,
.”
“I have been given the opportunity to request that specific responses
 be  kept  confidential  or  not  used.   If  I have  made  requests  for
information not to be used, I consent to the information or opinions
being  attributed  to  me  using  the  following  pseudonym,
_______________________________.”
“
. ,
, _____________
.”
“I would like to receive an executive summary of this research when it
is completed.”
“ .”
“I (name of participant) _________________________ agree to this
interview and to take part in this research”
“ ( ) _____________________ /
.”
Signed ( ):  ______________________________
Date ( ):  ______________
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes No
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Appendix Three: Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form for ‘Site
Visitors’
1980년대 민주화 운동의 representations에 대한 조사연구를 위한 참여 설명
서
Participant Information Sheet for Research on Representations of Pro-Democracy
Movements in South Korea in the 1980s
Researcher:   Thomas  Vink  –  School  of  Geography,  Environment  and Earth  Sciences,
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
: - , ,
:
I  am a Masters student in  Development Studies at Victoria University of Wellington,
New Zealand.  As part of this degree I am undertaking research that will lead to a thesis.
This research looks at how a number of different sites of memory in South Korea related
to pro-democracy movements, and their suppression, in the 1980s, are currently being
represented  and  reinterpreted.   It  is  intended  that  this  research  will  contribute  to
further understanding about how South Korea’s past is affecting its future and bring
insights  to  how  important  events  can  be  interpreted  to  meet  different  ends.   The
university  requires  that  ethics  approval  be  obtained  for  research  involving  human
participants.
.
.
1980
.
,
.
.
I am carrying out interviews with people who have visited these sites to find out why
they visit and what meaning the site(s) hold for them.  I am also interviewing people
who have done research related to the suppression of pro-democracy movements in
1980s South Korea and how the memory of this suppression is represented.
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. 1980
.
Some of  the  interview questions  deal  with  sensitive  issues  and you may decline  to
answer  any  question  without  having  to  give  reasons.  Should  you  feel  the  need  to
postpone or end the interview you may do so without question at any stage.  Likewise if,
for any reason, you decide after the completion of the interview that you do not want
any of the information given to be used, let me know and I will destroy it or return it to
you.
. ,
. ,
,
.
The interview will take approximately … minutes and will be one-off, unless we agree at
the time that a follow up interview would be beneficial.
___ . ,
.
Interview  responses  will  provide  specific  insights  that  will  be  combined  with  my
observational and literature research to form the basis of my thesis.  This interview will
follow an informal format and be strictly confidential.  Any information you provide will
not be able to be traced back to you and interview notes will be kept confidential. No
other  person  beside  my  supervisor,  Dr  Stephen  Epstein,  and  myself  will  see  the
interview notes.   Notes will  be destroyed two years following the completion of my
thesis.
.
.
.
.
2 .
The thesis will be submitted for marking to the School of Geography, Environment and
Earth Sciences and deposited in the University Library. A summary of the thesis may be
presented at academic or professional conferences and it is intended that one or more
articles will be submitted for publication in scholarly journals. In addition, an executive
summary will be produced and be made available to all participants.
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If  you  have  any  questions  or  would  like  to  receive  further  information  about  my
research, please contact me on my cellphone (010-2233-4232); at my home address (Ka-
320, Hanil Village, 275-11 Seongsan-I-Dong, Mapo-gu, Seoul); or from the 3 rd of June at
my  postal  address  in  New  Zealand  (PO  Box  29052,  Ngaio,  Wellington  6043,  New
Zealand), phone (+640210642689), email (vinkthom@gmail.com).  You can contact my
supervisor, Dr Stephen Epstein, at the Asian Studies Institute, School of Languages and
Cultures, Humanities and Social Sciences at Victoria University, P O Box 600, Wellington
6140, New Zealand, phone: +6444635703, email: Stephen.Epstein@vuw.ac.nz.
Thomas Vink Signed:
,
.
. ,
.
, .
010-2233-4243
1 275-11 320 . 2009
6 3 .
PO  Box  29052,  Ngaio,  Wellington  6043,  New  Zealand
+640210642689, vinkthom@gmail.com .
P.O. Box 600, Wellington 6140, New Zealand, : +6444635703,
Stephen.Epstein@vuw.ac.nz. .
: _________________________
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Consent to Participation in Research on Representations of Pro-Democracy
Movements in South Korea in the 1980s
1980 representations
[Please tick the appropriate box] V .
“I  have  been  given  and  have  understood  an  explanation  of  this
research project. I have had an opportunity to ask questions and have
them answered to my satisfaction.”
“ .
.”
“I understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have
provided)  from this  project  (before  data  collection  and  analysis  is
complete)  without having to give reasons or without penalty of any
sort.”
 “
.”
“I  understand that  if  I  withdraw from the project,  any data I  have
provided will be destroyed.”
“
.”
“I understand that two years following the completion of the thesis
the information obtained will be destroyed.”
“ 2
. “
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes No
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“I understand that the information I have provided will be used only
for  this  research  project  and  academic  articles/conference
presentations arising from it, and that any further use will require my
written consent.”
“
.”
“I understand that all responses will be strictly confidential and any
information used will not be able to be attributed to me in any way.”
“
.”
“I would like to receive an executive summary of this research when it
is completed.”
“ .”
“I (name of participant) _________________________ agree to this
interview and to take part in this research”
“ ( ) _____________________ /
. “
Signed( ):  ______________________________ Date( ):  ______________
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes No
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